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ABSTRACT
Information and Labor Markets in the Philippines
by
Emily A. Beam
Co-Chairs: Jeffrey Smith and Dean Yang
This dissertation explores barriers to job-search and labor migration in the Philippines. In
my first chapter, I test the impact of factual information and experience attending a job fair
on individuals’ job-search processes and labor-market outcomes through a field experiment I
conduct in the rural Philippines. Assignment to a voucher to encourage job-fair attendance
more than doubles the likelihood of looking for work in Manila in the two months following
the fair and increases formal sector employment ten months after the fair by 38 percent.
Direct provision of information about average wages or minimum qualifications for overseas
work does not affect individuals’ decisions to look for work overseas, though it does affect
their beliefs in predictable ways. These results indicate that a relatively modest increase
in labor-market exposure, such as that obtained from attending a job fair, can have lasting
effects on individuals’ job-search effort and employment outcomes.
The second chapter uses this same field experiment to explore how individuals self-select
into job search for overseas work. I examine the impact of a randomized one-time incentive
to initiate job search on this selection. Subsidizing job-fair attendance reduces otherwise
positive selection among those who attend the job-fair without the subsidy. While many
xiii
attendees then self-select out of participating, voucher assignment increases the attendance
rates for those with a high degree of uncertainty about their own labor market prospects,
indicating that imperfect information about the returns to participation affects individuals’
search decisions.
My third chapter, joint with David McKenzie and Dean Yang, presents results from a field
experiment to test the impact of reducing informational and bureaucratic barriers on indi-
viduals’ ability to migrate overseas. We find that removal of these barriers leads individuals
to take steps towards international migration, with passport assistance even leading to a
higher rate of job interviews and job offers abroad. None of our treatments generate a sig-
nificant increase in the likelihood of migrating abroad. We explore different explanations




Incomplete Information in Job Search: Evidence from a
Field Experiment in the Philippines
1.1 Introduction
Information is fundamental to how individuals decide when and where to search for work.
I conduct a field experiment that randomly varies information and job-search experience in
order to test the impact of information on these job-search behaviors. Improving information
has been an important aspect of governments’ efforts to promote employment in both devel-
oped and developing countries, as evidenced by the range of programs that provide potential
job seekers with labor market information, job-search assistance, or training in how to search
for work (Betcherman, Olivas and Dar, 2004).
Although standard dynamic job-search models assume that individuals have complete in-
formation about wages and their likelihood of finding work (Pissarides, 2000), a growing
literature considers the impact of incomplete information on job-search decisions.1 However,
1Rothschild (1974) develops a general theory of individuals searching with unknown price distributions
and demonstrates the existence of reservation wages. Burdett and Vishwanath (1988) extend his model into
the context of job search, finding that incomplete information about the wage offer distribution results in
reservation wages that fall with unemployment duration. Both Gonzalez and Shi (2010) and Falk, Huffman
and Sunde (2006a) model this uncertainty in the context of individual ability, building models in which
individuals redirect their search as they update beliefs about their own ability based on past job-search
outcomes.
1
the degree to which individuals lack information about wages or their likelihood of obtaining
a job offer, and how individuals learn about the returns to search, remain open empirical
questions. Laboratory evidence by Falk, Huffman and Sunde (2006b) indicates that bad
job-search outcomes may lead individuals to adjust downward their expectations of their
own qualifications and search less. Böheim, Hovarth and Winter-Ebmer (2011) find evidence
that displaced workers with high firm-specific wage components in their previous jobs have
higher reservation wages and, as a result, longer unemployment durations.2 These two pa-
pers suggest a potential role for information and feedback, but the impact of information
provision in actual job search has not been quantified.3
I examine the role of incomplete information on search decisions by testing the impact of
factual information and job-search experience on individuals’ job-search and labor-market
trajectories. I do so in the context of the overseas labor market in the rural Philippines, in
which potential job seekers have particularly limited access to jobs abroad but high poten-
tial returns.4 I overcome potential endogeneity in individuals’ information sets and search
decisions by implementing a randomized field experiment, enabling me to identify the causal
impact of reducing incomplete information along two separate dimensions - minimum quali-
fications and average wages - as well as the causal impact of providing job-search experience.
I conduct a baseline survey and assign individuals from randomly selected neighborhoods to
a control group or to receive one of two types of information: a flier about average overseas
wages or a tailored information treatment about the minimum qualifications for overseas
work. If individuals underestimate overseas wages, as McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2013)
2They interpret this result as evidence that workers are overconfident in their own ability as a result of
having high-paying jobs.
3In education, researchers find that individuals invest more in human capital when they learn about
higher than expected returns through direct information provision (Jensen, 2010; Nguyen, 2008) or the
expansion of labor market opportunities (Oster and Millett, 2011).
4Rural Filipinos also may increase their incomes by working in the capital of Manila, but information
barriers are likely to be less substantial, as 39 percent of survey respondents previously had worked in
Manila. Additionally, wages are much lower in the capital than than abroad. At P439 (US$10.03), average
daily wages of wage and salary workers in the National Capital Region (metro Manila) are nearly twice
as high as those in the Bicol Region, where this study takes place (BLES 2011). By comparison, overseas
Filipinos earn P28,500 (US$651.16) monthly on average.
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find in Tonga, wage information may induce individuals to take steps to find work overseas.
Because jobs are arranged prior to departure and because search is costly, an important
margin by which a person decides to search may be her perceived likelihood of being offered
a job abroad. The qualification information treatment provides minimum education and
experience requirements for common overseas positions based on 23,910 online job postings,
enabling individuals to update their beliefs about their own propensities of finding work
overseas.
Additionally, I use an encouragement design to randomly induce attendance at a job fair
by offering individuals a restaurant gift certificate for attending. Job fairs may provide
attendees with labor market information and experience looking for work, and they are one
of the primary ways in which the Philippine government makes it easier for provincial job
seekers to find work. Job-fair attendance may affect individuals’ decisions to apply for work
abroad, though the impacts may extend into the domestic labor market as well, particularly if
the experience they gain is generalizable. I measure the impact of the information treatments
on job-fair attendance by linking baseline survey data with job-fair administrative data, and
I conduct a follow-up survey ten months after the job fair to measure the impact of job-fair
attendance on the intensity and direction of individuals’ search effort, as well as on their
employment outcomes.
The two factual information treatments target incomplete information about wages and the
likelihood of receiving a job offer for overseas work. I measure individuals’ perceptions about
the overseas labor market at baseline and in the follow-up survey. In contrast to McKenzie,
Gibson and Stillman (2013), I find that individuals have reasonably accurate perceptions
about overseas wages.5 Additionally, they have accurate perceptions about the minimum
educational requirements for overseas work, although they underestimate the minimum ex-
perience requirements. Information about average overseas wages raises individuals’ expec-
5McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman (2013) find that non-migrants in Tonga report average overseas New
Zealand wages that are 72 percent of the actual average. In this study, likeliest wage respondents report
they could earn overseas is 93 percent of the intervention mean.
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tations about what they could earn abroad, but it does not induce them to look for work
abroad. Information about minimum qualifications for overseas work modestly increases
respondents’ accuracy about the minimum experience requirements, but it does not affect
their likelihood of looking for work overseas, which remains low for all treatment groups.
Attending the job fair does not affect individuals’ likelihood of migrating abroad, nor their
likelihood of taking steps to migrate abroad. However, it has large and persistent impacts
on individuals’ later job-search effort, though only within the domestic labor market. Using
a retrospective panel of job-search behavior, I find that voucher assignment changes where
individuals look for work. Voucher assignment more than doubles the likelihood of looking for
work in Manila, where job opportunities are more plentiful and wages are higher, in the two
months following the job fair, increasing it by 2.1 percentage points compared with a mean
rate of 1.6 percent among the control group. Voucher assignment reduces the likelihood of
looking for work within the province by 2.3 percentage points, compared with a control group
mean rate of 4.3 percent. I estimate local average treatment effects using voucher assignment
as an instrument for attendance, and I find that attendance increases the likelihood of
looking for work in Manila by 5.7 percentage points and reduces the likelihood of looking for
work within the province by 6.4 percentage points. These results are robust to alternative
specifications over the ten months following the fair.
Additionally, voucher assignment increases the likelihood of being employed in the formal
sector by 4.7 percentage points, a 38 percent increase compared with a mean rate of 12.4
percent among the control group, which is offset by a reduction in self-employment. This
large effect suggests that job-fair attendance not only affects where individuals search for
work, but that it also may affect search efficacy.
I adjust for multiple comparisons by computing average effect sizes, following Katz, Kling and
Liebman (2007), as well as by adjusting outcome-specific p-values to control for the family-
wise error rate (FWER) and false discovery rate (FDR). I find strong evidence that the
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voucher treatment results in an overall shift to search in Manila and to an increase in formal
and informal sector employment. In terms of specific outcomes, the employment results
remain robust to controlling for the FWER and FDR, although the impact on job search are
just shy of significance at conventional levels after controlling for the FDR, indicating that
some caution should be used when interpreting those individual outcomes.
The characteristics of those affected by job-fair attendance can indicate the potential rel-
evance of each of these channels and also lend insight into the populations for which the
gains of attendance are greatest. I find that those without formal job-search experience
as well as those with work history in Manila change how they search, indicating that the
fair may provide information or behavioral “nudge” into search (Paserman, 2008; DellaVigna
and Paserman, 2005). Additionally, the increase in formal sector employment is concen-
trated among those with at least some prior job-search experience or work history in Manila,
although those with formal job-search experience do not change their likelihood of search,
suggesting that attending the fair may instead improve the effectiveness of their search effort.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it provides empirical evidence on how
incomplete information affects individuals’ decisions to look for work abroad. I find that
although factual information does affect individuals’ perceptions, individuals initially have
reasonably accurate information about average wages and minimum qualifications for over-
seas work. Additional information does not lead them to change their investment in the
overseas labor market, which suggests that other barriers, such as high search costs, risk
aversion, or imperfect information on other dimensions, should be considered when assessing
why more people do not look for work overseas.
Secondly, this paper serves as the first study, to my knowledge, of the impact of job fairs.
I find that increasing access to fairs is ineffective in terms of direct impacts, as individuals
induced to attend are no more likely to migrate or to take steps to migrate. However, I find
that the relatively modest experience of attending a job fair does have persistent labor-market
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impacts domestically, affecting where individuals look for work as well as their employment
outcomes. For policymakers, these results imply that providing information or expanding
access to job fairs will not be sufficient to encourage overseas migration. However, real-world
exposure to the job-search process can be an important way for individuals to learn about
their own returns to search or to improve their search ability, which can affect how they look
for work and their employment outcomes.
The next section provides additional background on overseas migration, job fairs, and the
setting of this study. Section 1.3 describes my experimental design, and Section 1.4 describes
the data. I present results on the impacts of information and job-search experience on
migration steps, job-search effort, and employment in Section 2.4, and I discuss the role of
the factual information treatments and potential channels of job-fair attendance in Section
2.5. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Study location
I conduct this study in the municipality of Bulan in Sorsogon Province, located on the south-
ern tip of the main island of Luzon, 12 hours from Manila by bus. Sorsogon is a relatively
poor and isolated province: approximately 43 percent of families live below the poverty line
of US$300 per year, making it the 21st poorest out of 79 provinces (National Statistical
Coordination Board, 2006).6 With 92,000 residents, Bulan is the largest municipality in Sor-
sogon Province after the province’s capital city (National Statistics Office, 2007). It has a
centralized downtown as well as far-removed rural areas. The average education level is high
- 75 percent of my sample has completed at least high school - such that a substantial share
of the population may be qualified for overseas work, but there is also substantial diversity
6The poverty line is set separately for urban and rural areas by province to reflect the minimum income
required to meet a family’s basic needs.
6
in income and education levels. The local labor market is oversupplied with workers, and
a large share of workers travel to urban areas, primarily Manila, to look for work. In my
sample, 39 percent of respondents have worked in Manila in the past.
1.2.2 Overseas migration
The overseas labor market in the Philippines is large, formal, and highly regulated. The
Philippines sends an average of 1.7 million new workers overseas each year (Commission
on Filipinos Overseas, 2009), and 94 percent of new contracts are signed with recruitment
agencies, which tend to cluster in major urban areas like Manila or Cebu (Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, 2011). Consequently, the benefits of migration have been more
difficult to access for rural Filipinos, who have higher informational and financial search
costs than their urban counterparts. In the municipality of Bulan, most applicants for
overseas work travel to Manila, where there are hundreds of licensed agencies.7 Consequently,
although 25 percent of my sample is interested and 72 percent have at least some interest in
working abroad at baseline, only 28 percent have applied for overseas work before.
Job fairs and similar recruitment activities are the main way in which local institutions aim
to make overseas employment more accessible to residents living outside major urban areas.
At these fairs, recruitment agencies collect applications and conduct preliminary interviews
with applicants. Agencies invite qualified applicants to complete the process by visiting
their offices in person, usually for a final interview with the employer and documentation
processing. Governmental or educational institutions sponsor more than than 400 job fairs
per year nationally, and in Sorsogon Province, larger municipalities like Bulan hold job
fairs or smaller scale recruitment activities approximately once a year.8 Despite the relative
frequency of fairs, only 14 percent of respondents in my sample had ever attended a job fair
7There are no overseas recruitment agencies within Sorsogon Province
8In Bulan, there had not been an actual job fair in several years, but the municipality had held smaller-




Although the Filipino overseas labor market is in many ways unique, the decision to look
for work abroad may be similar to the decision to search in other labor markets, particularly
those in which applicants face costly search and have limited information about opportu-
nities, wages, or their chances of finding work.9 Specifically, the overseas market is largely
formal and highly regulated, with jobs secured prior to migrating. Contracts typically last
two years, and while workers can renew them multiple times, they rarely result in permanent
migration. In this way, job-search decisions in the Philippine overseas labor market bears a




My sample frame consists of 96 neighborhoods from 17 barangays in the municipality of
Bulan, Sorsogon Province. The barangay can be thought of as a village or, in more ur-
ban settings, a municipal district, and it serves as the smallest administrative unit in the
Philippines.10 Each barangay is composed of between three and ten formally defined neigh-
borhoods.11 The frame of neighborhoods is non-randomly selected to target those who are
most likely to be qualified for overseas work. I select all ten barangays that are either clas-
sified as urban by the Philippine National Statistics Office or that are located in the central
downtown areas. I randomly draw the remaining seven barangays from the remaining 53
9Also, search tends to be lumpy: visiting Manila to look for work abroad requires a substantial amount
of time and possibly money, and search at a job fair, while less costly, still requires a substantial time
investment.
10With an overall population of 92,000, Bulan has 63 barangays and an average of 1,500 residents in each
(National Statistics Office, 2007).
11Neighborhoods, or puroks, are political subdivisions of each barangay. Figure 1.A.4 depicts the neigh-
borhood and barangay boundaries for one urban and one rural barangay in my sample.
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rural and outlying barangays. This results in 107 neighborhoods across 17 barangays, of
which I randomly select 96 to form the sample area.12
I select respondents from household rosters provided by each barangay office, which include
the name, age, and gender of each barangay resident, by household. Because the overseas
labor market is highly segregated by gender, I target an equal number of men and women
from each barangay. I randomly select from each neighborhood five households with at least
one potential male respondent aged 20-35 and five households with at least one potential
female respondent aged 20-35.13 Upon finding a respondent, enumerators administer a brief
screening questionnaire to confirm the respondent’s eligibility. They verify that he is aged
20-35 at the time of the baseline survey. In addition, he must have a cell phone number and
no prior experience working abroad.14 When a target respondent cannot be interviewed due
to ineligibility, out-migration, or refusal, the enumerator attempts to interview the next listed
respondent of the same gender within that household. After two visits, if a household has no
eligible members, its members cannot be located, or all potentially eligible members refuse
to participate, the enumerator interviews the next randomly selected household. Overall,
I obtain a response rate of 53 percent.15 Using this procedure, I generate a sample of 865
respondents, though I restrict my analysis to the sample of 862 respondents for whom I am
not missing data on key covariates. This number is less than the targeted sample due to
high levels of out-migration and time constraints.16
12I originally select 99 barangays to target 990 respondents, but one selected neighborhood was inaccessible
and rosters were not available for two others.
13A given household could therefore be in both the male and female sample. For households with multiple
respondents of the same gender, I randomly order potentially eligible respondents, and enumerators attempt
to survey the first randomly selected respondent.
14The screening questionnaire was required because information on cell phone ownership and overseas
work experience was not included in the barangay rosters. Survey logs indicate that only five percent of
contacted individuals were not eligible for the survey.
15Of surveys not completed, approximately six percent were refusals.
16There was not enough time to replace all targeted households that could not be contacted initially
before the March job fair. The schedule was further constrained by a volcanic eruption in mid-February that
halted operations for several days.
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1.3.2 Randomization
Because respondents may have strong social networks in their nearby communities, I ran-
domize information and voucher treatment assignment at the neighborhood level to reduce
contamination from information spillovers.17 To increase power, I randomize within eleven
stratification cells of nine neighborhoods each, based on neighborhood density and distance
from the location of the job fair.18 This method minimizes the likelihood of an unbalanced
sample due to spurious correlations (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009). I randomly assign one-
third of neighborhoods to the control group, one-third to receive information about overseas
wages, and one-third to receive tailored information about minimum qualifications for over-
seas work. Additionally, I cross-randomize these information treatments with a direct incen-
tive to attend the job fair; because of budget constraints, only one-third of neighborhoods
are assigned to receive the incentive.19
1.3.3 Informational interventions
The wage information treatment consists of a flier that compares the average earnings of
overseas Filipino workers with the average reported income of families in Sorsogon Province.20
Wage data for OFWs is taken from a POEA dataset of all new overseas contracts from
2008-2009 (McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang, forthcoming). Data on income for Sorsogon
families comes from a survey of approximately 5,000 households across the province in other
municipalities (Beam, McKenzie and Yang, 2013). In addition to giving the flier to the
17Baseline results confirm that most spillovers are likely to occur within the neighborhood unit. Overall,
87 percent of those friends whom respondents see every day live within the same barangay, and 62 percent
live within the same neighborhood.
18I calculate population density by dividing the population of each neighborhood listed on the provided
rosters by the approximate area of each neighborhood, using barangay maps and satellite imagery. I then
divide neighborhoods into terciles based on population density, and I sort them by distance to the job fair
within each tercile. I generate blocks of nine neighborhoods with similar population densities and distance
based on that sorting and randomize within each block.
19The assignment distribution and realized sample size is shown in Appendix Table 1.A.2.
20 See Appendix 1.B.
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respondent, the enumerators read a short script describing the information it contains.21
The qualification information treatment consists of information about the minimum educa-
tional and experience requirements for overseas positions. This information is tailored to
respondents’ own characteristics in order to maximize its relevance and potential impact.22
Using the popular job-finding website workabroad.ph, I collect data on 23,910 job postings
representing 228,914 total vacancies for temporary overseas work. Most employers explicitly
restrict applications to only one gender, so I calculate separately the distribution of minimum
education level and minimum years of experience for the most common overseas positions
for men and women.23 I use this data to generate a set of occupational cards that describe
the distribution of minimum requirements for these positions.24 To increase the relevance
of the qualification information, respondents pick the two positions they are most interested
in learning about,25 and then the enumerators pick two more “best fit” positions by gender
from the remaining choices, using a simple scoring rubric. Enumerators read a script that
describes the four selected cards. The respondent receives a flier with the qualifications for
the best-matched position out of the four shared cards, based on the rubric.
21The wage information treatment is similar in spirit to those of Jensen (2010) and Nguyen (2008), who
use field experiments to measure the impact of providing information about the returns to education on
education completion and performance.
22Wage information was not tailored for simplicity of implementation. While an average wage seemed
relatively interpretable, an overall average qualification level did not. A large literature in public health finds
tailored information can be more effective than general information in influencing individuals’ behaviors. See
Kreuter and Strecher (1996) for an example in health risk appraisal and Noar, Benac and Harris (2007) for
a meta-analysis of a variety of printed health interventions.
23For men, the eight positions are (in order) factory workers, skilled tradesmen, general laborers and
construction workers, waiters and food service workers, heavy equipment operators, technicians, cooks and
assistants, and janitors and cleaners. For women, the ten positions (in order) are domestic helpers, factory
workers, caregivers/caretakers, housekeepers and cleaners, waiters and food service workers, salespersons
and assistants, cooks and assistants, receptionists, hairdressers, and sewers. I exclude nurses, which ranks
in the top ten but has complicated licensing and certification requirements.
241.B provides sample cards and scripts used in this information treatment. When the same occupation is
included for both men and women, I create different cards, as the minimum requirements are often different.
25Although the cards are separated by gender, respondents can select any occupation, and the list and
cards do not indicate which gender is dominant for each position.
11
1.3.4 Encouragement design
To generate exogenous variation in the likelihood of job-fair attendance, I assign respondents
in randomly selected neighborhoods (one-third) to receive a voucher that can be exchanged
for a gift certificate worth P150 (US$3.42, roughly the cost of a dinner for a family of four)
to Jollibee, a popular fast-food chain restaurant, which has a location in the central business
district.26 Respondents must pick up the gift certificates in person at the job fair, and they
can only do so during the two days of the job fair. To avoid confounding the encouragement
of the incentive with an informational component, members of both the voucher treatment
and control groups are invited to attend the job fair, and every respondent receives two text
message reminders in the days leading up to the job fair, which also minimizes potential
differential salience effects based on the date of the survey.
1.4 Data
Figure 1.1 outlines the timeline of the project and the order of interaction with respondents.
In January and February 2011, I generated the sample and conducted the baseline survey.
Respondents answered questions about their work experience, interest in and exposure to
overseas work, and beliefs about wages within and outside the Philippines. Upon conclusion
of the survey, those living in randomly selected neighborhoods received information about
wages overseas or information about minimum qualifications for overseas work. All respon-
dents were then invited to attend a nearby job fair for overseas employment, and randomly
selected respondents received the voucher that they could exchange at the fair.
26This and all other conversions are calculated using the average exchange rate from January-February,
2011 of 1 US$ = 43.7976 PHP (OANDA, 2012).
12
1.4.1 Bulan job fair, 2011
I first measure the decision to initiate job search for work overseas by whether respondents
attend a job fair for overseas work held March 1-2, 2011 (both weekdays). I partnered with
the municipal government and Public Employment Service Office (PESO) to hold this fair, in
which four overseas recruitment agencies and one domestic employer from another province
participated. Upon arrival, job-fair attendees signed in with research staff.27 The survey
team advertised using fliers and radio in the week prior to the fair.28 All survey respondents
received two text message reminders in the days leading up to and on the day of the job fair.
Overall attendance is 767. Survey respondents make up 29 percent of all attendees. I link
attendance rosters with respondents using an approximate string-matching algorithm.29
1.4.2 Follow-up survey
I supplement job-fair attendance data with responses from a follow-up survey conducted one
year after the baseline survey. Attrition is of particular concern in this study because if
migrants are missing from follow-up reports, actual increases in migration would be indistin-
guishable from differential attrition by treatment. By using proxy surveys with an alternate
household member when the original respondent was unavailable, I obtain a follow-up rate
of 97 percent, with full surveys for 80 percent of baseline respondents and proxy surveys for
the other 17 percent.30 I find no evidence of differential attrition across treatments; details
are provided in Appendix Table 1.A.4. For the rest of the analysis, I use the set of 862
27Although job-fair attendees provided written consent to participate in the research component of the fair
and were aware that researchers were tracking their numbers, they likely viewed the job fair as typical. Their
first interaction was with staff members of the municipal PESO, which typically coordinates local recruitment
activities and collects biographical data for their own records. The local PESO office also assumed full credit
for the implementation of the job fair, further reducing any perceptions that this was a “research” fair.
28Of non-survey respondents, 56 percent of attendees say they heard about the fair through radio, 17
percent through a flier, and 25 percent through a friend.
29I match individual names based on pairs of letters in relatively similar positions of the string (Winkler,
2004) and verify close matches with additional data on gender, age, and barangay when available. The
specific protocol is available upon request.
30Additional details about those who attrit from the sample are included in Appendix Table 1.A.1.
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baseline respondents when evaluating the impact of treatments on job-fair attendance and
participation, and I restrict the sample to the 826 respondents who participated in the base-
line and follow-up survey, including proxy responses, when considering outcomes measured
at the follow-up survey.
1.4.3 Estimation
I estimate intention-to-treat (ITT) effects of assignment to the three treatments using OLS
with the following specification:







where Yij is the outcome measure for individual i living in neighborhood j, and V oucherj,
Qualj, and Wagej are binary indicators for treatment assignment of neighborhood j. I also
include a vector of individual-level covariates Xi; stratification cell fixed-effects Sj for each of
the 11 stratification cells, which are assigned at the neighborhood level; and enumerator fixed
effects Eni. Because randomization takes place at the neighborhood level, I cluster standard
errors at the neighborhood level, which also accounts for heteroskedasticity introduced by
the linear probability model when estimating binary outcome variables.31 Because I cross-
randomize the two information treatments with voucher assignment, I can also examine
interaction effects of the voucher in combination with each information treatment. I report
these interacted impacts on job-fair attendance, but I restrict later analysis to the Equation
2.4 specification, as I find limited evidence of interaction effects.
31Assignment corresponds to actual treatment in all cases except for one neighborhood, in which enu-
merators accidentally administered the wrong treatments. Excluding that neighborhood or using realized
treatment does not affect results.
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1.4.4 Descriptive statistics and balancing tests
The first two columns of Table 1.1 present descriptive statistics of the full sample of 862
respondents, by treatment assignment. Columns 1 and 2 report covariate means of the
non-voucher and voucher treatment groups, respectively.32 By design, approximately half
the sample is female. Nearly three-fourths of respondents have completed high school, and
16 percent have completed college. These education completion rates are consistent with
work by Beam, McKenzie and Yang (2013) in other parts of Sorsogon Province, as well as
with statistics from the 2000 Philippine Labor Force Survey, which show that 58 percent of
residents, and 73 percent of urban residents of Sorsogon Province have completed at least
high school (NSO 2001). Slightly more than one-third of respondents are currently working
at baseline; this includes anyone who worked for pay in the previous month, regardless of
whether it was in the formal or informal sector, and 84 percent have ever worked in the
past. A high share of respondents, 39 percent, have previously worked in Manila. The mean
household income is P5,800 per month, approximately US$132. Twenty-six percent report
being interested in working abroad (not shown, 72 percent report at least some interest in
working abroad), and among all respondents, only 28 percent (45 percent of those strongly
interested in working abroad) have ever taken steps to apply for work overseas.
In Column 2, I use one, two, and three stars to indicate a statistically significant difference
in means for each covariate between the voucher and non-voucher groups at the ten, five,
and one-percent levels, respectively. Although the main demographic characteristics are
balanced, the voucher treatment group members are less likely to plan to apply for work
overseas in the next 12 months. As indicated by the F-test statistic at the bottom of Column
2, I cannot reject the joint equality of means between the voucher and non-voucher groups.
Columns 3-5 present means for the information control, wage information treatment, and
qualification information treatment groups, all of which include both voucher and non-
32Full sample means and standard errors are reported in Appendix Table 1.A.3.
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voucher recipients. As before, in Columns 4 and 5, I indicate where covariate means are
statistically significantly different from the information control group. The wage informa-
tion treatment group is slightly younger than the information control group, but I can-
not reject joint equality of the means between the wage treatment and information control
groups, which yields a p-value of 0.66. The qualification information treatment group dis-
plays stronger evidence of covariate imbalance. Members of this group are older, more likely
to be married, and more likely to have children. They are also marginally more likely to have
family members working abroad. Consequently, I reject joint equality of means between the
qualification information treatment and information control groups at the five-percent level
(p-value = 0.03).
The imbalance in qualification treatment assignment is concerning if it provides evidence that
enumerators manipulated treatment assignment. However, randomization was conducted at
the neighborhood level, and it was done prior to implementation. Imbalance could arise if
enumerators put forth differential effort to find respondents depending on the information
treatment. The number of respondents interviewed per information treatment assignment,
however, is essentially equal (292 received no information, 284 received wage information,
and 286 received qualification information).
1.5 Results
In this section, I first examine the impacts of assignment to factual information and voucher
treatments on steps to migration, job-search effort, and employment outcomes. I then con-
firm the robustness of my results to alternative specifications. Last, I report local average
treatment effect estimates of the impact of job-fair attendance on job-search and employment
outcomes, using voucher assignment as an instrument for attendance.
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1.5.1 Job-fair attendance and steps to migration
I examine whether the information and voucher treatments affect individuals’ decisions to
take steps to find work overseas, first looking at whether recipients were more or less likely to
attend a job fair for overseas work. Figure 1.2 shows the estimated impact of the information
treatments with and without voucher assignment, allowing for the possibility of interaction
effects, using the full panel of 862 baseline respondents.33 The voucher has a large, posi-
tive impact, nearly tripling the likelihood of attending the job fair, while the information
treatments, with or without the voucher, have no effect.
Table 1.2 provides numerical ITT estimates of the impact of the information and voucher
treatments on attendance. The first two columns include only binary treatment indicators
for the information and voucher treatments, as in Equation 2.4. In case the information
treatments have different impacts when combined with an incentive to attend, Columns 3 and
4 include interactions between information treatment assignment and voucher assignment.
Columns 1 and 3 include only stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects, while Columns
2 and 4 add individual covariates. The voucher treatment raises the probability of job-
fair attendance by 35.4 percentage points (Column 2) from a baseline of 12.7 percent, a
280-percent increase, making it a strong instrument for attendance. On their own, the
information treatments have no impact on attendance. As seen in Figure 1.2, the qualification
and wage information treatments, when combined with the voucher, have a small additional
positive and negative impact, respectively. However, these interaction effects are imprecisely
measured and not statistically significantly different from zero.
Job-fair attendance is not the only means by which individuals look for work overseas, and
the information treatments could lead individuals to take other steps to apply. In Table 1.3, I
estimate the impact of wage and qualification information treatment assignment on whether
individuals look for work overseas in the ten months following the job fair, on whether they
33I omit covariates, stratification cell fixed effects, and enumerator fixed effects in Figure 1.2 so that the
levels can be interpreted as attendance rates by treatment group.
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visit a recruitment agency for overseas work for the first time, and on whether they obtain
a passport.34 In all cases, I find that the information treatments have no effect on steps to
migrate. One exception is that wage information treatment assignment increases passport
acquisition, but this is only marginally statistically significant.
These results indicate that the information treatments do not substantially affect individuals’
decision to migrate overseas. I explore potential reasons in Section 2.5, finding that infor-
mation does affect individuals’ perceptions about the overseas labor market. Table 1.3 also
presents ITT estimates of the impact of voucher assignment, which also does not affect the
likelihood of taking steps to migrate, though they are three percentage points (27 percent)
less likely to report being interested in working abroad.35 The mean levels of these migration
steps are low: only two percent of respondents looked for overseas work in the ten months
following the job fair.36 If, however, individuals’ information sets and knowledge about how
to search and apply for work are affected by attending a job fair, this could instead affect
domestic labor outcomes.
1.5.2 Job-search effort and employment
In the previous section, I find that voucher assignment is a strong predictor of job-fair
attendance. In this section, I estimate ITT impacts of voucher assignment and information
treatment assignment, on labor market outcomes, interpreting the voucher as operating
through job-fair attendance.
34Those who had visited an agency before at baseline are coded as a zero when estimating whether
respondents visit an agency for the first time. Similarly, those who had a passport at baseline as coded as
zero when estimating whether respondents obtain a passport. Restricting the sample to those who had never
visited an agency or those who never had a passport yields similar results.
35Individuals report whether they are not interested, a little interested, neutral, somewhat interested,
or very interested in working abroad. I code individuals who respond with “very” or “somewhat” as being
“interested” in working abroad.
36I test but do not report whether the voucher treatment affects the likelihood of working abroad as of
the follow-up survey because, at 0.6 percent, the overseas migration rate is very low. Only five respondents
are overseas at follow-up: four from the voucher control group and one from the voucher treatment group.
LPM estimates do not show an impact of the information or voucher treatments.
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The experience of attending a job fair may have persistent impacts on individuals’ job-search
and labor-market trajectories in the presence of incomplete information. With respect to
a standard job-search model, information may update individuals’ beliefs about the wage
distribution (Burdett and Vishwanath, 1988) or their job-offer arrival rate, in the case of
learning about one’s absolute ability, one’s relative ability, or labor market conditions (Gon-
zalez and Shi, 2010; Falk, Huffman and Sunde, 2006a). Additionally, attendance may con-
vey knowledge about how to search and apply for work that increases the effectiveness of
search in other labor markets. Factual information about the overseas market may also
have medium-run effects in the domestic labor market if it changes the relative returns to
search or motivates individuals to obtain additional work experience or income, possibly as
a “stepping stone” to work abroad, or as a result of the information priming individuals to
think more about employment. Using follow-up survey data collected ten months after the
job fair, I measure the impact of factual information and job-fair attendance on individuals’
job-search effort and employment
Voucher assignment could affect the probability of job search on the extensive margin, as
well as change the intensity and direction of search. I first examine whether individuals look
for work in the two months after the job fair, which is most likely to reflect the direct impact
of fair attendance. The impact on the intensity of search over the ten-month period may
reflect this direct effect plus any indirect effects from previous changes in search behavior.
For example, if individuals search more effectively in the months immediately following the
fair, they may be less likely to search later. Alternatively, if attendance causes individuals
to postpone local search and instead pursue opportunities in Manila earlier, impacts may
attenuate in the long run. For this reason, I also examine the total number of months
individuals search in the ten months after the job fair.
In Column 1 of Table 1.4, I predict whether respondents look for work in the two months after
the fair using information and voucher assignment.37 Because search may have higher returns
37I exclude the month of the fair itself in order to avoid double counting job-fair attendance.
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in Manila, I differentiate between looking for work within Sorsogon Province and looking
in Manila in Columns 2 and 3, respectively.38 Column 1 shows that voucher assignment
does not affect the overall likelihood of search, though the effect is imprecisely measured.
Differentiating between looking for work within the province and in Manila in Columns 2
and 3, however, reveals that voucher assignment decreases the likelihood of looking within
the province by 2.3 percentage points but increases the likelihood of looking in Manila by
2.1 percentage points. The factual information treatments have no statistically significant
impact on whether individuals look for work in the two months following the fair: the
coefficients are generally negative but very close to zero.39 In Columns 4-6, I report the total
number of offers received overall, within the province, or in Manila during the ten months
following the job fair. Search in Manila induced by the voucher appears to be effective; the
number of offers in Manila increases by 0.04, or by 37 percent compared with a rate of 0.12
offers among the control group, though it is only significant at the ten-percent level.
Although the wage information treatment does not affect the total number of months
searched in Columns 4-6, there is also a reduction in the number of offers received over-
all as a result of the qualification information, consistent with the small, but statistically
insignificant, reduction in the likelihood of looking for work observed in Columns 1-3. This is
consistent with a positive, but statistically insignificant impact on the likelihood of informal
employment I report later, which could reflect some individuals focusing on accumulating
work experience as a result of the qualification treatment, but not doing so through direct
job search.
38Respondents are asked to classify whether they search within Bulan, outside Bulan but within Sorsogon
Province, in neighboring Albay Province, in Manila, overseas, or in some other location. I classify search
within Sorsogon and Albay as “within the province” because of Albay’s close proximity. Only 1.8 percent
of respondents report ever looking for work in an “other location”; of them, only two do not also search in
Manila.
39Appendix Table 1.C.2 of 1.C demonstrates that the impact of voucher assignment on the likelihood of
search is concentrated in the first month after the fair, and that it remains substantial ten months afterward.
Overall, the voucher increases the unconditional total number of months looked for work in Manila by 0.09,
or by 44 percent. Non-experimental estimates on the number of months searched conditional on ever looking
for work in the ten months following the job fair indicates that those assigned the voucher search 0.24 months
fewer inside the province, from a mean of 0.67, and search 0.32 months more in Manila, from a mean of 0.70.
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Individuals may be more likely to be working or may work in different sectors if job seekers
are successful in finding work as a result of the redirection of search effort I observe. Job-fair
attendance may also affect employment outcomes by increasing the effectiveness of search,
which I do not measure directly. To examine the medium-run impact of the information and
voucher interventions on employment, I consider whether respondents are working at the
time of the follow-up survey and whether they are working in the formal sector, working in
the informal sector, or self-employed.
Column 1 of Table 1.5 demonstrates that information and voucher assignments have no
impact on whether individuals are working at the time of the follow-up survey. Assignment
to the qualification information treatment has a positive impact on the likelihood of being
employed, consistent with the earlier overall reduction in the number of months spent looking
for work, but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Columns 2-4 reveal
that the voucher induces individuals to shift into formal sector work from self-employment.
Voucher assignment increases the likelihood of formal sector employment by 4.7 percentage
points, significant at the five-percent level.40 This increase is offset by a 6.7 percentage-point
reduction in the likelihood of being engaged in self-employment, which also includes farming
and fishing.41 These magnitudes are large relative to the change in search effort, suggesting
that attendance may also increase the efficacy of search.
1.5.3 Adjustments for multiple comparisons
These results broadly indicate that in addition to increasing the likelihood of job-fair at-
tendance, voucher assignment induces individuals to look for work in Manila rather than in
40Informal sector employment increases by 2.4 percentage points, though this is not statistically significant.
Testing for a change in the likelihood of being employed in the formal or informal sector produces a p-value
of 0.02.
41Because these reported employment categories are mutually exclusive, I can also estimate marginal
effects at covariate means using a multinomial logit model. The results are broadly unchanged: voucher
assignment increases formal sector employment by 4.4 percentage points (p = 0.04), and decreases self-
employment by 7.1 percentage points (p = 0.00).
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the local labor market and to shift from self-employment to formal-sector employment. The
informational treatments do not affect individuals’ decisions to look for work abroad. In this
section, I discuss the sensitivity of these estimates to adjustments for multiple comparisons
and to other specifications.
Because main results are based on hypothesis tests from multiple outcome variables, some
hypotheses may be falsely rejected due to chance.42 I employ two approaches to address
this concern.43 My main specifications encompass ten unique outcome variables, which
are naturally divided into three groups: migration outcomes (4), job-search outcomes (4),
and employment outcomes (3).44 I follow Katz, Kling and Liebman (2007) and compute
the average effect size for each outcome group. That is, I estimate the following average
standardized treatment effect τg for outcome group g with N total variables as the average











where τgk is the treatment effect for outcome variable k in group g that is standardized
by dividing the estimated treatment effect πgk by the standard deviation of the outcome
variable for the control group σgk. I measure the average treatment effect of the voucher and
of each information treatment including the full set of covariates and stratification cell fixed
42See Fink, McConnell and Vollmer (2012) for a detailed example.
43Because the analysis draws conclusions about the effectiveness of treatment on the outcomes measures
reported in the previous section, one can think of these as “confirmatory” analysis, and I adjust these results
for concerns about multiple comparison. In Section 2.5, I investigate potential mechanisms driving these
as well as impacts for subgroups. Because that section primarily derives hypotheses and insights for future
research, I am more interested in the magnitude and direction of estimated coefficients than in statistical
significance. Those tests can be thought of as “exploratory” and therefore not subject to the same set of
concerns (Schochet, 2008).
44I omit three variables that are linear combinations of the other hypotheses: whether the respondent
looks for work anywhere in the two months following the job fair, the total number of offers he receives
overall in the ten months following the fair, and whether he is employed at all.
45The notation differs slightly from Katz, Kling and Liebman (2007) to be consistent with the later
discussion of controlling the FWER and FDR.
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effects used in previous specifications. I jointly estimate the πgk using seemingly unrelated
regressions to account for dependence between outcome variables within a group.
Table 1.6 reports the average effect size for each outcome group. I cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no treatment effect on steps to migrate for the voucher or the qualification
information, though I find a 0.09 standard deviation increase in taking steps to migrate for
those receiving the wage information treatment, significant at the 10-percent level. With
respect to the job-search outcomes, I reverse the sign of the local search and local offers
variable to test whether there is evidence of a positive or negative shift to search in Manila.
I find the voucher led to a 0.12 standard deviation increase in that domain, significant at less
than the one-percent level. For the employment group, I reverse the sign of self-employment
to test for evidence of an increase in formal and informal employment, and I reject the
null hypothesis that the voucher had no effect at less than the one-percent level.46 Table
1.6 confirms earlier results that the voucher has substantial impacts on individuals’ job-
search and employment outcomes, namely shifting their search from the local labor market
to Manila, and increasing their likelihood of being employed formally (and informally).47
One concern with the Katz, Kling and Liebman (2007) approach in this setting is that I am
interested in the impact of individual outcome variables within each family as much as the
family of outcomes itself, particularly in the case of the job-search and employment outcomes.
To account for multiple comparisons at the individual outcome level, I control for the family-
wise error rate (FWER), the likelihood of falsely rejecting at least one hypothesis in a group
of outcomes, and for the false discovery rate (FDR), the share of rejected hypotheses that
are true (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). The Bonferroni correction provides the simplest
and most conservative method to control the FWER, ensuring that it is no greater than α by
46I also test the more conservative hypothesis that the voucher shifted employment to the formal sector
by reversing the signs of both informal employment as well as self-employment. I reject the null of no effect
of the voucher at the ten-percent level.
47One less-powered alternative is to conduct F-tests for the joint hypotheses of no treatment effects across
multiple variables, without adjusting outcome signs. I still reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect
across the search and employment outcomes at the five-percent level.48
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using a revised critical p-value of αadj = α/N , where N is the number of tests in the family.
One refinement of that approach is the Holm step-down procedure (Holm, 1979), which
sequentially rejects hypotheses based on the ranked order of the p-values. I rank hypotheses
from that with smallest p-value to that with the largest. If the hypothesis with the smallest
p-value is less than α/N , then I reject it. If I reject the first hypothesis, I then test the
second, rejecting a null effect for the second-smallest p-value if it is less than α/(N − 1). If I
cannot reject the kth hypothesis, then I cannot reject any subsequent hypothesis. I proceed
through all of the hypotheses until no further hypotheses can be rejected, rejecting the kth
hypothesis if its p-value is less than α/(N − k + 1).
Finally, I control for the FDR using the Benjamini-Hochberg step-up procedure, which is
similar in spirit to the Holm procedure, except in this case I start with the largest p-value, pK ,
and move downward. Once I reject hypothesis pk, I reject all outcomes with a smaller p-value
(Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).49 Though less conservative, the FDR is more appropriate
for this context than the FWER if I am interested in the significance of individual outcome
variables within a family, rather than the overall significance of the effects within a family.
In Table 1.7, I report the significance of intention-to-treat estimates of voucher assignment
on each outcome variable, using the outcome groups described previously, adjusting with the
three procedures described above:
1. Bonferroni (FWER): pbon = padj = pN , where p is the uncorrected p-value.
2. Holm (FWER): padj = pk(N − k + 1), where k is the rank of pk after ordering the p-
values such that p1 < p2 < ... < pN . As this is a step-down prodecure, begin with the
lowest p-value, and pholm = padj for k = 1. Moving upward, pholm = max(padj, padj−1),
where padj−1 is the previously (lower) ranked p-value.
3. Benjamini-Hochberg (FDR): padj = pN/k, where k is the rank of p, after ordering
49It is likely to be conservative under when the p-values are positively correlated (Benjamini and Yekutieli,
2001).
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the p-values such that p1 < p2 < ... < pN (Anderson, 2008). As this is a step-
up procedure, begin with the highest p-value, and pBH = padj for k = K. Moving
downward, pBH = min(padj, padj+1, where padj+1 is the previously (higher) ranked p-
value.
Results in Table 1.7 indicate that the decrease in individuals’ interest in working abroad
induced by the voucher remains significant at the ten-percent level, regardless of the correc-
tion. The job-search results are less robust, with only the reduction in individuals’ likelihood
of looking for work locally in the two months following the job-fair remaining significant at
the 10-percent level. However, the increase in the likelihood of looking for work in Manila
and the number of offers received are nearly statistically significant under the Benjamini-
Hochberg methods, with adjusted p-values of 0.12. The employment results remain highly
robust regardless of the correction I use. The increase in formal-sector employment remains
statistically significant at the ten-percent level under the Holm and Benjamini-Hochberg cor-
rections, and the decrease in self-employment is statistically significant at the five-percent
level under all corrections.
1.5.4 Robustness checks
Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) raise concerns about bias and inconsistency that may be in-
troduced by OLS estimates of linear probability models, particularly with low frequency
outcomes. Appendix Tables 1.D.1, 1.D.2, and 1.D.3 show that neither the magnitude nor
the significance of results are affected by using a probit model.
I also test whether results are sensitive to the inclusion of covariates. Appendix Table 1.D.4
demonstrates that the voucher migration and search results are not affected by the inclu-
sion of covariates. The impacts on employment, while still in the same direction, are not
statistically significant without covariates. This difference appears to be driven by sample
imbalance on education - those assigned to the voucher treatment group have lower edu-
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cational attainment - which biases downward the impact of voucher assignment if I do not
control for education. Appendix Tables 1.D.5 and 1.D.6 show that the estimated impacts of
the targeted information interventions are not affected by the inclusion of covariates or fixed
effects. The same set of tables indicate that my results are robust to excluding proxy surveys.
Proxy surveys may be noisier than full surveys, as a family member or neighbor may not
have full information about the job-search activities of the respondent, so it is unsurprising
that my estimates are more precise when I exclude proxy respondents, but the magnitudes
are not affected substantially.
1.5.5 Local average treatment effects
I interpret voucher treatment assignment as affecting individuals’ behavior through job-fair
attendance, which provides individuals with some combination of information and knowledge.
Because job-fair attendance is endogenous, directly estimating the impact of attendance on
outcomes will generate biased estimates. The encouragement design I implement generates
exogenous variation in the likelihood of attendance, and I use voucher assignment to instru-
ment for job-fair attendance. In addition to examining intention-to-treat effects of voucher
assignment, I can examine local average treatment effects (LATE) for compliers, that is,
those induced to attend the fair as a result of being assigned the voucher.50
I use two-stage least squares to estimate the following equations:







Yij = a+ b1 ̂Attendij + b2Qualj + b3Wagej +X ′id+ S ′js+ En′ic+ vij (1.3b)
where Attendij is a binary indicator for whether respondent i in neighborhood j attended
the job fair, and V oucherj, Qualj, and Wagej are binary indicators for neighborhood j’s
50The LATE estimates will be equal to average treatment effect estimates if the effect is constant across
individuals.
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assignment to treatment. I include the same set of covariates Xi, stratification cell fixed
effects Sj, and enumerator fixed effects Eni in both stages. Using predicted attendance,
̂Attendij, I estimate medium-run impacts on outcome variable Yij measured at the follow-up
survey.
The coefficient of interest is the estimated b̂1, which can be interpreted as the causal impact
of job-fair attendance on outcome Yij if the instrument is correlated with attendance and
the conditional independence assumption holds: it cannot be correlated with any unobserved
determinants of the outcome variable, and it cannot affect later stage outcomes in any other
way than through job-fair attendance. The first-stage estimate of voucher assignment on
job-fair attendance using the sample of follow-up respondents yields an F-statistic of 108.
Random assignment ensures that on average, cov[V oucherj, vij] = 0.51
If, for instance, the voucher itself motivates applicants to apply for work or take steps to
look for work, perhaps by providing them with more information or inducing them to feel
more encouraged, than this mechanism would violate the exclusion restriction. To minimize
any differential informational impact, both treatment and control respondents are invited to
attend the job fair, and all respondents receive a flier to keep and two text message reminders
about the fair. Additionally, enumerators inform respondents that they are receiving the
voucher to encourage them to attend the fair, without any mention of their own qualification
levels or job-finding prospects. Because randomization takes place at the neighborhood level,
respondents’ neighbors receive the same offer, so it is less likely that they would feel relatively
qualified or unqualified by comparison. Another concern might be that the voucher affects
individuals’ budget constraints. However, I find no evidence that respondents exchange the
voucher for cash, and the voucher is small enough to not affect individuals’ budget constraints
51For interpretation as a LATE, assignment must have a monotonic effect on attendance; in this case,
it must have had a zero or positive effect for all individuals. The voucher could have a negative impact on
attendance if it raised concerns about the legitimacy of the fair or if it seemed “too good to be true.” However,
the job fair was backed by the local Public Employment Service Office and was advertised broadly in the
community, which, in addition to increasing attendance, should have encouraged trust among respondents.
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in any substantial way.52
Table 1.8 presents the ITT impacts of the voucher with OLS and IV estimates of job-fair
attendance on search effort and employment. OLS estimates of the impact of attendance,
which are likely biased due to endogeneity, indicate that overall attendance is not correlated
with job-search effort and that it is slightly negatively correlated with the likelihood of being
employed, particularly in the informal sector. Using voucher assignment as an instrument
for attendance demonstrates that the OLS results in Column 2 are biased downward. Those
induced to attend by the voucher are negatively selected compared to those who attend
without the voucher.53 This indicates that it is those who are less skilled and have less
job-fair experience who benefit the most from attending a job fair, and OLS estimates of
attendance would underestimate these impacts. Those induced to attend the job-fair by the
voucher are 5.7 percentage points more likely to look for work in the capital two months
after the job fair than those not included, and they are 13.0 percentage points more likely
to be employed in the formal sector.
1.6 Discussion
Job-fair attendance has a persistent impact on individuals’ job-search behavior and their em-
ployment outcomes in domestic markets, but, on average, the factual information treatments
do not. That the factual information treatments have limited impact on individuals’ steps
to migration may not be surprising if the information itself is ineffective in updating indi-
52I explore this more specifically using results from a brief survey in May 2012 with 102 randomly selected
respondents, who I recontact because they won a raffle prize for their participation in the follow-up survey.
Eighty-one percent of original respondents are contacted, of which 31 respondents are voucher treatment
group members. Fourteen out of the 31 respondents report receiving and exchanging the voucher at the job
fair, and no one trades or gives away the voucher.
53For example, 29 percent of all job-fair attendees who are in the voucher control group are college
graduates, compared with only 14 percent of job-fair attendees who are in the voucher treatment group.
Similarly, at baseline 61 percent of voucher control group job-fair attendees have looked for work formally,
versus 33 percent of voucher treatment group job-fair attendees.
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viduals’ perceptions of overseas wages or their own qualifications.54 In this section, I explore
potential explanations for these results by examining the impact of wage and qualification
information on labor market perceptions and exploring treatment effect heterogeneity. I find
that factual information affects individuals’ labor market perceptions, although it does not
affect their job-search decisions. I also explore the characteristics of those who are affected
most by the experience of attending a job fair, finding that employment effects are concen-
trated among those with either some formal search experience or past work experience in
Manila, while those with no formal search experience change how they search for work.
1.6.1 Why doesn’t factual information matter more?
1.6.1.1 Wage information treatment
The limited impact of the wage information treatment contrasts with the strong link between
expected wages and migration in other migration research (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman,
2013), as well as the substantial impact that revising wage expectations upward has on
education decisions (Jensen, 2010; Nguyen, 2008). I find that the wage information does
affect the individuals’ beliefs about their likely wages overseas in predictable ways; however,
beliefs about overseas wages do not correlate strongly with individuals’ decisions to look
for work. Another explanation for the ineffectiveness is that the wage information updated
beliefs, but the effect was offset by increased interest in local job search because of a coding
error that overstated average local wages on the intervention flier. However, I find no evidence
that the wage treatment increased job search in any labor market, local or otherwise.
To examine whether individuals’ beliefs are affected by the wage information treatment, I
measure the impact of wage information assignment on the the “likeliest” wage that they
personally could earn abroad.55 I plot the smoothed distribution of the change in likeliest
54For example, Eberlein, Ludwig and Nafziger (2011) find that feedback does not necessarily change
individuals’ self-assessments, particularly in the case of bad news.
55This measure is implicitly conditional on being offered a job. Wage information may affect individuals’
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wage between baseline and follow-up separately for the wage treatment group and the control
group. Figure 1.3 shows that the wage information treatment shifts the distribution to the
right, indicating that, on average, perceived wages of the wage information treatment group
increase relative to the control group. A Komogorov-Smirnov test rejects the equality of
distributions at the five-percent level (p = 0.03).56 These results indicate that the wage in-
formation treatment does affect job-seeker beliefs about wages, increasing their expectations
relative to the control group.
The wage information treatment may have a limited impact if individuals already have good
information about the wages they could earn abroad. On average, the mean value of the
likeliest wage individuals report they could earn abroad is only six percent lower than the
intervention mean (P26,800 compared with P28,500). But this obscures heterogeneity in in-
dividuals’ perceived likely wages, as 35 percent of individuals report higher expected wages
than the intervention average. The results in Table 1.9 are consistent with differential treat-
ment effects by baseline wage perceptions. I examine heterogeneity by perceived overseas
wage at baseline along two outcome measures: whether the individual attends the job fair,
and the likeliest wage she thinks she could earn abroad as of the follow-up survey. Columns
1 and 2 show that although the wage information treatment has no effect on job-fair at-
tendance overall, the impact is slightly positive, though not significant, for those with low
perceived wages, and the effect decreases as baseline perceived wages increase (significant
at the 10-percent level). Furthermore, Columns 3 and 4 show that individuals’ perceived
overseas wages are affected in predictable ways. Overall, there is a small, positive impact on
perceived overseas wages, but the interaction term in Column 4 indicates that the impact of
the wage information decreases in individuals’ perceived overseas wages.
Although the wage information treatment affects beliefs, this shift might not affect behavior
beliefs about wages across the distribution of workers or about their own wage prospects, and this measure
captures only the latter.
56 I exclude those who received the qualification information treatment or the cross-randomized voucher.
Results are robust to alternative specifications.
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if individuals’ search and employment decisions on the margin are not determined by ex-
pected wages.57 In Appendix Table 1.C.1, I predict whether respondents had ever applied
for overseas work, as reported at baseline. Education, work experience, and beliefs about the
likelihood of being offered a job abroad are strong predictors of past application, but per-
ceived likely wages overseas do not predict past decisions to look for work abroad, conditional
on these other variables. Given that overseas wages across occupations are consistently high
relative to local wages, that median likely wages are 5.7 times higher than median household
income,58 and that most respondents (75 percent) have an immediate or extended family
member who has worked abroad in the past five years, it is less surprising that increasing
expected wages does not translate to changes in job-search and employment decisions.
1.6.1.2 Qualification information
The impact of qualification information may depend on individuals’ baseline perceptions as
well as their own characteristics.59 At baseline, respondents report the minimum educa-
tional requirements and the minimum number of years of experience for six common over-
seas positions: domestic helper, caretaker, construction worker, plumber, factory worker,
and food service worker. I compare the median responses to the median minimum require-
ments for each job based on position-weighted calculations from 23,910 job postings taken
from workabroad.ph, described earlier.60 Individuals have accurate expectations about the
minimum educational requirements for these positions, as seen in Appendix Table 1.C.3.
57Additionally, if individuals have a high reservation wage for overseas work, the increase in expected
wages may not be sufficient to induce search overseas. However, only 13 percent of respondents report a
reservation wage that is higher than what they think they could earn abroad, consistent with other research
that finds reservations wages not to be the constraint preventing job search (Diagne, 2011).
58The median likeliest wage respondents report they could earn abroad is P20,000, or US$457, per month.
The median household income at baseline is P3,500, or US$80, per month.
59In 1.E, I examine heterogeneous treatment effects between men and women and between those with a
high school diploma or less and those with some post-secondary education. I find that men update their
beliefs about their own qualifications, and they are more likely to attend the job fair, but they are no more
or less likely to take steps to migrate abroad.
60Medians overlap between men and women for food service worker positions. Women have lower expe-
riential requirements for factory worker positions, so I use the median the corresponds to the respondent’s
gender.
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However, they tend to underestimate the minimum experience requirements.61
To measure the impact of qualification information on the accuracy of individuals’ percep-
tions about minimum experience requirements, I calculate the absolute value of the difference
between the median years of related experience required for six common overseas positions,
as measured using the data from workabroad.ph, and the number of years of experience re-
ported by respondents the number of years experience required for each position. I average
that difference over the six positions and report the results in Table 1.10. In the control
group, individuals estimate minimum experience requirements at baseline that are 1.3 years
away from the true values on average, with the average respondent underestimating experi-
ence requirements for 59 percent of positions and overestimating for 16 percent of positions.
Column 1 shows that qualification information has a modest impact on perceptions, reducing
the absolute difference between reported and actual experience requirements by 0.06 years,
which is statistically significant at the ten-percent level. This is roughly the same impact as
that of the voucher assignment, which reduces the absolute difference by 0.07 years. Columns
2 and 3 show that this change comes from a reduction in the likelihood of underestimating
minimum experience requirements. These results indicate that the qualification information
has a small impact on individuals’ perceptions, but the tailored information on average is
no more effective in changing perceptions than being incentivized to attend the job fair. To-
gether, these results suggest that information about qualifications does improve information
about minimum overseas qualifications, but that the provision of this information does not
have substantial impacts on decisions to migrate overseas.
1.6.2 Who is affected by job-fair attendance?
In this section, I examine the characteristics of those affected by job-fair attendance, explor-
ing whether the voucher most influences those with or without prior labor market exposure.
61One exception is the domestic helper position, for which more than half of vacancies do not require
experience.
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In Panel A of Table 1.11, I estimate the main job-search and employment outcomes using
binary indicators for whether individuals do or do not having formal job-search experience
at baseline interacted with the voucher assignment indicator, omitting the non-interacted
voucher dummy.62 In Panel B, I estimate the same outcomes, this time interacting voucher
assignment with indicators for whether the respondent had worked in Manila as of the base-
line survey. In the bottom row of each panel, I report the p-values for a test of equality of
the two interacted terms for each subgroup.
The voucher increases the likelihood of search in Manila for those without formal job-search
experience, but not those with job-search experience, suggesting that the information or
a behavioral nudge provided by the fair is important for the former group. However, this
change in search behavior for those without formal job-search experience does not lead to
a statistically significant increase in formal or informal sector employment (though there is
an overall increase in formal or informal sector employment, significant at the five-percent
level). Those with past formal job-search experience increase their likelihood of formal sector
employment and reduce their likelihood of search either in Manila or locally. This result is
consistent with a scenario in which those with past formal job-search experience gain an
improvement in their search ability as a result of attendance.
In Panel B, I find that those with work history in Manila adjust their search behavior, and
they are more likely to be employed in the formal sector at follow-up.63 Broadly, these
results indicate that, in terms of formal-sector employment, those with at least some labor
market exposure gain the most from job fair attendance, in terms of increasing formal sector
employment, and that the gain appears to be driven by an improvement in search skills
as well as through potential informational or behavioral channels. However, even those
62I define having formal job-search experience as having either submitted at least one resume (40 percent)
or having interviewed at least once (38 percent). Results are robust to splitting the sample by whether
individuals submitted a resume, or by whether individuals ever interviewed. The correlation between these
two measures is 0.89.
63There is a positive correlation between having work history in Manila and having formal-search expe-
rience (ρ = 0.16), but 48 percent of those with history in Manila have never looked formally for work.
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with essentially no labor-market exposure still change their search behavior, indicating that
improving access to labor market information can affect search trajectories for a broad range
of individuals. This change in behavior does not appear to be driven by individuals looking
for work as a “stepping-stone” to migration; Table 1.3 demonstrates that voucher assignment
does not increase individuals’ likelihood of taking steps to find work overseas, and individuals
are, in fact, less likely to report they are interested in working abroad as a result of voucher
assignment. Overall, these results provide suggestive evidence that the employment gains of
increased job-search exposure are concentrated among those with at least some prior search
experience, while those with no formal job-search experience have the greater change in
how they search. These results provide suggestive evidence that attendance works through
multiple mechanisms, which provides an outline for future work to disentangle the roles of
information, skill acquisition, and reduction of behavioral barriers on job-search effort.
1.7 Conclusion
I implement a randomized field experiment in the rural Philippines to evaluate the role of
incomplete information in job-search decisions. I conduct a baseline survey with 862 respon-
dents in Bulan, a rural municipality with limited access to opportunities to find work abroad.
Individuals from randomly selected neighborhoods receive information about average over-
seas wages, minimum qualifications for common overseas positions, or no information. I
also generate exogenous variation in job-fair attendance through an encouragement design.
I measure the impact of these interventions on job-fair attendance as well as on migration,
job-search, and employment outcomes I measure in a follow-up survey conducted ten months
after the job fair.
This paper has two main findings. Information about the overseas labor market increases
the accuracy of individuals’ labor market perceptions, but their decisions to search for work
overseas are not affected. It appears that despite their geographic isolation from the capital,
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individuals already have fairly good information about overseas work at baseline, particu-
larly about wages and the minimum education requirements. These results indicate that
information is not a main barrier to overseas migration in this context.
Secondly, job-fair attendance does not increase migration, though it has persistent domestic
labor-market impacts. Assignment to the voucher treatment group, which subsidizes job-
fair attendance, more than doubles the likelihood that individuals search for work in Manila
in the two months after the job fair, increasing the likelihood of search by 2.1 percentage
points compared with an average of 1.6 percentage points for the control group. Additionally,
attendance induces individuals to shift from self-employment to work in the formal sector.
Formal sector employment rises by 38 percent, or 4.8 percentage points, as a result of voucher
assignment, and self-employment falls by 25 percent, or 6.7 percentage points. These results
are highly robust to estimating average effect sizes by outcome group, and the employment
results remain significant after adjusting for multiple comparisons by controlling the FWER
or FDR.
The change in search experience is concentrated among two groups: those without formal
job-search experience and those with work history in Manila, indicating a potential role
for information or behavioral “nudge’ into search. However, only those with at least some
labor-market exposure - either with past formal job-search experience or with work history
in Manila - increase their likelihood of being employed in the formal sector. Because those
with formal job-search experience are more likely to be employed in the formal sector but
do not change how they search, there is also evidence that attending the fair may improve
individuals’ skill in looking for work.
This paper provides the first evidence of the impact of factual information and the experience
of searching on individuals’ job-search beliefs and decisions. In addition, the main results
have implications beyond the realm of job-search decisions in the rural Philippines. These
findings indicate that experiential learning may be particularly important in shaping individ-
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uals’ beliefs and decisions, particularly when information and knowledge is costly and there
is uncertainty about outcomes, which is important in contexts ranging from education and
health investment decisions to technology adoption. While the exact parameter estimates
are likely specific to this context, they indicate the importance of accounting for incomplete
information in job-search decisions more broadly.
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Figure 1.1: Project timeline and intervention flowchart
37







































-100 -50 0 50
Change in likeliest wage resp. could earn overseas (thousands of Pesos)
Control Wage only
Figure 1.3: Differential change in likeliest wages respondent would earn overseas between
baseline and follow-up surveys, by wage treatment assignment
Note: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects equality of distributions with p = 0.026
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Tables
Table 1.1: Summary statistics and balancing tests
Voucher Information
ControlO Treatment Control WageO Qual.O
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 49.3 52.6 49.3 48.9 52.8
Age (mean) 27.2 27.2 27.2 26.4 28.0**
Married 57.3 56.9 54.1 51.4 66.1**
With children 58.2 59.5 56.2 51.8 67.8**
High school or greater 74.7 67.9 72.3 75 70.3
College graduate 17.5 13.1 16.8 15.5 16.1
Mean household income (,000s) 6.1 5.3 5.6 6.3 5.5
Working at baseline 35.9 37.2 37.7 35.6 35.7
Ever worked 83.7 85.4 84.9 81.7 86.0
Ever worked in Manila 40.0 37.2 38.0 41.5 37.8
Interested in working abroad 28.2 20.1 28.1 23.9 24.8
Plan to apply abroad, next 12 mo. 34.7 27.4* 29.1 34.2 33.9
Currently has passport 5.4 4.4 4.5 4.2 6.6
Ever applied abroad 29.1 24.8 25.3 28.1 29.7
Any family abroad since 2005 48.5 45.3 45.5 49.7 47.1831
Distance to job fair (km) 3.0 3.2 2.9 3.6 2.8
Observations 588 274 292 284 286
F-test statistic 1.14 0.83 1.82
P-value 0.33 0.65 0.04**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Starred values indicate statistically significant differences between that treatment group
(voucher, wage information, or qualification information) and the respective control group. F-test
statistic and corresponding p-value reported for joint test of the equality of all covariates between that
treatment group and the respective control group. Standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level.
Income is top-coded at P40,000 ($US 913) per month.
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Table 1.2: Intention-to-treat estimates of voucher and information treatments on whether
respondents attend job fair
Attend job fair
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 0.334*** 0.354*** 0.327*** 0.336***
[0.035] [0.035] [0.053] [0.055]
Wage Information -0.008 -0.006 0.004 0.000
[0.034] [0.035] [0.031] [0.031]
Wage X Voucher -0.034 -0.015
[0.090] [0.092]
Qualification Information 0.007 0.018 -0.010 -0.003
[0.031] [0.032] [0.034] [0.032]
Qualification X Voucher 0.062 0.077
[0.076] [0.076]
Constant 0.687*** 0.663*** 0.648*** 0.622***
[0.086] [0.121] [0.079] [0.116]
Observations 862 862 862 862
Individual covariates NO YES NO YES
P-value of joint tests:
Voucher + Wage + Voucher X Wage = 0 0.00*** 0.00***
Voucher + Qual + Voucher X Qual = 0 0.00*** 0.00***
Dependent Mean, Control 12.7%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to baseline respondents with non-missing covariates. Robust standard
errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell and enumerator
fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education, and
dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested
in working abroad.
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Table 1.3: Intention-to-treat estimates of voucher and information treatments on steps to
migrate
Look abroad, Visit recruit. Obtain Interested
Apr.-Jan. agency, passport working
first time abroad
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 0.000 -0.017 0.005 -0.035**
[0.008] [0.013] [0.013] [0.015]
Wage Information 0.008 0.012 0.032* -0.004
[0.008] [0.018] [0.017] [0.023]
Qualification Information 0.007 -0.009 0.008 -0.034
[0.009] [0.017] [0.013] [0.025]
Constant -0.050 0.002 -0.036 0.001
[0.033] [0.061] [0.044] [0.078]
Observations 826 826 826 825
Dependent Mean, Control 1.1% 6.0% 1.6% 13.0%
Stratification Cell FE YES YES YES YES
Individual Covariates YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to follow-up respondents. Robust standard errors clustered at the neigh-
borhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Indi-
vidual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether
currently or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad.
41
Table 1.4: Intention-to-treat estimates of voucher and information treatments on job-search
effort
Whether look for work Total offers received
two months after fair ten months after fair
Anywhere Within Within Anywhere Within Within
province Manila province Manila
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Voucher -0.002 -0.023** 0.021* 0.016 -0.028 0.044*
[0.015] [0.010] [0.012] [0.032] [0.020] [0.025]
Wage Info -0.004 -0.007 0.008 -0.006 -0.014 0.008
[0.017] [0.013] [0.013] [0.039] [0.027] [0.027]
Qualification Info -0.011 -0.011 -0.001 -0.068* -0.025 -0.043
[0.016] [0.012] [0.011] [0.039] [0.026] [0.029]
Constant 0.095 0.069 0.040 0.308** 0.239** 0.070
[0.066] [0.055] [0.035] [0.139] [0.111] [0.108]
Observations 826 826 826 826 826 826
Dep. Mean, Control 5.9% 4.3% 1.6% 0.3 0.1 0.1
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to follow-up respondents. Robust standard errors clustered at the neigh-
borhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Indi-
vidual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether
currently or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad.
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Table 1.5: Intention-to-treat estimates of voucher and information treatments on employment
status at follow-up survey
Employment status Any Formal Informal Self-employ.
at follow-up survey (1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 0.005 0.047** 0.024 -0.067***
[0.028] [0.023] [0.026] [0.025]
Wage Information 0.005 -0.001 0.029 -0.023
[0.033] [0.028] [0.034] [0.029]
Qualification Information 0.059 -0.000 0.041 0.019
[0.037] [0.025] [0.038] [0.033]
Constant 0.275** 0.132 0.111 0.032
[0.133] [0.084] [0.108] [0.127]
Observations 826 826 826 826
Dependent Mean, Control 54.1% 12.4% 14.6% 27.0%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to follow-up respondents. Robust standard errors
clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell
and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex,
age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently or
ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad.




Take steps to migrate -0.033 0.091* -0.001
[0.037] [0.047] [0.047]
Shift search to Manila 0.118*** 0.039 0.001
[0.042] [0.046] [0.044]
∆ in formal/informal sector employment 0.120*** 0.044 0.024
[0.041] [0.046] [0.053]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to baseline respondents with non-missing covariates. Robust standard
errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell and enumerator
fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education, and
dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested
in working abroad. Mean effect sizes calculated based on Equation 1.2.
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Table 1.7: Family-wise and false discovery rate adjusted p-values of voucher treatment effects
FWER FDR
Unadjusted Bonferroni Holm Benjamini-
p-value Step-down Hochberg
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Take steps to migrate
Look abroad, Apr.-Jan. 0.997 1.000 1.000 0.997
Visit recruitment agency, first time 0.197 0.788 0.591 0.394
Obtain passport 0.682 1.000 1.000 0.909
Interested in working abroad 0.020 0.080* 0.080* 0.080*
Job search, months after fair
Look for work locally, 2 months 0.027 0.108 0.108 0.108
Look for work in Manila, 2 months 0.087 0.348 0.255 0.116
# local offers, 10 months 0.162 0.648 0.255 0.162
# offers in Manila, 10 months 0.085 0.340 0.255 0.116
Employment
Employed in formal sector 0.046 0.138 0.092* 0.069*
Employed in informal sector 0.347 1.000 0.347 0.347
Self-Employed 0.009 0.027** 0.027** 0.027**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Adjusted p-values calculated as discussed in Section 1.5.3. Sample restricted to follow-up
respondents. Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets.
Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex,
age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever
employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad.
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Table 1.8: IV and OLS measures of job-fair attendance on job-search effort and employment
status
Voucher Attend Job Fair
OLS OOOLSOO IV
(1) (2) (3)
Whether look for work, two months after job fair:
Anywhere -0.002 -0.011 -0.006
[0.015] [0.020] [0.039]
Within Province -0.023** -0.001 -0.064**
[0.010] [0.016] [0.028]
Within Manila 0.021* -0.004 0.057*
[0.012] [0.012] [0.033]
Whether employed at follow-up:
Any 0.005 -0.026 0.013
[0.028] [0.035] [0.076]
Formal 0.047** 0.042 0.130**
[0.023] [0.029] [0.063]
Informal 0.024 -0.049* 0.067
[0.026] [0.028] [0.069]
Self-Employed -0.067*** -0.019 -0.185***
[0.025] [0.036] [0.069]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to follow-up respondents. Robust standard errors
clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell
and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex,
age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently or
ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad.
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Table 1.9: Heterogeneous impacts of wage information on job-fair attendance and perceived
likeliest wages overseas, by baseline beliefs about overseas wages
Attend job fair Likeliest wage could earn
overseas, follow-up
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage Info -0.004 0.062 1.502 8.195**
[0.034] [0.057] [1.917] [3.259]
Wage X Expected Wage -0.003* -0.232*
[0.002] [0.119]
Constant 0.205* 0.210* 24.861*** 15.721***
[0.111] [0.114] [5.926] [5.349]
Observations 862 862 663 663
Individual covariates YES YES YES YES
DV Mean, control 12.7% 24.9
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to baseline respondents with non-missing covariates. Robust
standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Stratification
cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex, age,
marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed,
ever employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad.
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Table 1.10: Intention-to-treat impacts of voucher and information treatments on accuracy
of expectations about minimum experience requirements for overseas work.
Difference between reported and actual Abs. average Avg. share Avg. share
minimum experience for overseas work difference overestimate underestimate
(1) (2) (3)
Voucher -0.070*** 0.022 -0.027**
[0.025] [0.013] [0.013]
Wage Information -0.001 0.009 -0.015
[0.030] [0.017] [0.016]
Qualification Information -0.057* 0.010 -0.025
[0.031] [0.016] [0.017]
Constant 1.075*** 0.140** 0.491***
[0.149] [0.055] [0.050]
Observations 629 629 629
Dependent Mean, Control 1.3 21.1% 56.5%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Average difference based on six common overseas occupations: domestic helper, caretaker,
construction worker, plumber, factory worker, and food service worker. Actual minimum ex-
perience based on median experience requirements from 23,910 job postings on workabroad.ph.
Sample includes full follow-up respondents with non-missing qualification information at baseline
and follow-up. Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets.
Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex,
age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.A.4: Urban and rural barangay maps, with neighborhood boundaries
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Refused (no proxy) 15 1.7%
In Manila (no proxy) 4 0.5%
Outside municip. (no proxy) 4 0.5%
Moved w/in Bulan (no proxy) 2 0.2%
Unlocated 1 0.1%
Table 1.A.2: Treatment assignment distribution
(Share)
Sample Size
No Voucher Voucher Total
No Information 22% 11% 33%
197 95 292
Wage Information 22% 11% 33%
186 98 284
Qualification Information 22% 11% 33%
205 81 286
Total 66% 33% 100%
588 274 862
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Table 1.A.3: Summary statistics and balancing tests
Mean S.D. F-test
All Info Voucher
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 50.3 50.0 2.2 2.3
Age (mean) 27.2 4.4 9.2*** 0.0
Married 57.2 49.5 5.7*** 0.0
With children 58.6 49.3 6.3*** 0.1
HS Only 31.1 46.3 0.6 0.1
Some college or vocational 25.3 43.5 0.6 0.9
College graduate 16.1 36.8 0.1 2.2
Mean household income (thousands) 5.8 6.6 0.5 1.4
Working at baseline 36.3 48.1 0.2 0.1
Ever worked 84.2 36.5 0.7 0.3
Ever worked in Manila 39.1 48.8 0.2 0.2
Interested in working abroad 25.6 43.7 0.5 5.9**
Plan to apply abroad in next 12 months 32.4 46.8 0.6 3.4
Currently has passport 5.1 22.0 1.0 0.4
Ever applied abroad 27.7 44.8 0.7 1.6
Any family abroad since 2005 47.4 50.0 0.3 0.6
Distance to job fair (km) 3.1 2.8 0.6 0.1
Observations 862
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Mean and standard deviation reported for full sample. F-test statistic for joint test
of equality of means between all information groups (control, wage, qualification) and for
voucher groups (control, treatment), with standard errors clustered at the neighborhood
level. Income is top-coded at P40,000 ($US 913) per month.
51
Table 1.A.4: Differential attrition by treatment assignment
Attrition Proxy
Mean SD F-test P-val Mean SD F-test P-val
No Information 2.73 16.32 18.43 38.86
Wage Info. 4.58 20.94 1.82 0.18 16.90 37.54 0.27 0.61
Qualification Info. 3.13 17.43 0.02 0.88 14.24 35.00 1.59 0.21
No Voucher 3.05 17.21 17.12 37.70




Figure 1.B.1: Wage information treatment (English translation)
Wage information script:
I would like to share with you some information about average wages locally and over-
seas. Information on OFW wages comes from POEA and information on Sorsogon
wages come from a survey we conducted around Sorsogon Province last year. These
wages are based on an average of the experiences of thousands of workers and families,
so the experiences of yourself and the people you know may be different.
On average the salary of an OFW is more than two times the total income of a Sor-
soganon family. The average OFW earns P28,500 every month. The average family in
Sorsogon province earns P12,000 every month.
53
Figure 1.B.2: Occupation cards for domestic helper (women) and factory worker (men)
54
Qualification Information Script:
I would like to share with you some information about your qualifications for work overseas. We’ve
collected information about job postings for thousands of overseas job vacancies from workabroad.ph
and we’ve summarized it on these pages.
In order to give you the most useful information, please select TWO occupations that you would like
to learn more about from the following list. [SHOW LIST]
First, I’m going to tell you about typical qualifications for a position as a [DESIRED POSITION 1].
These qualifications are based on an average of hundreds of job postings, so there may be vacancies
with both higher and lower minimum qualifications.
Each shaded person represents one job vacancy out of 100 job vacancies. For example, if all job postings
for a certain position are open to a high school graduate, all 100 persons will be shaded. If only half of
positions are open to a high school graduate, 50 persons will be shaded and 50 persons will be empty.
Do you have any questions? [READ SCRIPT FOR DESIRED POSITION 1]
Now, I’m going to tell you about typical qualifications for a position as a [DESIRED POSITION 2].
[READ SCRIPT FOR DESIRED POSITION 2]
Based on your qualifications, I’m going to tell you about the typical qualifications for positions as a
[ASSIGNED POSITION 1] and [ASSIGNED POSITION 2].
[READ SCRIPT FOR ASSIGNED POSITIONS 1 AND 2]
Position Script:
For [WOMEN/MEN] applying for a position as a POSITION,
[READ ONLY THOSE EDUCATION PROMPTS INCLUDED ON THE INFO SHEET]
XX vacancies out of every 100 vacancies, or XX percent, would be open to you if you had less than a
high school diploma. YY vacancies out of every 100 vacancies, or YY percent, would be open to you if
you are a high school graduate. ...
[READ ONLY THOSE EXPERIENCE PROMPTS INCLUDED ON THE INFO SHEET]
With respect to experience, XX vacancies out of every 100 vacancies, or XX percent, would be open to
you if you have no related experience. YY vacancies out of every 100 vacancies, or YY percent, would
be open to you if you have 1 year of related experience. ...
Because you are a RESPONDENT EDUCATION, you would be eligible for XX vacancies out of 100
vacancies, or XX percent. Because you have RESPONDENT RELATED EXPERIENCE years of
related experience, you would be eligible for YY vacancies out of 100 vacancies, or YY percent.
[PICK THE CUTOFF WHERE AT LEAST 40 VACANCIES ARE AVAILABLE]
In general, a good candidate for POSITION would be at least CUTOFF EDUCATION and have at
least CUTOFF EXPERIENCE years of related experience.
[IF MEETS BOTH > 60] Based on your qualifications, you would be a very strong candidate for a
position overseas as a POSITION.
[IF MEETS BOTH > 40] Based on your qualifications, you would be a strong candidate for a
position overseas as a POSITION.
[IF MEETS ONE OR NONE > 40] Based on your qualifications, you are not a strong can-
didate right now for a position as a POSITION, but you could be by increasing your [EDUCA-
TION/EXPERIENCE/EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE].
Do you have any questions?
55
1.C Additional specifications
Table 1.C.1: Predictors of whether respondents had ever applied overseas at baseline
Ever applied for overseas work, baseline
(1) (2)
Likeliest wage would earn abroad (in thousands) 0.003** 0.001
[0.001] [0.001]














Ever worked in Manila 0.070**
[0.034]




*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to baseline respondents with non-missing covariates. Stratification cell
and enumerator FE included. Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.D.1: Intention-to-treat estimates of voucher and information treatments on steps to
migrate, probit specifications
Look abroad, Recruitment Obtain Interested
Apr.-Jan. agency visit, passport in working
first time abroad
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 0.000 -0.013 0.008 -0.034**
[0.002] [0.012] [0.010] [0.017]
Qualification Information 0.005 -0.009 0.011 -0.027
[0.005] [0.013] [0.012] [0.021]
Wage Information 0.006 0.009 0.028* -0.005
[0.006] [0.015] [0.015] [0.020]
Observations 826 826 826 825
Observations 826 826 826 826
Dependent Mean, Control 1.1% 6.0% 1.6% 13.0%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to follow-up respondents. Marginal effects reported at co-
variate means. Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported
in brackets. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education,
and dummy variables for whether currently employed, ever employed in Manila, and
interested in working abroad. Whether ever employed and whether completed at
least high school excluded because they perfectly predict some outcome variables.
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Table 1.D.2: Intention-to-treat estimates of voucher and information treatments on job-
search effort, probit specifications
Whether look for work




Voucher 0.004 -0.020** 0.020*
[0.014] [0.008] [0.011]
Wage Information -0.002 -0.005 0.006
[0.015] [0.010] [0.009]
Qualification Information -0.004 -0.008 0.004
[0.016] [0.009] [0.009]
Observations 826 826 826
Dependent Mean, Control 5.9% 4.3% 1.6%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to follow-up respondents. Marginal effects reported
at covariate means. Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood
level reported in brackets. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital
status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently employed,
ever employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad. Whether ever
employed and whether completed at least high school excluded because they
perfectly predict some outcome variables.
Table 1.D.3: Intention-to-treat estimates of voucher and information treatments on employ-
ment status at follow-up survey, probit specifications
At follow-up: Any Formal Informal Self-employ.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 0.018 0.037* 0.034 -0.059*
[0.039] [0.022] [0.030] [0.031]
Wage Information 0.016 -0.011 0.031 -0.025
[0.042] [0.023] [0.034] [0.035]
Qualification Information 0.090* -0.005 0.048 0.019
[0.051] [0.023] [0.039] [0.036]
Observations 826 826 826 826
Dependent Mean, Control 54.1% 12.4% 14.6% 27.0%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to follow-up respondents. Marginal effects reported
at covariate means. Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood
level reported in brackets. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital
status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently employed,
ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad.
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Table 1.D.4: Robustness of voucher impacts on migration steps, job-search effort, and em-
ployment status
Voucher
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whether take steps to find work abroad
Look for work abroad, 10 mo -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004
[0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009]
Visit RA first time -0.022 -0.016 -0.017 -0.013 -0.009 -0.011
[0.016] [0.014] [0.013] [0.018] [0.016] [0.014]
Obtain passport -0.000 0.007 0.005 -0.002 0.004 0.001
[0.015] [0.014] [0.013] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015]
Interested in working abroad -0.051** -0.036** -0.035** -0.044** -0.034* -0.029*
[0.020] [0.018] [0.015] [0.022] [0.019] [0.017]
Whether look for work, two months after job fair
Anywhere -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.011 0.011 0.006
[0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Within province -0.023** -0.022** -0.023** -0.022** -0.022** -0.023**
[0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
Within Manila 0.022* 0.022* 0.021* 0.033** 0.033** 0.029**
[0.013] [0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.013]
Employment status at follow-up survey
Any 0.000 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.014 0.010
[0.037] [0.031] [0.028] [0.046] [0.038] [0.035]
Formal 0.022 0.039 0.047** 0.033 0.040* 0.046**
[0.028] [0.023] [0.023] [0.026] [0.022] [0.022]
Informal 0.026 0.029 0.024 0.040 0.041 0.041
[0.029] [0.030] [0.026] [0.035] [0.035] [0.030]
Self-employment -0.049 -0.056* -0.067*** -0.061 -0.067* -0.075**
[0.033] [0.031] [0.025] [0.039] [0.037] [0.031]
Proxy respondents included YES YES YES NO NO NO
Observations 826 826 826 663 663 663
Individual covariates X X X X
Stratification cell fixed effects X X
Enumerator fixed effects X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to follow-up respondents. Robust standard errors clustered at the neighbor-
hood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual
characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently
or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad.
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Table 1.D.5: Robustness of wage information impacts on migration steps, job-search effort,
and employment status
Wage Information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whether take steps to find work abroad
Look for work abroad, 10 mo 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.008
[0.010] [0.010] [0.008] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010]
Visit RA first time 0.005 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.011
[0.021] [0.019] [0.018] [0.021] [0.019] [0.019]
Obtain passport 0.030 0.031* 0.032* 0.039* 0.038* 0.040**
[0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.021] [0.020] [0.018]
Interested in working abroad -0.012 -0.007 -0.004 0.003 0.006 0.010
[0.030] [0.026] [0.023] [0.034] [0.030] [0.026]
Whether look for work, two months after job fair
Anywhere -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
[0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018]
Within province -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.000
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Within Manila 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Employment status at follow-up survey
Any -0.016 0.004 0.005 -0.003 0.000 0.000
[0.039] [0.033] [0.033] [0.051] [0.040] [0.043]
Formal -0.007 -0.012 -0.001 0.009 0.002 0.013
[0.033] [0.028] [0.028] [0.031] [0.025] [0.023]
Informal 0.027 0.035 0.029 0.030 0.032 0.020
[0.032] [0.032] [0.034] [0.034] [0.033] [0.035]
Self-employment -0.036 -0.019 -0.023 -0.042 -0.033 -0.033
[0.038] [0.033] [0.029] [0.044] [0.038] [0.034]
Proxy respondents included YES YES YES NO NO NO
Observations 826 826 826 663 663 663
Individual covariates X X X X
Stratification cell fixed effects X X
Enumerator fixed effects X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to follow-up respondents. Robust standard errors clustered at the neigh-
borhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Indi-
vidual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether
currently or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad.
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Table 1.D.6: Robustness of qualification information impacts on migration steps, job-search
effort, and employment status
Qualification Information
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whether take steps to find work abroad
Look for work abroad, 10 mo 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.009
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009]
Visit RA first time -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002
[0.018] [0.017] [0.017] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017]
Obtain passport 0.007 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.012
[0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014]
Interested in working abroad -0.046 -0.034 -0.034 -0.051* -0.037 -0.030
[0.028] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.023] [0.024]
Whether look for work, two months after job fair
Anywhere -0.010 -0.004 -0.011 0.010 0.015 0.011
[0.017] [0.017] [0.016] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017]
Within province -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Within Manila -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.013 0.016 0.013
[0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Employment status at follow-up survey
Any 0.051 0.065 0.059 0.057 0.074 0.074*
[0.044] [0.041] [0.037] [0.052] [0.046] [0.044]
Formal -0.027 -0.007 -0.000 -0.001 0.013 0.018
[0.030] [0.026] [0.025] [0.027] [0.023] [0.023]
Informal 0.042 0.049 0.041 0.065 0.070* 0.061
[0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040]
Self-employment 0.035 0.023 0.019 -0.007 -0.009 -0.004
[0.038] [0.036] [0.033] [0.045] [0.043] [0.039]
Proxy respondents included YES YES YES NO NO NO
Observations 826 826 826 663 663 663
Individual covariates X X X X
Stratification cell fixed effects X X
Enumerator fixed effects X X
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to follow-up respondents. Robust standard errors clustered at the neigh-
borhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Indi-
vidual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether
currently or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested in working abroad.
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1.E Qualification treatment heterogeneity
Like the wage information treatment, information about minimum qualifications for over-
seas work may have heterogeneous impacts depending on respondents’ characteristics, both
because their response may depend on their own perceptions, and because what information
they receive depends on their gender and may also depend on their education level and work
experience. I examine the role of heterogeneity to determine whether the information affects
individuals’ behavior and labor market perceptions differentially by gender or by educational
attainment. I estimate the ITT impact of minimum qualification information on whether
individuals attend the job fair, their average accuracy on minimum experience requirements
described earlier, their predicted probability of being offered a job overseas if they apply
(the “perceived likelihood of job-finding abroad”), and their self-reported qualification level
for overseas work. The last measure is based on reports of how qualified respondents say they
are for each of six common overseas positions, ranging from “not qualified” (1) to “very qual-
ified” (5).64 I take the maximum of these six values as their self-reported qualification level.
Appendix Table 1.E.1 reports estimates for these three measures, first using the full sample,
then separately by gender and by whether they had completed at least some post-secondary
schooling.65
Although the qualification information has no net impact overall, men assigned to receive
qualification information are 9.1 percentage points more likely to attend the job fair, and
they increase their perceived likelihood of job-finding abroad, conditional on applying, by
10.3 percentage points. This change in the perceived likelihood of job-finding abroad is sta-
tistically significantly different between men and women.66 The impact on the maximum
qualification index is also positive for men, though small and not statistically significant.
64These positions are domestic helper, caretaker, construction worker, plumber, factory worker, and food
service crew member. I control for the baseline reported maximum qualification index in these specifications.
65I exclude proxy surveys in all specifications, as the perceived probabilities of job offers and qualification
levels are only reported in the full surveys. Attendance results are comparable in the full sample.
66The reported p-values of tests of the equality of coefficients between men and women are based on a
model that fully interacts a gender dummy with all treatment indicators, covariates, and fixed effects.
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These results contrast sharply with the results for women, which are all negative and not
statistically significant, and are different from the results for men at the five-percent level.
The distinction along education lines is less clear, which is reasonable given that a high school
diploma is a sufficient qualification for many occupations and that this does not account for
relevant experience, the dimension along which individuals were the least accurate. Con-
sequently, qualification information does not affect attendance or the perceived likelihood
of job-finding abroad for those with or without post-secondary education, though individ-
uals with some post-secondary education report that they are more qualified for overseas
positions at follow-up.
Together, the heterogeneity in impacts suggest that information about minimum qualifica-
tions for overseas work does affect individuals’ perceptions about minimum qualifications for
overseas work, but that it only translates to changes in one’s own labor market perceptions
and job-fair attendance for men. In Appendix Table 1.E.2, I find that qualification infor-
mation has small impacts on migration steps taken (those used in Table 1.3) by gender and
by educational attainment. There are broadly positive impacts on migration steps among
those who did not complete any post-secondary schooling, but only one of these - whether
an individual searched abroad at all in the ten months following the fair - is marginally
statistically significant. There are also small, negative impacts of qualification information
on the likelihood of visiting a recruitment agency for the first time among women and those
with some post-secondary schooling, but only the latter is marginally statistically significant.
I cannot reject the equality of coefficients between gender or education subgroups.
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Table 1.E.1: Heterogeneous impacts of qualification information on job-fair attendance and
overseas labor market perceptions, by gender and education
Attend job Abs. average Prob. job Qualification
fair dif. in min. offer abroad, index, 1(low)
experience if apply -5 (high)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All 0.024 -0.057* 0.040 0.106
[0.031] [0.031] [0.025] [0.137]
Men 0.091* -0.067 0.103*** 0.140
[0.047] [0.048] [0.032] [0.178]
Women -0.025 -0.062 0.004 -0.018
[0.042] [0.043] [0.033] [0.153]
High school or less 0.014 -0.044 0.070** -0.016
[0.041] [0.046] [0.035] [0.175]
More than high school 0.020 -0.087** -0.032 0.365*
[0.054] [0.042] [0.039] [0.217]
Total observations 862 629 663 663
Dep. Mean, Control 12.7% 1.3 47.5% 3.7
P-value from test for equality of coefficients
Gender 0.12 0.98 0.01** 0.60
Education 0.80 0.74 0.05* 0.04**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to baseline respondents with full follow-up surveys. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets.
Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteris-
tics include sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether
currently or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and interested in working
abroad.
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Table 1.E.2: Heterogeneous impacts of qualification information on steps to migrate, by
gender and education
Look abroad, Recruitment Obtain
Apr.-Jan. agency visit, passport
first time
(1) (2) (3)
All 0.007 -0.009 0.008
[0.009] [0.017] [0.013]
Men 0.024 0.024 -0.008
[0.016] [0.026] [0.016]
Women -0.003 -0.034 0.023
[0.009] [0.024] [0.023]
High school or less 0.013* 0.012 0.010
[0.008] [0.022] [0.014]
More than high school 0.007 -0.034 0.002
[0.021] [0.026] [0.024]
Total observations 826 826 826
Dependent Mean, Control 1.1% 5.9% 1.6%
P-value from test for equality of coefficients
Gender 0.17 0.12 0.28
Education 0.74 0.18 0.79
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample includes all follow-up respondents. Robust standard errors
clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell
and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include
sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether




Perceived Returns and Job-Search Selection
2.1 Introduction
Participant self-selection into (or out of) active labor market programs is a fundamental
component of measuring the programs’ overall impact. While natural and randomized ex-
periments can obtain causal identification of these program impacts, generalizing these esti-
mates requires understanding how people who select into the evaluated program may differ
from the general population, which they may do in both observable and unobservable ways.
This paper uses experimental evidence from the rural Philippines to examine how the char-
acteristics of individuals who participate in labor market programs differ from those who
do not. Specifically, I consider the degree and nature of individuals’ self-selection into at-
tending and participating in a job fair for overseas work. By combining survey data with a
novel dataset of labor demand for overseas work, I examine how individuals’ qualifications
and labor market perceptions correlate with their decisions to look for work at the fair. I
also measure how this selection changes in response to exogenous variation in the benefit of
searching. Specifically, I examine the impact of a modest incentive to look for work abroad,
similar in spirit to door prizes or giveaways commonly used to entice job-seekers to job and
career fairs, on the overall levels of attendance and participation at the fair, as well as on
the characteristics of the searchers.
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Under a simple framework of program participation, individuals will attend the job fair if the
perceived benefits exceed the perceived costs.1 Positive selection will occur if more-qualified
workers, with higher expected benefits from working abroad, are more likely to attend.2
However, more-qualified workers may also have higher opportunity costs of attending the
fair and of migrating abroad, inducing negative selection.3 The distribution of underlying
relative returns to migration - reflecting qualification levels, individuals’ outside options,
and the costs of search - will determine the overall pattern of selection (Roy, 1951; Borjas,
1987). A subsidy will increase the benefit of attending, bringing in less qualified workers in
the case of positive selection, or bringing in more-qualified workers in the case of negative
selection. For example, Duflo and Saez (2003) find that paying university employees to
attend a retirement savings plan enrollment fair yields large increases in attendance, but the
higher rate of enrollment they observe is driven entirely by spillovers to untreated members
of the same department, as those who attend the fair as a result of the subsidy are no more
likely to enroll.4
In the presence of imperfect information, however, two additional issues may complicate
selection. First, individuals’ perceptions of their labor market prospects may not correlate
perfectly with their actual returns; individuals may over or underestimate their own quali-
fications or they may be highly uncertain about their prospects (Falk, Huffman and Sunde,
2006a). These factors may affect their attendance decisions directly, and individuals may
also revise their beliefs upon attending. If individuals update their expectations about their
1I assume that credit constraints do not prevent attendance. In this context, most individuals live within
walking distance from the job fair. The subsidy is unlikely to address credit constraints directly because
individuals receive the subsidy after traveling to the fair, and because the subsidy is a restaurant voucher,
which is difficult to convert to cash.
2Alternatively more-qualified workers may participate if they’re more likely to know about the fair. See
Heckman and Smith (2004) for an example.
3For example, recent evidence on the impact of the expansion of relatively low-cost Internet job search
on unemployment suggests that these online job-seekers are negatively selected on unobserved characteristics
(Kuhn and Skuterud, 2004; Hadass, 2004).
4That degree of negative selection is particularly problematic in the similar case of a job fair, as a large
number of unmotivated attendees might crowd out motivated attendees, potentially reducing their chances
of job-finding.
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job-finding prospects after attending, and if the cost of participating conditional on attend-
ing is non-zero, they may select differently into participation, and this change in selection
may depend on their underlying qualifications and their prior perceptions.5
To understand how individuals self-target into job search, I surveyed 862 residents of Bulan,
Sorsogon Province, who were ages 20-35 and had never worked overseas. I obtained their
detailed work histories and measured their beliefs about the likelihood they would be of-
fered a job abroad if they were to apply. I also collected data from the most popular online
job-finding database for overseas Filipino workers on minimum educational and experiential
requirements for overseas work from 24,300 job-postings, representing roughly 230,000 va-
cancies. I linked this data on the number of overseas jobs available by education, years of
relevant experience, and gender to respondents’ backgrounds to measure the share of overseas
jobs for which they are potentially qualified. This measure serves as a proxy for individuals’
relative qualification levels for overseas work, which reflects their likelihood of being able to
find work abroad.6
I generated exogenous variation in the benefit of attending by offering individuals from
randomly selected neighborhoods vouchers that they could exchange for a gift certificate
to a local fast-food restaurant any time during a two-day overseas employment fair located
nearby.7 The survey team hosted this job-fair in partnership with the municipality, and it
5Respondents may have stayed at the job fair after receiving the voucher despite low perceived returns
if applying is nearly costless, particularly if the job fair is viewed as more of a social event or if the time
required to apply is negligible. However, slightly more than half of respondents arrive at the job fair alone.
Additionally, there were large queues of applicants at the recruitment agency booths. Applicants spent, on
average, 116 more minutes at the job fair than those who only attended. For respondents to view applying
as costless, the opportunity cost of time for low-qualified applicants would have to be very low.
6I use a measure that reflects the likelihood of job-finding rather than wages because the relative returns
to migration are high even for relatively low-paying overseas jobs. In 2011-adjusted pesos, the average
overseas worker earned P28,500 (US$650) monthly (McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang, forthcoming), and
for relatively less-skilled overseas domestic helpers, the Philippine government set a minimum wage of US$400
monthly. In contrast, the median wage of a permanent wage/salary worker in Manila was 404 pesos daily
in 2011, roughly US$185 per month with 20 workdays. Outside the capital, the median wage was about
273 pesos daily (US$125 monthly). This and all subsequent currency conversions are based on the average
exchange rate from January to February 2011 of 1 US$= 43.7976 PH (OANDA, 2012).
7The gift certificate was for Jollibee, a popular fast-food chain with a restaurant located in the central
business distract of Bulan. It was worth P150 (US$3.42), which was approximately enough to buy a fast-food
meal for four people.
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attracted more than 750 participants, roughly 30 percent of whom were survey respondents.
Enumerators tracked individuals’ attendance and participation at the job fair, and I matched
this administrative data with survey responses to examine how those induced to search
through the increased benefit of attending differ from the general applicant pool, as well as
how those who stay and participate in the fair differ from those who leave immediately after
retrieving their incentive.
I find that 13 percent of the control group - individuals who were invited to attend the
job-fair but not subsidized - do attend the fair, and they are positively selected from the
overall distribution of respondents, in terms of both their qualifications and their own percep-
tions. Offering a subsidy increases attendance by 35.4 percentage points, or by 270 percent.8
Attendance rates increase for both high and low qualification levels, indicating that high
opportunity costs or underestimation of one’s qualifications may be restricting attendance
in the absence of this subsidy. In general, this increase is greatest for the least qualified
and those with the lowest perceived chance of job-finding. However, these attendees, while
negatively selected compared to the control-group attendees, are broadly representative of
the population from which they are drawn.
The subsidy also generates a 8.8 percentage-point increase in the likelihood that individuals
visit an information booth at the fair and a 4.7 percentage-point increase in application
rates. While most unsubsidized control-group attendees (78 percent) apply with a recruit-
ment agency, roughly half of subsidized attendees leave after collecting their voucher. I find
that individuals self-select out based on their interest in working abroad and qualifications.
However, their perceived likelihood of job-finding remains a strong predictor of participation
even after controlling for individuals’ education or the share of jobs for which they may be
qualified. The voucher induces individuals with a high degree of uncertainty about their
8These effects are large in magnitude but in line with estimates of the response to incentivized fair
attendance in other contexts; for example, Duflo and Saez (2003) find that offering $20 subsidy to university
employees for attending an employee retirement-benefits fair increased attendance rates by a factor greater
than five.
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job-finding prospects - those who report a 50-percent chance they would be offered a job
abroad if they applied - to apply with recruitment agencies. I find suggestive evidence that
this reported uncertainty proxies for individuals not knowing their labor market prospects,
suggesting that these uncertain searchers are either just on the margin of applying without
the subsidy, or that they update their beliefs about their own prospects upon attending the
fair.
These results have several implications: they provide evidence that small incentives to in-
crease job search have large effects on attendance and application. While these incentives
“undo” some of the positive selection that occurs in their absence, those who attend the
fair are reflective of the general population in their qualifications, perceived chances of job-
finding, and interest in overseas work. Additionally, that the increase in application induced
by the voucher is concentrated exclusively among those with a high degree of uncertainty
about their job-finding prospects indicates the presence of imperfect information about over-
seas migration, and that a modest subsidy can help individuals choose to reduce these infor-
mational barriers. Additionally, unless these uncertain respondents are just on the margin
of applying, where the difference between the benefits exceed the cost but by less than the
utility gained from a P150 voucher, these results suggest these uncertain individuals may be
dynamically updating their beliefs during the job fair experience.
These findings are relevant to the program participation literature pertaining to active labor
market programs, but also to other literatures in which uncertainty about market returns
may influence not only individuals’ take-up decisions, but also their response to incentives.
Selection into take-up and the role of imperfection information in self-selection have been
important issues in the education and health literatures. Recent work has found individuals
in developing countries tend to underestimate their own and others’ returns to education
(Jensen, 2010; Nguyen, 2008) or migration (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2013). However,
these studies do not account for the perceived likelihood of finding a job, which may be
especially important in contexts with high unemployment and underemployment. In the
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education literature, Attanasio and Kaufmann (2012) and Kaufmann (2012) do account
for perceived unemployment risk but not uncertainty around that risk.9 Avery and Kane
(2004) find suggestive evidence that many students from low-income backgrounds interested
in attending college do not apply because they believe they will be rejected.
The next section provides additional background on overseas migration and the project
location. Section 2.3 discusses the characteristics of those who attend the job fair, and
Section 2.4 examines the impact attendance subsidy on job-fair participation and selection
into search. In Section 2.5, I discuss the role of individual perceptions, and Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 Overseas migration and job fairs in the Philippines
For decades, Filipino politicians and government officials have heralded overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs) as the “bagong bayani,” or “modern-day heroes” of the nation (E.O.446
2005).10 The pool of OFWs is large and growing: approximately nine percent of Filipinos
are living overseas, and nearly half of those abroad are on temporary work contracts. The
Philippines deploys an average of 1.7 million temporary workers annually (CFO 2009; POEA
2013). These overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) have been an important means of economic
growth for the Philippines; total remittances have more than doubled over the past eight
years to US$21.4 billion in 2012, which account for roughly 8 percent of total GDP (BSP
2012).
On an individual level, migration can bring large income gains for migrants and their fam-
ilies (Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett, 2009; Adams and Page, 2005). But despite high
demand abroad for both low and high-skilled workers, the benefits of migration have been
9Attanasio and Kaufmann (2012) find that boys who have a relatively low perceived likelihood of employ-
ment conditional on only having high school degree, and a relatively high perceived likelihood conditional
on having a college degree, are more likely to attend college.
10The term “modern-day heroes” was first used by President Corazon Aquino in a 1988 speech to Filipino
domestic helpers in Hong Kong.
73
more difficult to access for rural Filipinos, who face higher informational and financial over-
seas search costs than their urban counterparts. In Bulan, the nearest overseas recruitment
agency branch office is more than a two-hour bus ride away; anecdotally, most interested
applicants choose to travel twelve hours to Manila in order to search for work abroad. As a
result of this limited access to recruiting institutions, the job search process is particularly
costly for rural applicants, and there may be few opportunities for applicants to learn about
potential returns to job search.
2.2.1 Job fairs in the Philippines
Job fairs in the Philippines are frequent and crowded events. Participants first queue outside
to register with the organizing agency, typically the Department of Labor and Employment
or an educational institutions. In the case of overseas employment, recruitment agencies
set up booths at which they collect applications and conduct preliminary interviews with
applicants. Fair participants queue up at the agencies to which they wish to apply, waiting
their turn to submit their application materials and interview one-on-one with a recruitment
officer.
At typical job fairs, a small share of applicants are offered a job “on-the-spot;” more com-
monly, successful applicants receive invitations to the agency’s office for a final interview with
the employer or additional testing (Tubeza, 2011). For overseas employment, recruitment
agencies can only recruit for job orders registered with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, though they may also conduct “manpower pooling,” in which they note those
applicants who are qualified for positions that may arise in coming months. In general, the
number of positions available at a given fair far exceed the number of applicants, and the
manpower pooling option ensures that all qualified applicants are likely to be considered for
vacancies, rather than fair applicants competing against each other. Consequently, encour-
aging job-fair attendance is likely to lead to additional hires rather than shifting offers from
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less to more-qualified applicants.
The overseas labor market in Sorsogon Province provides an useful context in which to exam-
ine individuals’ self-selection into program participation: non-migrants are highly interested
in working overseas, yet few who who want to work abroad have taken steps to apply. In my
sample, of the 26 percent who reported they were “strongly interested” in working abroad,
less than half had ever applied. Although job fairs are the main way agencies recruit in
rural areas, and most larger municipalities of the province hold fairs roughly once a year,
only 14 percent of respondents, and 24 percent of “strongly interested” individuals, had ever
attended a job fair for overseas work. Expanding access to job fairs may provide those with
limited information or high opportunity or transport costs with additional opportunities to
learn about their prospects and apply for work abroad.
2.3 Selection into job-fair participation
2.3.1 Data
2.3.1.1 Survey data
In January and February 2011, interviewers surveyed 862 residents of Bulan, Sorsogon
Province. They collected data on individuals’ qualifications and labor market perceptions
from a randomly selected sample of individuals ages 20-35 who had never worked overseas.
The sample frame of seventeen barangays included all ten barangays classified as “urban” by
the National Statistics Office, as well as seven that I randomly selected from the remaining
list of rural barangays.11 In these barangays, there are 107 neighborhoods in total, of which
I randomly selected 99.
I used recent household rosters provided by barangay captains to randomly order households
11The barangay is the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines. The municipality of Bulan has 63
barangays. In Bulan, each barangay has between three and ten puroks, or neighborhoods.
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with at least one man aged 20-35 listed on the household roster and to randomly order
households with at least one women aged 20-35. Enumerators targeted five women and
five men per neighborhood. They visited each household in order and screened the first
potentially eligible member, selected randomly from the list of same-gendered respondents
within the target ages of 20-35 in that household. To be eligible, the respondent must also
have had a cell phone number and not have worked overseas before. Ineligible respondents
were replaced with eligible respondents in the same household, and if the household had no
eligible members, the enumerator would proceed to the next randomly selected household.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.1 report demographic characteristics of the sample respon-
dents. Half of respondents are female (a result of the explicit stratification by gender), 58
percent percent are married, and the mean age is 27 years. Roughly three-fourths of re-
spondents reported completing high school, and 16 percent are college graduates. 36 percent
reported that they were working at baseline, defined as “currently working for pay," and
nearly 40 percent had worked in Manila previously. Exposure to overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs) is quite high; 45 percent had at least one family member work abroad since 2005.
To assess how comparable this sample is to the general Filipino population, I report de-
mographic characteristics taken from the January wave of the 2011 Philippine Labor Force
Survey.12 The sample in columns (3) and (4) consists of individuals ages 20 through 35 who
live in a rural area.13 Columns (5) and (6) include all individuals from the Bicol Region,
where Sorsogon Province is located. The samples are similar on most dimensions, such as
the mean age and the share who are female, are married, and have completed at least high
school. Members of my sample are slightly more educated, and they are less likely to report
working at baseline.14 Although I select individuals randomly within each randomly selected
12The LFS is a household-level survey, and respondents list the work experience and demographic char-
acteristics of each household member. I exclude household members who are reported as working overseas.
13This definition excludes the National Capital Region, which is entirely classified as urban.
14The definition of working is slightly different as well: in the LFS, respondents are considered to be
working if they did any work in the past week or if they had a job (but did not work) during that past week.
I code those whose primary occupation is "worked without pay on own-family operated farm or business"
as not currently working.
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household, individuals who had migrated internally or could not be reached because of work
were not surveyed, so it is unsurprising that the Bulan sample reflects a population that is
less likely to be working.
In the survey, I collected detailed information on individuals’ qualifications for overseas work,
primarily through their education and work history, which included both position name and
the number of years they had worked at each job. I use this history to generate measures
of the number of relevant years of work experience each individual has. Additionally, I
collected data on individuals’ subjective likelihood of job finding overseas. Specifically, each
respondent used a 0 to 100 scale to answer the question: “Suppose you submit an application
for overseas work today. How likely is it that you will be offered overseas work in the next
12 months?”15 Responses are fairly evenly divided between a less than 50-percent chance
(33 percent), exactly a 50-percent chance (30 percent), and more than a 50-percent chance
(36 percent) (see Figure 2.1). I refer to this measure as the “perceived chance of job-finding
abroad.”
2.3.1.2 Job-fair outcomes
All survey respondents received an invitation to attend a job-fair for overseas work that took
place March 1 and 2, 2011, in Bulan. I link respondents’ survey responses to their participa-
tion in this fair,16 which I organized in partnership with the municipal government.17 Four
overseas recruitment agencies and one domestic employer from another province participated
15Respondents used a visual scale to assist them in answering the question. This question was one of
a series of questions about their subjective expectations about the likelihood of other labor market events,
which were preceded by two practice questions to ensure they understood the question structure.
16At the fair, participants signed a separate consent form if they were willing to have their participation
information linked to survey responses.
17Although participants were aware that researchers were tracking their numbers and signed a consent
form, they likely perceived the job fair as a typical job fair. Their first interaction was with staff members
of the municipal Public Employment Service Office (PESO), which typically coordinates local recruitment
activities. Receiving numbers and filling out forms is common at most job fairs - the PESO officers also
distributed numbers and a bio-data sheet - and the remaining post-registration activities were typical of
other local job fairs. The local PESO office also assumed full credit for the implementation of the job fair
both during and afterwards, further reducing any perceptions that this was a “research” job fair.
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in the fair. Although specific recruitment procedures vary by firm, participants typically vis-
ited agencies of interest to apply and undergo a pre-screening interview that day. Job fair
participants could also enroll in an online job-finding website or visit a booth to learn how to
apply for a passport. The fair was advertised through fliers and radio in the days before the
fair, and all survey respondents received two text message reminders on the days leading up
to the job fair. Overall attendance was 767, and survey respondents made up 29 percent of
all attendees.18 Survey staff assigned each participant a unique identifier upon arrival, and
this number was recorded whenever participants visited a recruitment agency, enrolled in an
online job-finding website, visited a passport information booth, retrieved their restaurant
vouchers, or exited.
I consider four outcomes of interest: whether respondents attend the fair, visit an informa-
tion booth, apply with a recruitment agency, and receive a final interview offer. A survey
respondent is recorded as “attending” the fair if he registered his name at the entrance and
received a number. Some attendees left immediately after exchanging their vouchers for
the restaurant gift certificate; others attended both days of the fair and applied at several
recruitment agencies. If a respondent enrolled in an online job-finding website or visited a
passport information booth, he is recorded as having “visited an information booth”.19 Those
who visited a recruitment agency booth are also recorded as “applying.” A job-fair partici-
pant could visit an recruitment agency booth without actually applying, but that would be
unlikely given the long wait. The application rate is 11.1 percent from the entire sample,
or 47.3 percent among those who attended the job fair. Finally, roughly half of those who
applied were invited to attend a final interview, and a few were offered a job on the spot;
these respondents are recorded as having received a “final interview offer.”20
18Forty percent of attendees said they heard about the fair through radio, 11 percent through a flier, and
16 percent through a friend.
19Enrolling in the website could also be thought of as applying for work, but unlike visiting a recruitment
agency booth, there is no immediate feedback on one’s qualifications. Like the passport booth, this element
of the fair was staffed by the research team, and therefore I classify it as visiting an information booth.
20One agency only provided data on the people they interviewed in Manila after the fair, not on the
individuals who they invited to interview. Of those who applied at this agency, most were offered a final
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2.3.1.3 Online job-posting data
I use a novel dataset on labor demand for overseas work to derive an objective proxy for
respondents’ qualifications for work abroad. I collect 24,310 job postings, representing
227,243 vacancies, from the most popular overseas job-finding website in the Philippines,
workabroad.ph.21 By using posting data rather than data on the occupational distribution
of actual overseas migrants, I can measure labor demand independently of how that demand
matches with the supply of workers.
Data was collected the during the last two weeks of October 2010 on all current job postings.
In addition to providing a description of the position, each recruitment agency or employer
reports the minimum educational requirements, the minimum number of years of related
experience, and for which genders the position is open.22 I classify occupations based on
name using two-digit codes from the International Standard Classification of Occupations,
or ISCO (ILO 2007). Using occupation-specific years of experience rather than total years
of experience generates a more accurate measure of qualification level, and it is particularly
important in this setting, as work experience in a specific position is often a main qualifica-
tion for technical and vocational positions. In Appendix Figure 2.A.1a, I plot the rank of
each respondent relative to the other survey respondents in terms of the share of jobs for
which he or she is potentially qualified, first using the preferred “relevant experience” mea-
sure (y-axis) and again using a measure which only accounts for education and total years of
work experience (x-axis). I do this separately by respondents’ level of education, and there
is substantial variation in rank order; specifically, when I do not account for whether their
experience is related to the occupation, less-educated individuals are ranked too highly, and
interview from another agency anyway, but seven were not offered a final interview from another agency,
which could lead to a downward bias in my estimates. I check the robustness of my results to assuming all
applicants to that agency were offered a final interview, and doing so does not affect the results.
21Competitors include jobsdb.com and jobstreet.com. However, workabroad.ph was most referenced by re-
cruitment agencies as their main source for online recruits, and it averages the greatest number of job postings.
The Philippine government also runs a job-finding website for domestic and overseas jobs, www.phil-job.net;
however, it is much less popular.
22These overseas positions are highly sex-segregated.
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higher-educated individuals are ranked too low.23 Weighting these postings by the number
of vacancies each represents, I calculate the share of vacancies for which each respondent
meets the minimum qualifications, based on his or her gender, education, and work experi-
ence. Appendix Table 2.A.1 shows the distribution of respondents’ positions across two-digit
ISCO codes, and Appendix Table 2.A.2 reports descriptive statistics of the characteristics
of respondents with experience in each position group.
Figure 2.2 plots the distribution of the share of overseas jobs for which respondents are
potentially qualified, using two-digit ISCO codes. The absolute number of jobs is less relevant
than the share, which provides a unidimensional estimate of how qualified each individual
is for work overseas. There is a wide distribution in qualification levels, with a few outliers
who are potentially qualified for more than eight percent of job vacancies. In Figure 2.3, I
plot the distribution separately by education level, using a smoothed kernel density function.
Education correlates highly with the share of jobs for which respondents are qualified but
there is still a wide range of qualifications within each education level.24
2.3.2 Determinants of job-fair participation
Focusing on the sample respondents who were invited to attend but not subsidized - the
control group - I predict whether respondents attend, visit an information booth, apply, or
are offered a final interview using individuals’ demographic and employment characteristics.
In Table 2.2, the perceived chance of job-finding abroad is a strong predictor of attendance;
every 10 percentage-point increase is associated with an additional 1.5 percentage point
increase in attendance. Additionally, attendees are more likely to report they are strongly
23Appendix Figure 2.A.1b shows that using three-digit occupational codes yields broadly similar results to
the two-digit codes. However, for some occupations, there are relatively few opportunities within the three-
digit code but many within the two-digit code. For example, individuals with experience in the three-digit
occupation of “sales shopkeeper” are likely qualified for other three-digit occupations within the broader two-
digit grouping “salesperson”. Because the two-digit code seems to correspond more closely to a job definition
of “relevant experience,” I prefer these more general codes.
24Eight percent of vacancies have minimum educational requirements but do not require any relevant
experience.
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interested in working abroad, significant at the ten-percent level. Of those who attend, 53
percent visit at least one information booth, and 78 percent apply with a recruitment agency.
Columns (2) and (3) predict the likelihood of visiting an information booth or applying with
a recruitment agency, conditional on attending. Those who visit the information booth are
more likely to have applied for work overseas and they are less likely to be interested in
working abroad, though only the second covariate is statistically significant. Conditional on
attending, those who apply are potentially qualified for a higher share of jobs (p = 0.073),
come from farther away (p = 0.070), are more educated, and report a higher perceived chance
of job-finding abroad, though the last two covariates are not statistically significant. Among
those who apply, 53 percent receive invitations to a final interview. Being qualified for a
higher share of jobs abroad and having applied for work in the past are strong predictors of
being invited to a final interview, as column (4) shows.
Figure 2.4a plots the distribution of qualification levels across the control-group baseline
sample (solid line) and for those who participate in the fair (dashed lines). Without an
incentive, those who attend the job fair are positively selected from the overall population,
and the distribution of those who attend and are offered the final interview are nearly
identical, except at the left tails of the distribution, where the least qualified who attend are
not offered a final interview.
2.4 Subsidy impact on selection
2.4.1 Experimental design
I generateed exogenous variation in individuals’ likelihood of attending a job fair by as-
signing individuals in randomly selected neighborhoods to receive a small, in-kind subsidy
conditional on attendance. Randomization took place at the neighborhood level to reduce
spillovers within neighborhoods, and respondents in one-third of neighborhoods were assigned
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to receive a restaurant voucher. Respondents in the remaining two-thirds of neighborhoods
form the control group. At the end of the survey, all respondents were invited to attend the
job fair already described. Recipients assigned to the treatment group received a voucher
that they could exchange at the two-day job fair for a gift certificate worth P150 (US$3.42)
to Jollibee, a popular fast-food franchise. All respondents also received two text message
reminders in the days leading up to the job fair to minimize differential salience effects based
on the administration date of the survey. This voucher treatment was cross-randomized
with two other information treatments, which are outside the scope of the paper.25 I include
binary indicators for assignment to the two information groups in all specifications.26
In Table 2.3, I test the balance of treatment assignment across respondents’ demographic
characteristics. I conduct a series of F-tests of the equality of means between the two groups
after controlling for stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects, clustering standard er-
rors at the barangay level. The sample is largely balanced, though members of the voucher
treatment group report lower educational attainment on average, are less likely to be inter-
ested in working abroad, and are less likely to plan to apply overseas in the next year. Only
the difference between groups on having plans to apply abroad is statistically significant (at
the ten-percent level). Overall, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that these means are
jointly equal between treatment and control groups (F = 1.23, p = 0.26). I control for these
individual-level covariates in my specifications.
2.4.2 Impact of subsidy on job-fair participation
In order to measure the causal intention-to-treat (ITT) impacts of the voucher treatment
on job-fair attendance, information-booth visits, application, and final interview offers, I
25See Beam (2013).
26Appendix 2.C shows that my results are broadly robust to excluding individuals cross-randomized to
either of the two information treatments.
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estimate the following regression specification using ordinary least squares.




kδ + εijk (2.1)
where individual i from neighborhood j in stratification cell k has binary job-fair outcome
Yijk. The binary variable V oucherjk is equal to one if neighborhood j from stratification cell
k is assigned to the voucher treatment group. Xijk is a vector of individual-level covariates,
Sk is a set of stratification cell dummy variables, and εijk is the individual-specific error term.
Because treatment is assigned at the neighborhood level, I cluster estimated standard errors
at the neighborhood level to account for likely correlation in outcomes between individuals
from the same neighborhood and to correct for heteroskedasticity imposed by the linear
probability model.
Table 2.4 presents estimates of Equation 2.1 for the full sample. Column (1) omits the
set of individual-level covariates discussed above, including only a binary indicator for as-
signment to the voucher, dummy variables for the other cross-randomized treatments, and
stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects. Column (2) includes a series of individual
characteristics that may influence the likelihood of attending or participating in the job
fair. From column (2), the voucher increases the likelihood of attendance by 35.4 percentage
points, a 270 percent increase from the 13.1 percent attendance rate among the control group.
The voucher has substantial but smaller effects on participation at the fair; it increases the
likelihood of visiting an information booth by 8.8 percentage points and of applying by 4.7
percentage points, 128 and 46-percent increases, respectively, from control-group rates of 7.0
and 9.5 percent. The impact on the likelihood of being offered a final interview is close to
zero and not statistically significant, indicating that the subsidy is not effective in increasing
the number of people who successfully pass the first stage of the interview process.27
27Results are robust to using a probit model.
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2.4.3 Impact of subsidy on selection into search
2.4.3.1 Differences in demographic characteristics
Table 2.5 presents the distribution of respondent characteristics conditional on participation
at the job fair separately for members of the treatment and control groups. I superscript
voucher means with one, two, and three stars if the mean is statistically significantly different
from the control group mean at the ten, five, and one-percent level, respectively, clustering
at the neighborhood level and including stratification-cell fixed effects.28 Job-fair attendees
from the voucher treatment group differ substantially from control-group attendees. They
have completed less education, are less likely to be interested in working abroad, report a
lower perceived chance of job-finding abroad, and are potentially qualified for fewer overseas
jobs (differences significant at the one-percent level). They also are younger and more likely
to be married, though these differences are not statistically significant.
This negative selection on qualifications, perceptions, and interest in work abroad among
voucher recipients lessens somewhat for those who visit an information booth or apply at
the job fair. They are less educated on average, but they are just as likely as control-group
participants to report they are interested in working abroad at baseline. Among the 46
respondents who are invited to a final interview, the treatment group is less educated and
less confident about their chance of being offered jobs abroad than the control group, but
they are much closer in the share of jobs for which they might be qualified.
Figure 2.4 also demonstrates how the voucher “undoes” the positive selection among job-fair
attendees. Those who attend are no more or less qualified than the full set of members of
the voucher treatment group. The distribution shifts rightward among those who visit the
information booth and those who apply for work; those who receive final interview offers are
more positively selected, though still less so than as compared to the control group attendees.
28I omit enumerator fixed effects because there are relatively few observations in columns (3) through (8).
Including them does not change the results.
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To see this comparison more clearly, Figure 2.5 compares the qualification levels of control
and voucher-group attendees, information booth visitors, applicants, and those who receive
final interviews. The qualification distribution of voucher-receiving attendees, booth visitors,
and applicants is to the left of the control group.29 The distribution of qualification levels
is fairly similar between those offered final interviews, with a longer left tail for the voucher
treatment group members.
2.4.3.2 Impacts by education
I then examine the impact of voucher assignment on job-fair participation by education.
In Table 2.6, I interact voucher assignment with mutually exclusive indicators for whether
the respondent’s highest education level completed is high school, some college, vocational
training, or a college degree (omitting less than high school). I report the interacted im-
pacts as well as the binary indicators for educational completion. Consistent with Table
2.2, education is a strong predictor of job-fair attendance and participation, particularly
whether individuals have completed at least high school, and whether they have completed
any post-secondary schooling.30 Uninteracted voucher assignment, which can be interpreted
as the impact of the voucher for those without a high school diploma, has large, statistically
significant impacts on whether individuals attend, visit an information booth, or apply for
work abroad at the job fair, with effects of 39.8, 9.2, and 6.0 percentage points, respectively.
With the exception of college graduates, the impact of the voucher does not vary with re-
spondents’ educational attainment. The voucher-college graduate interaction is consistently
negative and is significant at the ten-percent level for application and final interview offer.
29 A two-sided Komologorov-Smirnov test rejects the equality of the attendee distributions (p = 0.002).
However, it does not reject equality of the booth visitor or applicant distributions (p = 0.182, p = 0.145,
respectively), in part because the distributions are closer together, and in part because they reflect a smaller
sample.
30For attendance, application, and final interview offer, I reject the equality of all four education indicators
at the at the ten, five, and one-percent levels, respectively. I cannot reject equality of the some college,
vocational, and college graduate indicators.
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Overall, however I cannot reject the joint null hypothesis of no interaction effects for any out-
come. Figure 2.6 plots the mean rates of attendance and job-fair participation separately by
education and treatment group assignment. The 95-percent confidence-interval bars reflect a
simple regression of treatment indicators on each outcome, clustering standard errors at the
neighborhood level but omitting individual covariates or stratification and enumerator fixed
effects for ease of interpretation. Graphically, these figures show that the voucher increases
attendance for all groups, with a smaller increase for college graduates. Information booth
visits and application increases most for those with only a high school diploma or some col-
lege; but, with the exception of visiting an information booth for those who have completed
some college, these differences are not statistically significant.
2.4.3.3 Impacts by qualification
That the subsidy generates relatively equal effects across education levels, excepting college
graduates, may not be surprising if education is a poor proxy for individuals’ expected returns
to looking for overseas work. Because there is high demand for Filipino workers in both low
and high-skill positions, using education alone is likely to miss the important variation within
skill levels that determine job-hiring decisions. As Figure 2.3 shows, education is correlated
with the share of jobs for which one is qualified, but accounting only for education leaves
out substantial variation.
I examine the differential impact of subsidy assignment between relatively low and highly
qualified individuals linearly and semi-parametrically in Table 2.7. In the odd-numbered
columns, I interact a binary indicator for voucher assignment with the continuous measure
of the share of jobs qualified, using two-digit ISCO codes. In the even-numbered columns, I
interact voucher assignment with tercile indicators for the share of jobs qualified, omitting the
lowest tercile indicator and its interaction. Although I cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the interactions are jointly zero, the signs of the interaction terms indicate that the effects
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of the voucher are strongest for those in the lowest qualification tercile. While the voucher
increases attendance substantially for members of all qualification terciles, application rates
increase only for those in the bottom tercile.31
In Figures 2.7a through 2.7d, I estimate the impact of voucher assignment non-parametrically
across two-digit ISCO qualification level, using local constant regressions.32 Consistent with
the regression results of Table 2.7, the impact of the voucher on attendance (Figure 2.7a)
and information booths visits (Figure 2.7b) is essentially flat across the full distribution of
qualification levels, with confidence intervals converging at the high end of the qualification
distribution, where there are relatively few respondents. The impact on application (Figure
2.7c) starts positive (though not statistically significant) and converges to zero among the
higher qualified individuals. There is no detectable treatment effect on final interview offers
across the distribution (Figure 2.7d).33
2.4.3.4 Impacts by perception
Table 2.8 shows that the voucher induces individuals who report a 50-percent perceived
chance of job-finding not only to attend, but also to apply at the job fair. In the odd-
numbered columns, I include a linear term for the perceived chance of job-finding abroad
and an indicator for whether the respondent reported a 50-percent chance (as roughly one-
third of the sample does - see Figure 2.1). I interact both terms with an indicator for voucher
assignment. The continuous measure of the perceived chance of job-finding is itself statis-
tically significant; holding all other covariates equal, reporting a ten-percent higher chance
of job-finding abroad is associated with percentage-point increases of 2.5, 1.4, 2.3, and 1.3
in the rates of attendance, visiting an information booth, application, and receiving a final
31These results are robust to using quartiles or quintiles.
32I bootstrap 95-percent confidence intervals using 5,000 repetitions, clustering at the barangay level. I
trim the qualification measure at the 99th percentile. These specifications do not account for covariate means
or stratification cell or enumerator fixed effects.
33These results are robust to estimating first and second-degree local polynomial regressions, which are
reported in Figures 2.D.1 and 2.D.2.
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interview offer, respectively, all of which are significant at the one-percent level. The linear
interaction term is itself negative, and not statistically significant, but the interaction with
the indicator for having a 50-percent perceived chance of job-finding abroad is generally pos-
itive, and in the case of application, it is quite large (9.2 percentage points) and statistically
significant. In the even-numbered columns, I interact voucher assignment with indicators
for having a 50 percent or greater than 50 percent perceived chance of job-finding abroad,
leaving the less than 50-percent chance indicator as the omitted category. Consistent with
the linear results, the voucher increases attendance and the likelihood of visiting an infor-
mation booth regardless of individuals’ perceived chances of job-finding abroad. However,
the voucher increases application only for the 50-percent chance group, and does so by an
additional 9.5 percentage points, statistically significant at the five-percent level. I jointly
reject that these two interaction terms are zero at the ten-percent level.
2.5 Discussion: Who stays?
In Section 2.4, I find that voucher assignment reduces the positive selection into job-fair
attendance I find among the non-subsidized attendees, both in terms of qualifications and
in terms of individuals’ perceived chances of job-finding abroad. This reduction attenuates
slightly in the decision to participate in the fair; those who are least interested and least
qualified leave after redeeming their voucher. What stands out particularly is that individuals
who express a high degree of uncertainty about their job finding prospects - that is, those
who report a 50-percent likelihood of finding work abroad - respond strongly to the modest
incentive and do stay to apply.
In this section, I explore ways to interpret this 50-percent perceived chance of job-finding,
and I find that it is indicative of individuals being highly uncertain about their own prospects
in the overseas labor market, and that this uncertainty is correlated with their past exposure
to the overseas labor market. These results are consistent with two explanations: that indi-
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viduals on the margin of applying at the job fair are those with a high degree of uncertainty
about their overseas labor market prospects, and that these uncertain individuals are most
likely to update their beliefs upon attending and consequently are more likely to stay to
apply once they attend.
Individuals’ perceived chance of job-finding abroad is correlated with objective measures of
qualification; those who are more highly educated report higher chances, and those who
are potentially qualified for a higher share of jobs abroad report higher chances. To check
whether the differential impacts of those reporting a 50-percent chance of job-finding reflect
other qualifications, I include interactions with both the share of jobs abroad for which the
respondent is potentially qualified and his perceived chance of job-finding abroad in Table 2.9.
I include both linear specifications with an indicator for a 50-percent chance of job-finding
(odd-numbered columns) as well as categorical variables (even-numbered columns). In this
“horse race,” the 50-percent perceived chance interaction is the clear winner. The voucher
has an additional 11-percentage point effect on the likelihood of application for those who
report a 50-percent chance. The uninteracted voucher coefficient on application, representing
the impact on those in the lowest qualification tercile with a less than 50-percent perceived
chance of job-finding abroad, is close to zero and not statistically significant, indicating that
the positive and significant impact of voucher assignment for the lowest qualification tercile
in Table 2.7 is driven by those with 50-percent (and higher) perceived chances of job-finding
abroad.
I also report local constant regressions of the control and treatment group job-fair partic-
ipation rates across qualification levels, separately for each perceived chance of job finding
group, in Appendix 2.B. The results are consistent with the regression results in Table 2.9;
increases in application rates are concentrated among those who report a 50-percent chance
of job-finding abroad, and the increase is relatively constant across the distribution of qual-
ification levels.
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The results in Table 2.9 indicate that the perceived chance of job-finding abroad reflects more
than simply qualification level, and in fact, those with a high degree of uncertainty about
they job prospects are more responsive to the voucher. The impact of voucher assignment
on application is large, but it is entirely concentrated among those who report they have a
50-percent of job-finding abroad. Individuals’ reported likelihoods could reflect their beliefs
about the market, beliefs about their own qualification levels, beliefs about the difficulty
of matching with the market, as well as individual factors like confidence, self-esteem, and
optimism. An extensive body of literature finds that respondents frequently use “50 percent”
or “fifty-fifty” to indicate that the answer is beyond their control or that they simply don’t
know (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000; Fischhoff and Bruine de Bruin, 1999). In the context of
overseas job finding, feelings of uncertainty may prevent respondents from applying for work
abroad, even if their perceived net benefits are positive.
In Table 2.10, I examine predictors of individuals’ reported likelihood of job-finding, as well
as predictors of whether they report a 50-percent chance of job-finding abroad. In columns
(1) and (2), I use the full range of perceived chance responses as a linear outcome variable,
and in columns (3) and (4), I exclude those who report a 50-percent chance of job-finding.
Columns (1) and (3) include standard covariates that reflect individuals’ demographic char-
acteristics and past educational and work experience. Education is the strongest predictor
of individuals’ reported likelihood of job-finidng abroad, and the share of jobs for which they
are potentially qualified is also positively correlated, but not statistically significant.
Columns (2) and (4) include additional covariates that reflect individuals’ past job-search
behavior such as whether they reported they had ever worked in Manila, had searched for
work formally (by submitting a resume or interviewing), had ever applied for work abroad,
or have had a family member working abroad since 2005. Additionally, I include measures of
individuals’ general perceptions and interest in overseas work: whether they are “strongly”
interested in working abroad and whether they say their lives will be better next year (instead
of reporting they will be the same or worse), a linear measure of self-confidence. Additionally,
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to check whether their responses are related to whether they understood the questions, I
include a binary indicator for whether the enumerator marked that the respondent had
trouble answering some questions.
With the addition of these covariates, having completed at least some post-secondary ed-
ucation is smaller in magnitude and no longer significant, and the share of jobs for which
the respondent is potentially qualified is large and negative (though imprecisely estimated).
Instead, those who have higher self-reported likelihoods of job-finding are those with more
labor force exposure: those who have looked for work formally and have ever applied for
work abroad. Additionally, those who are interested in working abroad, more optimistic,
and more self-confident also report higher values. Conditioning on these factors, whether
individuals reported they had ever been employed is negatively correlated with the perceived
chance of job-finding abroad.
In columns (5) and (6), I predict whether individuals report a 50-percent perceived chance
of job-finding abroad using the above covariates. Individuals who are have completed at
least high school are more likely to report a 50-percent chance, while those who have worked
in Manila are less likely. Neither having trouble answering questions nor being more or
less confident is correlated with individuals’ likelihood of reporting a 50-percent chance,
indicating that this response pattern is more consistent overall with limited labor market
exposure than with their inability to understand or answer the question.
The question about the perceived likelihood of job-finding is one of eight labor market
expectations questions, which follow two practice questions to ensure respondents understand
the question structure. If respondents only answer “50 percent” to the overseas job-finding
question, it would be more likely they truly believe there is a 50-percent chance. However,
if they answer “50-percent” to many questions, this suggests their answers are consistent
with a high degree of uncertainty, and that they may feel generally uncertain about their
labor market prospects. To examine this, I count the number of 50-percent responses each
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respondent gives in the seven other labor-market questions.34 I define respondents as having
a “high share” of 50-percent responses if they report three or more 50-percent responses.35
In Table 2.11, I interact voucher assignment with whether respondents report a 50-percent
chance of overseas job-finding and with whether they report a “high share” of 50-percent
responses in the other labor market questions. Having a high share of 50-percent responses
in itself does not predict job-fair attendance or participation, nor does the interaction of
a high share of 50-percent responses with voucher assignment. However, the voucher-50-
percent chance of job-finding interaction term is largest for those with a “high share” of
50-percent responses, and I can reject the equality of interaction terms between the low
and high share of responses at the five-percent level for attendance and application. These
results suggest that the individuals who respond to the voucher by applying at the fair may
be facing a high degree of uncertainty about their overseas job-market prospects.
2.6 Conclusion
Even after controlling for education and relative qualification level, individuals’ perceived
chances of job-finding abroad are strong predictors of their participation in a job fair for
overseas work. While job-fair attendees are positively selected from the general population,
a modest subsidy to incentivize search “undoes” this selection by increasing attendance rates
both among more and less qualified searchers, but many of the least qualified individuals
then self-select out of participation in the fair.
The voucher yields a large increase in application among individuals who express the greatest
degree of uncertainty in their job-search prospects abroad - those who report a 50-percent
chance of job-finding overseas if they were to submit an application. It could be that these
uncertain job-seekers happen to form the sub-group most on the margin of applying at the
34Fifty-five percent report zero or one 50-percent responses, 18 percent report two, 12 percent report
three, and 15 percent report four or more.
35These results are robust to setting the cutoff at two, four, or five out of seven responses.
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fair, but given the relatively modest size of the subsidy and the large potential gains from
overseas migration, this finding is more consistent with individuals dynamically updating
their beliefs about their overseas prospects once they attend the fair.
This result on the role of uncertainty is in line with related work I conduct on the medium-
run impacts of job-fair attendance in the Philippines (Beam, 2013). In the Philippines, the
decision to look for work abroad is just the first step in what is often a difficult and costly
process of migrating overseas (Beam, McKenzie and Yang, 2013), and the job fair subsidy
is not sufficient to induce individuals to migrate abroad. However, I find attending a job-
fair changes how individuals interact with the domestic labor market, consistent with them
updating their beliefs in response to the job-fair.36
These results highlight the importance of individuals’ prior beliefs about their returns, not
only with respect to whether they believe they are likely to be offered a job abroad, but also
to the sense of uncertainty they have about their own job prospects. This paper contributes
to our understanding of how individuals select into programs and what impact a modest
subsidy may have on the direction of selection. In similar contexts, initiatives to incentivize
program participation may have substantial impacts on take-up, and an untargeted subsidy
can bring in a range of participants relatively similar to the underlying population. Without
conditioning the incentive on fully participating in the designated program, individuals may
self-select out of participating fully, in line with their perceived returns, but these subsidies
may have additional indirect benefits through information provision to potential participants
who are uncertain about their own potential gains.
36Incentivizing fair attendance increases the likelihood individuals look for work in the capital, particularly
in the months immediately following the fair, and it increases the share of individuals who report they
are employed in the formal sector approximately ten months afterward. I find evidence consistent with
individuals updating their beliefs, but I am not able to rule out other explanations, such as the subsidy
providing a one-time “nudge” to initiate search.
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Table 2.1: Individual demographic characteristics, Bulan and Philippine Labor Force Survey
(2011) samples
Bulan sample LFS, rural LFS, Bicol
provinces Region
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 50.3 50.0 46.8 49.9 46.9 49.9
Age (mean) 27.2 4.4 26.9 4.8 26.8 4.8
Married 57.2 49.5 53.6 49.9 50.0 50.0
With children 58.6 49.3
High school or greater 72.5 44.7 56.0 49.6 62.7 48.4
College graduate 16.1 36.8 10.8 31.0 13.1 33.8
Mean household income (,000s) 5.8 6.6
Working at baseline 35.7 47.9 52.0 50.0 49.7 50.0
Ever worked 84 36.7 86.4 34.3 85.6 35.1
Ever worked in Manila 39.1 48.8
Interested in working abroad 25.6 43.7
Plan to apply abroad, next 12 months 32.4 46.8
Currently has passport 5.1 22.0
Ever applied abroad 27.7 44.8
Any family abroad since 2005 47.4 50.0
Distance to job fair (km) 3.1 2.8
Observations 862 22,241 2,154
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: LFS data taken from January wave of 2011 Philippine Labor Force Survey. Both samples
include individuals ages 20-35 who are not currently working overseas. Column (2) includes all people
living in areas classified as "rural" by the NSO, and column (3) includes all residents of Bicol Region,
where Sorsogon Province is located. "Currently employed" in LFS data is defined as having worked
at least one hour or had a job in the past week, excluding those whose primary occupation is "worked
without pay on own-family operated farm or business." Income top-coded at P40,000.
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Table 2.2: Predictors of job-fair attendance, participation, application, and final interview
offer
Attend Visit information booth Apply Final interview offer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age -0.023 0.150 0.116 0.146
[0.030] [0.159] [0.138] [0.187]
Female -0.005* 0.006 -0.001 -0.029
[0.003] [0.016] [0.013] [0.023]
HS diploma or greater 0.004 0.142 0.261 0.411
[0.032] [0.233] [0.245] [0.294]
Some college or greater 0.064 -0.156 0.172 0.018
[0.041] [0.147] [0.116] [0.173]
Income -0.004* 0.012 -0.003 0.006
[0.003] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Currently employed -0.025 -0.132 0.053 -0.059
[0.033] [0.165] [0.138] [0.196]
Share jobs abroad qualified 0.022 0.036 0.036* 0.062**
[0.014] [0.032] [0.020] [0.026]
Ever employed -0.014 -0.239 -0.075 0.066
[0.048] [0.239] [0.203] [0.333]
Ever worked in Manila -0.008 -0.074 -0.189 0.077
[0.031] [0.145] [0.144] [0.198]
Looked for work formally 0.039 0.244 0.068 -0.051
[0.029] [0.202] [0.158] [0.233]
Interested work abroad 0.060* -0.229* -0.029 0.036
[0.032] [0.128] [0.103] [0.174]
Applied for work abroad 0.004 0.133 0.099 0.415***
[0.036] [0.146] [0.122] [0.148]
Pr(job offer abroad) 0.147*** 0.043 0.217 -0.283
[0.050] [0.292] [0.307] [0.391]
Pr(job offer abroad) = 50 -0.025 -0.084 -0.109 -0.148
[0.032] [0.138] [0.133] [0.165]
Distance to job fair (km) -0.004 -0.035 0.039* -0.029
[0.005] [0.029] [0.021] [0.038]
Constant 0.118 0.278 0.163 0.672
[0.096] [0.577] [0.433] [0.777]
Observations 588 77 77 60
R-squared 0.091 0.211 0.259 0.314
Dep. variable mean 13.1% 53.2% 77.9% 53.3%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Sample
restricted to the control group. An indicator for a missing perceived chance of job-finding abroad
is included but not reported.
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Age (mean) 27.2 27.2
Married 57.3 56.9
With children 58.2 59.5
High school or greater 74.7 67.9
College graduate 17.5 13.1
Mean household income (,000s) 6.1 5.3
Working at baseline 35.2 36.9
Ever worked 83.3 85.4
Ever worked in Manila 40.0 37.2
Interested in working abroad 28.2 20.1
Plan to apply abroad, next 12 mo. 34.7 27.4*
Currently has passport 5.4 4.4
Ever applied abroad 29.1 24.8
Any family abroad since 2005 48.5 45.3




*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Tests for statistically significant differences are clustered at the
neighborhood level. Income is top-coded at P40,000.
103




Attend 13.1% 0.335*** 0.354***
[0.035] [0.035]
Visit information booth 7.0% 0.076*** 0.088***
[0.023] [0.023]
Apply 10.2% 0.029 0.047**
[0.023] [0.023]
Final interview offer 5.4% -0.006 0.007
[0.016] [0.015]
Observations 862 862
Individual covariates NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported
in brackets. Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. In-
dividual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education, and
dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever employed
in Manila, and strongly interested in working abroad.
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Table 2.5: Individual characteristics, conditional on job-fair attendance, application, partic-
ipation, and final interview offer
Sample: Attendees Visit info. booth Applicants Final interview
Control Voucher Control Voucher Control Voucher Control Voucher
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female 42.9 55.6 46.3 56.4 45.0 55.6 46.9 50.0
Age 20-24 41.6 38.1 29.3 35.9 41.7 47.2 43.8 50.0
Age 25-29 32.5 31.0 36.6 28.2 33.3 30.6 31.3 21.4
Age 30-35 26.0 31.0 34.1 35.9 25.0 22.2 25.0 28.6
Married 44.2 61.9*** 48.8 56.4 46.7 44.4 40.6 42.9**
Has children 49.4 65.1** 51.2 64.1 50.0 52.8 43.8 35.7
Less than high school 7.8 29.4*** 4.9 20.5*** 3.3 16.7*** 0.0 7.1
High school graduate 23.4 32.5 24.4 30.8 20.0 33.3** 15.6 28.6
Some college or vocational 40.3 23.8** 41.5 35.9 45.0 38.9 43.8 50.0
College graduate 28.6 14.3** 29.3 12.8** 31.7 11.1*** 40.6 14.3***
Employed 32.5 32.5 29.3 38.5 35.0 36.1 34.4 57.1
Family abroad since 2005 45.5 48.4 43.9 53.8 46.7 50.0 56.3 64.3
Interested in working abroad 46.8 27.8*** 39.0 46.2 50.0 52.8 56.3 78.6
<50% chance job offer abroad 14.3 31.0** 17.1 23.1 11.7 11.1 15.6 14.3
50% chance job offer abroad 26.0 34.1 26.8 33.3 23.3 44.4** 18.8 28.6
>50% chance job offer abroad 59.7 34.9*** 56.1 43.6 65.0 44.4 65.6 57.1
Share of jobs qualified 4.5 3.6*** 4.7 3.8** 4.7 3.8*** 5.2 4.2
Observations 77 126 41 39 60 36 32 14
F-test, joint equality of means 4.8*** 5.7*** 4.1*** 2.8**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Tests for statistically significant differences are clustered at the neighborhood level and
include stratification cell fixed effects.
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Table 2.6: ITT impact of voucher on job-fair participation, by education
Attend Visit info. Apply Final inter.
booth offer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 0.398*** 0.092*** 0.060** 0.015
[0.061] [0.032] [0.026] [0.014]
Voucher X HS graduate -0.021 -0.004 0.012 0.004
[0.091] [0.052] [0.048] [0.031]
Voucher X Some college -0.069 0.057 0.020 -0.018
[0.115] [0.075] [0.071] [0.057]
Voucher X Voc. graduate -0.269 -0.099 -0.090 0.088
[0.163] [0.127] [0.141] [0.137]
Voucher X Col. graduate -0.126 -0.081 -0.136* -0.091*
[0.092] [0.077] [0.071] [0.047]
HS graduate 0.067** 0.052** 0.065*** 0.030**
[0.030] [0.024] [0.025] [0.014]
Some college 0.108** 0.064** 0.124*** 0.075***
[0.043] [0.027] [0.040] [0.024]
Vocational graduate 0.219*** 0.158*** 0.243*** 0.137***
[0.072] [0.058] [0.064] [0.049]
College graduate 0.169*** 0.103*** 0.171*** 0.128***
[0.047] [0.036] [0.042] [0.030]
Observations 862 862 862 862
DV Mean, Control 13.1% 7.0% 10.2% 5.4%
Interactions jointly zero 0.369 0.491 0.336 0.340
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets.
Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics
include sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently
or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and strongly interested in working abroad.
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Table 2.7: ITT impact of voucher on job-fair participation, by share of jobs abroad for which
potentially qualified
Attend Visit info. Apply Final interview
booth offer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Voucher 0.418*** 0.385*** 0.070 0.107*** 0.071 0.070** 0.032 0.023
[0.099] [0.056] [0.072] [0.032] [0.063] [0.031] [0.050] [0.015]
Voucher X Share jobs qualified -2.064 0.396 -0.859 -0.806
[2.660] [2.132] [1.724] [1.487]
Voucher X Mid. tercile qualified -0.045 -0.054 -0.049 -0.041
[0.080] [0.042] [0.041] [0.031]
Voucher X Top tercile qualified -0.093 -0.026 -0.056 -0.033
[0.075] [0.058] [0.051] [0.040]
Share of jobs qualified 3.802*** 2.611*** 3.952*** 3.187***
[0.989] [0.910] [0.988] [0.937]
Mid. tercile qualified 0.059** 0.051** 0.076*** 0.056***
[0.027] [0.021] [0.023] [0.016]
Top tercile qualified 0.123*** 0.093*** 0.142*** 0.097***
[0.032] [0.025] [0.029] [0.018]
Observations 862 862 862 862 862 862 862 862
DV Mean, Control 13.1% 7.0% 10.2% 5.4%
V + V*Middle tercile 0.000*** 0.081* 0.549 0.509
V + V*Top tercile 0.000*** 0.105 0.719 0.779
Interactions jointly zero 0.444 0.426 0.402 0.403
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Strat-
ification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex, age,
marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever
employed in Manila, and strongly interested in working abroad.
107
Table 2.8: ITT impact of voucher on job-fair participation, by perceived chance of job-finding
abroad
Attend Visit info Apply Final interv.
booth offer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Voucher 0.363*** 0.358*** 0.083 0.064* 0.013 0.002 0.015 -0.004
[0.076] [0.058] [0.052] [0.035] [0.038] [0.026] [0.023] [0.016]
V X Pr(job offer) -0.074 -0.009 -0.014 -0.041
[0.128] [0.113] [0.085] [0.057]
V X Pr(job offer) = 50% 0.043 0.011 0.003 0.017 0.092* 0.095** 0.010 0.009
[0.083] [0.095] [0.047] [0.051] [0.049] [0.044] [0.032] [0.030]
V X Pr(job offer) > 50% -0.062 0.030 0.008 -0.001
[0.084] [0.064] [0.049] [0.038]
Pr(job offer abroad) 0.245*** 0.144*** 0.230*** 0.131***
[0.053] [0.043] [0.044] [0.034]
Pr(job offer) = 50% -0.019 0.056* -0.008 0.029 -0.031 0.039 -0.028 0.009
[0.030] [0.030] [0.023] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.018] [0.019]
Pr(job offer) > 50% 0.141*** 0.070*** 0.131*** 0.071***
[0.033] [0.025] [0.026] [0.021]
Observations 856 856 856 856 856 856 856 856
DV Mean, Control 13.1% 7.0% 10.2% 5.4%
V + V X 50% = 0 0.000*** 0.038** 0.024** 0.868
V + V X >50% = 0 0.000*** 0.058** 0.808 0.873
Interactions jointly zero 0.707 0.658 0.996 0.887 0.146 0.099* 0.767 0.953
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Stratification
cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital status,
education, and dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and
strongly interested in working abroad.
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Table 2.9: ITT impact of voucher on job-fair participation, by share of jobs abroad for which
potentially qualified and perceived chance of job-finding abroad
Attend Visit info. Apply Final interview
booth offer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Voucher 0.438*** 0.390*** 0.077 0.093** 0.063 0.039 0.042 0.020
[0.116] [0.075] [0.079] [0.040] [0.068] [0.031] [0.048] [0.016]
Voucher X Share of jobs qualified -2.300 0.335 -1.473 -0.747
[2.652] [2.167] [1.893] [1.535]
Voucher X Mid. tercile qualified -0.043 -0.060 -0.059 -0.045
[0.080] [0.043] [0.041] [0.031]
Voucher X Top tercile qualified -0.090 -0.034 -0.075 -0.035
[0.072] [0.058] [0.054] [0.041]
Voucher X chance job offer abroad -0.046 -0.003 0.009 -0.025
[0.128] [0.114] [0.085] [0.056]
Voucher X chance job offer = 50% 0.046 0.031 -0.003 0.022 0.092* 0.111** 0.008 0.015
[0.082] [0.095] [0.045] [0.049] [0.050] [0.048] [0.033] [0.029]
Voucher X chance job offer > 50% -0.039 0.041 0.029 0.010
[0.083] [0.066] [0.051] [0.038]
Share of jobs qualified 3.260*** 2.300** 3.473*** 2.969***
[0.916] [0.898] [0.917] [0.936]
Mid. tercile qualified 0.048* 0.047** 0.069*** 0.055***
[0.029] [0.021] [0.024] [0.015]
Top tercile qualified 0.097*** 0.082*** 0.122*** 0.089***
[0.033] [0.025] [0.029] [0.018]
Chance job offer abroad if apply 0.209*** 0.117*** 0.190*** 0.098***
[0.053] [0.042] [0.044] [0.035]
Chance job offer abroad = 50% -0.025 0.035 -0.012 0.011 -0.037 0.012 -0.033* -0.010
[0.030] [0.034] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.028] [0.018] [0.020]
Chance job offer > 50% 0.117*** 0.049** 0.101*** 0.049**
[0.033] [0.024] [0.026] [0.020]
Observations 862 862 862 862 862 862 862 862
DV Mean, Control 13.1% 7.0% 10.2% 5.4%
Chance offer interact. = 0 0.779 0.739 0.998 0.812 0.156 0.074* 0.898 0.863
Qual. interact. = 0 0.444 0.383 0.265 0.336
All interactions jointly zero 0.734 0.693 0.999 0.710 0.291 0.181 0.916 0.673
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell and
enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy
variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and strongly interested in working
abroad.
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Table 2.10: Determinants of perceived chance of job-finding abroad
Chance offer 50% chance offer
job abroad job abroad
All Excl. 50% chance All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -0.022 -0.020 -0.025 -0.021 -0.003 -0.007
[0.018] [0.017] [0.025] [0.024] [0.037] [0.037]
Age 25-29 -0.012 -0.003 -0.008 0.000 0.004 0.003
[0.019] [0.019] [0.026] [0.023] [0.041] [0.040]
Age 30-35 0.001 0.022 0.017 0.041* 0.054 0.061
[0.017] [0.018] [0.024] [0.023] [0.042] [0.043]
HS or greater 0.107*** 0.072*** 0.127*** 0.084** 0.202*** 0.195***
[0.028] [0.025] [0.038] [0.034] [0.046] [0.047]
Some col. or greater 0.083*** 0.038 0.120*** 0.052 -0.021 -0.025
[0.023] [0.024] [0.033] [0.034] [0.045] [0.047]
Currently employed 0.017 0.020 0.030 0.027 0.047 0.033
[0.022] [0.022] [0.031] [0.031] [0.040] [0.041]
Share of jobs qualified 0.031 -0.377 0.191 -0.407 -0.969 -0.702
[1.046] [0.927] [1.495] [1.230] [1.367] [1.331]
Ever employed -0.010 -0.062** -0.033 -0.088** -0.042 -0.017
[0.026] [0.025] [0.038] [0.035] [0.052] [0.053]
Ever worked in Manila 0.018 0.021 -0.076**
[0.019] [0.025] [0.036]
Looked for work formally 0.059*** 0.087*** 0.021
[0.018] [0.025] [0.041]
Ever applied abroad 0.061*** 0.065*** -0.044
[0.017] [0.024] [0.040]
Interested in work abroad 0.131*** 0.169*** -0.060
[0.017] [0.024] [0.040]
Any family abroad -0.009 -0.006 0.055
[0.017] [0.025] [0.035]
Better life next year 0.044** 0.071*** 0.022
[0.018] [0.024] [0.040]
Confidence [0-4] 0.050** 0.052* -0.028
[0.022] [0.029] [0.046]
Trouble answering ques. -0.009 -0.003 -0.003
[0.028] [0.038] [0.058]
Observations 856 854 601 600 856 854
R-squared 0.152 0.255 0.205 0.324 0.055 0.068
Mean 49.9% 49.8% 29.8%
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample excludes respondents with missing responses to perceived chance of
job-finding abroad. Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included.
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Table 2.11: Interacted impact of 50-percent perceived chance of job-finding abroad with low
versus high number of “50-percent chance” responses
Attend Visit info. Apply Final inter.
booth offer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 0.363*** 0.104*** 0.027 0.015
[0.047] [0.031] [0.028] [0.022]
Voucher X Pr(job offer) = 50% X Low50 -0.050 -0.054 0.011 -0.018
[0.113] [0.063] [0.069] [0.034]
Voucher X Pr(job offer) = 50% X High50 0.274*** 0.148 0.250*** 0.083
[0.102] [0.090] [0.077] [0.052]
Voucher X High share with prob. = 50% -0.140 -0.105 -0.063 -0.058
[0.104] [0.069] [0.064] [0.038]
Pr(job offer) = 50% -0.059 -0.014 -0.044 -0.048**
[0.040] [0.033] [0.035] [0.022]
High share with prob. = 50% -0.020 0.035 0.004 -0.011
[0.055] [0.045] [0.051] [0.032]
Pr(job offer) = 50% X High50 0.081 -0.025 0.008 0.041
[0.072] [0.061] [0.062] [0.042]
Observations 856 856 856 856
DV Mean, Control 13.1% 7.0% 10.2% 5.4%
Pr(50) X Low50 = Pr(50) X High50 0.043** 0.105 0.022** 0.123
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample excludes respondents with missing responses to perceived chance of job-finding
abroad. Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Strat-
ification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex, age,
marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever
employed in Manila, and strongly interested in working abroad. A “high share” of 50% chance
responses is coded as having three or more responses of “50 percent” to seven labor market ex-
pectations question, excluding the perceived chance of job-finding abroad.
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Table 2.A.1: Classification of occupations, sample
Job title, two digit ISCO code Number of positions
Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 56
Sales workers 44
Food preparation assistants 19
Cleaners and helpers 18
Refuse workers and other elementary workers 17
General and keyboard clerks 15
Food processing, wood working, garment and other craft and related trades
workers
13
Legal, social and cultural professionals 13
Personal service workers 11
Protective services workers 9
Market-oriented skilled forestry, fishery and hunting workers 9
Other clerical support workers 8
Drivers and mobile plant operators 8
Numerical and material recording clerks 7
Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers 7
Handicraft and printing workers 7
Teaching professionals 6
Health associate professionals 6
Customer services clerks 6
Metal, machinery and related trades workers 5
Personal care workers 4
Electrical and electronic trades workers 4
Science and engineering associate professionals 4
Street and related sales and service workers 3
Building and related trades workers, excluding electricians 3
Health professionals 3
Information and communications technicians 2
Business and administration associate professionals 1
Unclassified 1
Administrative and commercial managers 1
Legal, social, cultural and related associate professionals 1
Stationary plant and machine operators 1
Notes: Counts reflect number of total positions reported by respondents, matched to two-digit
ISCO-08 codes.
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Table 2.A.2: Characteristics of respondents, by 2-digit ISCO code
Avg. yrs. % jobs HS grad. Some col. Share
Job title, two digit ISCO code exper. qualified or more or more female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Laborers in mining, construction, etc. 3.9 3.6 60.5 21.4 24.7
Sales workers 2.1 4.6 92.5 64.0 52.3
Food preparation assistants 2.7 3.8 83.7 55.4 50.5
Cleaners and helpers 2.7 3.5 51.7 36.7 63.0
Refuse workers and other elementary workers 3.4 4.2 87.7 55.8 12.5
General and keyboard clerks 2.6 4.7 86.7 80.0 61.6
Other craft and related trades workers 2.6 3.4 75.3 20.7 47.0
Legal, social and cultural professionals 3.4 4.1 100.0 92.3 38.5
Personal service workers 3.5 4.4 87.1 39.0 57.3
Protective services workers 2.8 4.1 88.9 80.7 11.5
Skilled forestry, fishery and hunting workers 7.4 3.4 41.5 28.6 0.0
Other clerical support workers 3.2 5.0 99.3 74.6 46.8
Drivers and mobile plant operators 3.1 5.9 95.8 50.0 0.0
Numerical and material recording clerks 2.4 4.0 100.0 85.7 57.1
Market-oriented skilled agricultural workers 6.3 3.0 26.5 6.3 0.0
Handicraft and printing workers 1.9 3.2 42.9 14.3 42.9
Teaching professionals 2.6 4.7 100.0 100.0 85.3
Health associate professionals 1.4 3.6 83.3 72.2 100.0
Customer services clerks 0.9 4.5 97.2 97.2 50.0
Metal, machinery and related trades workers 4.1 10.0 92.1 66.4 0.0
Personal care workers 3.7 3.1 65.0 20.8 89.2
Electrical and electronic trades workers 2.6 8.0 90.0 82.5 0.0
Science and engineering associate professionals 1.5 6.0 83.3 83.3 41.7
Street and related sales and service workers 6.0 3.9 33.3 33.3 33.3
Building and related trades workers 3.9 5.6 56.4 5.1 0.0
Health professionals 1.6 3.4 66.7 66.7 83.3
Information and communications technicians 1.3 8.5 100.0 100.0 5.6
Business and admin. associate professionals 0.7 4.5 100.0 100.0 66.7
Unclassified 1.7 3.9 87.0 52.2 47.8
Administrative and commercial managers 3.0 5.2 100.0 100.0 0.0
Legal, social, cultural and related associate prof. 5.0 4.5 100.0 100.0 0.0
Stationary plant and machine operators 3.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: Counts reflect number of total positions reported by respondents, matched to two-digit
ISCO-08 codes.
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2.B Supplemental non-parametric estimates
Figure 2.B.1: Impact of voucher assignment on job-fair attendance, by qualification level
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Figure 2.B.2: Impact of voucher assignment on whether visited job-fair information booth,
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Figure 2.B.3: Impact of voucher assignment on application, by qualification level (2-digit
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Figure 2.B.4: Impact of voucher assignment on whether invited to final interview, by quali-
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2.C Main specifications, excluding information treatment groups
Table 2.C.1: ITT impact of voucher on job-fair participation, excluding wage and qualifica-
tion information groups
DV Mean, Control Voucher
(1) (2)
Attend 0.127 0.331*** 0.337***
[0.049] [0.052]
Visit info. booth 0.071 0.071** 0.074**
[0.033] [0.036]
Apply 0.102 0.005 0.010
[0.035] [0.037]
Final interview offer 0.0609 0.004 0.009
[0.027] [0.028]
Observations 292 292
Individual covariates NO YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level re-
ported in brackets. Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects in-
cluded. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, educa-
tion, and dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever
employed in Manila, and strongly interested in working abroad.
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Table 2.C.2: ITT impact of voucher on job-fair participation, by education, excluding wage
and qualification information groups
Attend Visit info. Apply Final inter.
booth offer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Voucher 0.409*** 0.152** 0.017 0.023
[0.116] [0.058] [0.056] [0.052]
Voucher X HS graduate 0.021 -0.079 0.123 0.013
[0.180] [0.087] [0.104] [0.070]
Voucher X Some college -0.140 -0.031 -0.033 -0.013
[0.223] [0.152] [0.143] [0.131]
Voucher X Voc. graduate -0.367 -0.276** 0.030 0.105
[0.311] [0.124] [0.231] [0.231]
Voucher X Col. graduate -0.208 -0.218** -0.227** -0.150*
[0.137] [0.102] [0.107] [0.080]
HS graduate 0.059 0.084** 0.058 0.009
[0.049] [0.034] [0.046] [0.026]
Some college 0.081 0.082* 0.075 0.055
[0.081] [0.045] [0.073] [0.050]
Vocational graduate 0.175 0.153 0.171 0.147
[0.138] [0.112] [0.120] [0.093]
College graduate 0.223** 0.150* 0.191* 0.132*
[0.097] [0.083] [0.100] [0.066]
Observations 292 292 292 292
DV Mean, Control 12.7% 7.1% 10.2% 6.1%
Interactions jointly zero 0.396 0.112 0.091* 0.227
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets.
Stratification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics
include sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently
or ever employed, ever employed in Manila, and strongly interested in working abroad.
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Table 2.C.3: ITT impact of voucher on job-fair participation, by share of jobs abroad for
which potentially qualified, excluding wage and qualification information groups
Attend Visit info. Apply Final interview
booth offer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Voucher 0.483*** 0.406*** 0.218* 0.156** 0.179** 0.060 0.166 0.035
[0.164] [0.095] [0.119] [0.060] [0.088] [0.042] [0.098] [0.046]
Voucher X Share jobs qual. -3.925 -3.920 -4.549* -4.220
[4.411] [3.445] [2.581] [2.813]
Voucher X Mid. tercile qual. -0.104 -0.164* -0.054 -0.062
[0.131] [0.082] [0.056] [0.068]
Voucher X Top tercile qual. -0.113 -0.081 -0.102 -0.022
[0.132] [0.106] [0.078] [0.084]
Share of jobs qualified 5.074*** 3.426** 5.328*** 5.072***
[1.550] [1.448] [1.419] [1.527]
Mid. tercile qualified 0.079 0.097*** 0.093* 0.066*
[0.050] [0.034] [0.046] [0.034]
Top tercile qualified 0.150** 0.115** 0.167** 0.093**
[0.066] [0.050] [0.064] [0.039]
Observations 292 292 292 292 292 292 292 292
DV Mean, Control 12.7% 7.1% 10.2% 6.1%
V + V*Middle tercile 0.001*** 0.901 0.896 0.509
V + V*Top tercile 0.000*** 0.295 0.511 0.779
Interactions jointly zero 0.667 0.139 0.423 0.403
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Strat-
ification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex, age,
marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever
employed in Manila, and strongly interested in working abroad.
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Table 2.C.4: ITT impact of voucher on job-fair participation, by perceived chance of job-
finding abroad, excluding wage and qualification information groups
Attend Visit info Apply Final interv.
booth offer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Voucher 0.471*** 0.432*** 0.172** 0.116* 0.019 -0.014 0.039 -0.000
[0.121] [0.096] [0.071] [0.062] [0.041] [0.031] [0.041] [0.033]
V X Pr(job offer) -0.237 -0.224 -0.116 -0.138
[0.239] [0.142] [0.111] [0.093]
V X Pr(job offer) = 50% -0.083 -0.164 0.024 -0.033 0.149** 0.122** 0.109* 0.078
[0.125] [0.151] [0.066] [0.071] [0.069] [0.055] [0.057] [0.048]
V X Pr(job offer) > 50% -0.148 -0.102 -0.045 -0.053
[0.156] [0.095] [0.072] [0.067]
Pr(job offer abroad) 0.270** 0.198** 0.262*** 0.199**
[0.110] [0.083] [0.087] [0.082]
Pr(job offer) = 50% -0.018 0.064 -0.023 0.025 -0.058 0.024 -0.061 -0.003
[0.062] [0.056] [0.055] [0.048] [0.046] [0.043] [0.037] [0.029]
Pr(job offer) > 50% 0.147** 0.088* 0.146*** 0.103**
[0.068] [0.046] [0.053] [0.045]
Observations 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291
DV Mean, Control 12.7% 7.1% 10.2% 6.1%
V + V X 50% = 0 0.018** 0.143 0.094* 0.076*
V + V X >50% = 0 0.006*** 0.821 0.370 0.373
Inteactions jointly zero 0.502 0.516 0.299 0.568 0.098* 0.095* 0.142 0.182
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Strat-
ification cell and enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex, age,
marital status, education, and dummy variables for whether currently or ever employed, ever
employed in Manila, and strongly interested in working abroad.
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Table 2.C.5: ITT impact of voucher on job-fair participation, by share of jobs abroad for
which potentially qualified and perceived chance of job-finding abroad, excluding wage and
qualification information groups
Attend Visit info. Apply Final interview
booth offer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Voucher 0.566*** 0.476*** 0.280** 0.181** 0.204** 0.030 0.192* 0.027
[0.185] [0.125] [0.131] [0.073] [0.095] [0.041] [0.101] [0.039]
Voucher X Share of jobs qualified -2.666 -3.392 -5.872** -4.749
[4.150] [3.356] [2.516] [2.981]
Voucher X Mid. tercile qualified -0.088 -0.152* -0.051 -0.057
[0.126] [0.088] [0.058] [0.076]
Voucher X Top tercile qualified -0.058 -0.062 -0.127 -0.028
[0.110] [0.104] [0.076] [0.092]
Voucher X chance job offer abroad -0.208 -0.184 -0.046 -0.082
[0.242] [0.137] [0.108] [0.095]
Voucher X chance job offer = 50% -0.092 -0.166 0.026 -0.032 0.155** 0.147*** 0.109* 0.076
[0.110] [0.132] [0.058] [0.067] [0.059] [0.053] [0.055] [0.048]
Voucher X chance job offer > 50% -0.125 -0.072 -0.016 -0.041
[0.147] [0.097] [0.076] [0.080]
Share of jobs qualified 4.730*** 3.149* 4.962*** 4.836***
[1.565] [1.570] [1.392] [1.530]
Mid. tercile qualified 0.062 0.088** 0.079* 0.056*
[0.050] [0.032] [0.045] [0.031]
Top tercile qualified 0.129** 0.105** 0.151** 0.082**
[0.061] [0.046] [0.058] [0.034]
Chance job offer abroad if apply 0.224** 0.166* 0.211** 0.150*
[0.109] [0.084] [0.087] [0.085]
Chance job offer abroad = 50% -0.023 0.041 -0.028 0.003 -0.065 -0.005 -0.067* -0.019
[0.057] [0.057] [0.049] [0.047] [0.039] [0.046] [0.035] [0.028]
Chance job offer > 50% 0.122* 0.063 0.116** 0.086*
[0.063] [0.044] [0.050] [0.044]
Observations 291 291 291 291 291 291 291 291
DV Mean, Control 12.7% 7.1% 10.2% 6.1%
Chance offer interact. = zero 0.461 0.427 0.410 0.738 0.041** 0.031** 0.159 0.175
Qual. interact. = zero 0.767 0.231 0.258 0.508
All interactions jointly zero 0.618 0.775 0.436 0.276 0.002*** 0.063* 0.101 0.356
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the neighborhood level reported in brackets. Stratification cell and
enumerator fixed effects included. Individual characteristics include sex, age, marital status, education, and dummy




Figure 2.D.1: Local linear regressions of voucher assignment on job-fair outcomes, by quali-
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Local first-degree polynomial regressions using Epanechnikov kernal. Confidence intervals bootstrapped with
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Local first-degree polynomial regressions using Epanechnikov kernal. Confidence intervals bootstrapped with
5000 repetitions, clustered by neighborhood. X-axis trimmed at 99 percentile.











.02 .04 .06 .08
Share of overseas jobs for which qualified (education and 2-digit ISOC)
No voucher Voucher
Local first-degree polynomial regressions using Epanechnikov kernal. Confidence intervals bootstrapped with
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Local first-degree polynomial regressions using Epanechnikov kernal. Confidence intervals bootstrapped with
5000 repetitions, clustered by neighborhood. X-axis trimmed at 99 percentile.
(d) Final interview offer
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Figure 2.D.2: Local quadratic regressions of voucher assignment on job-fair outcomes, by
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Local  polynomial regressions using Epanechnikov kernal. Confidence intervals bootstrapped with
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Local  polynomial regressions using Epanechnikov kernal. Confidence intervals bootstrapped with
5000 repetitions, clustered by neighborhood. X-axis trimmed at 99 percentile.












.02 .04 .06 .08
Share of overseas jobs for which qualified (education and 2-digit ISOC)
No voucher Voucher
Local  polynomial regressions using Epanechnikov kernal. Confidence intervals bootstrapped with




















.02 .04 .06 .08
Share of overseas jobs for which qualified (education and 2-digit ISOC)
No voucher Voucher
Local  polynomial regressions using Epanechnikov kernal. Confidence intervals bootstrapped with
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CHAPTER 3
Unilateral Facilitation Does Not Raise International
Labor Migration from the Philippines
3.1 Introduction
Wage rates of workers using the same skills and doing the same jobs differ by as much as
ten to one depending on the country in which they work (Ashenfelter, 2012). Moving from
a developing to a developed country results in immediate large increases in income for the
migrants, with gains that far exceed those of any other development policy intervention
(Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett, 2009; Gibson and McKenzie, 2013; Hanson, 2009;
McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2010). Why do so few people emigrate, and what policies
can governments in developing countries pursue to make it easier for their citizens to escape
poverty through international migration?
Migration-source country governments have pursued two broad approaches to facilitating
international migration for formal, legal work. Source countries can pursue unilateral fa-
cilitation policies on their own, without needing the cooperation of migration-destination
country governments. Unilateral facilitation may involve provision of information, loan fa-
cilitation, and policies to ease the international job search process. These policies act on the
supply side of the migrant labor market. Enhanced unilateral facilitation could have positive
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impacts on migration if immigration policies in destination countries are sufficiently open,
or if bilateral policies are already in place. Bilateral facilitation policies, on the other hand,
involve cooperation with governments or employers in destination countries, and include for-
malization of agreements to allow labor migration of specified numbers and types of workers.
Such policies primarily attempt to influence the demand side of the migrant labor market,
but could also have supply-side components.
Despite the spread of these policies, there is currently little rigorous empirical evidence
on the effectiveness of either unilateral or bilateral migration facilitation. We implement
a randomized experiment measuring the impacts of unilateral migration facilitation. Our
experiment is large in scale, implements unilateral facilitation at a range of intensities, and
occurs in the Philippines, one of the world’s most important sources of legal, temporary
international labor migration.
The Philippines has made perhaps the greatest progress among migration-source countries
in implementing bilateral approaches, as evidenced by the existence of 49 bilateral migration
agreements with 25 destination countries (6) and an annual deployment of more than 1.6
million Filipino workers worldwide (POEA 2013). We implement our study in Sorsogon, a
province that sends relatively few labor migrants overseas, compared to other parts of the
Philippines. These features - existing and extensive bilateral labor migration arrangements,
but relatively low migration relative to other parts of the country - make our experimental
context one where unilateral migration policies could potentially have a substantial positive
impact.
In the classic economic migration model, migration is an investment: individuals and house-
holds incur moving costs to generate returns via higher incomes (Sjaastad, 1962). Subsequent
work acknowledges imperfect financial markets in developing countries can also create addi-
tional rationales for migrating such as to finance household investments (Stark and Bloom,
1985; Yang, 2006).
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This framework suggests three main reasons why individuals do not migrate even when
there are job opportunities abroad. First, individuals may have high disutility from moving
and therefore not wish to participate in international migration even though the monetary
benefits outweigh the monetary costs. This is certainly not what many non-migrants say
- for example, 51.1 percent of surveyed Filipinos aged 15 and over say they would like to
work abroad if they had the opportunity (Gallup, 2010). Second, individuals may not be
fully informed about the costs and benefits of migration. Perhaps because they do not get to
observe the outcomes of the most successful individuals who leave (Wilson, 1987), potential
migrants may underestimate the benefits of migration (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman,
2013). Third, individuals may wish to migrate, but be unable to do so because of various
constraints such as credit market imperfections (Mckenzie and Rapoport, 2007; Grogger and
Hanson, 2011); documentation barriers such as difficulty in obtaining a passport (McKenzie,
2007); or frictions in job search that are exacerbated when searching internationally (Ortega,
2000; Lumpe and Weigert, 2009).
Our experiment tested the impact of unilateral facilitation policies designed to reduce such
barriers. We randomized adults of prime migration age into various combinations of treat-
ments facilitating international labor migration. Individuals were randomized into a control
group that received no treatments, or into receiving one or more of the set of facilitation
treatments. The different treatments alleviated constraints in the following areas: 1) infor-
mation (about job search, migration financial, and passport processing); 2) frictions in job
search (assistance in enrolling in an online job-finding website set up by the project to lower
search costs and facilitate matching between recruiters and workers); and 3) documentation
barriers (assistance and a full subsidy for passport application).
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3.2 Setting
The Philippines is a useful setting to study the impact of unilateral approaches. The Philip-
pine government’s extensive bilateral facilitation policies, along with strong international
labor demand, have created many migration opportunities in the past few decades. The
government directly encourages international emigration, regulates private labor recruiters,
and numerous financial institutions provide financial to help potential migrants pay recruit-
ment fees (O’Neil, 2004). Yet even with this infrastructure in place, and despite the fact that
the country’s per capita GDP (around US$2,000) is less than one tenth of that in developed
countries, most Filipinos do not migrate (five in six families do not receive remittances from
workers abroad). We conducted our experiment in Sorsogon, a rural province 10-12 hours
by bus from the capital, Manila, where most recruitment activities take place. Reflecting its
relative poverty and isolation, the Bicol region (where Sorsogon is located) has relatively low
participation in international migration. The region accounts for 5.8 percent of the Philip-
pine population, but only 3.3 percent of the country’s overseas worker deployments in 2011
(NSO 2011).
3.3 Methods
We randomly selected 4,153 households from six municipalities in Sorsogon Province. From
each household, we interviewed the first member we met who had never worked abroad
and was aged 20-40. The supplementary online text describes our sampling procedure in
greater detail. We conducted the baseline survey in early 2010. Table 1 reports demographic
characteristics of the sample from the baseline survey. 71 percent of respondents are female,
reflecting the fact that females were more likely to be at home when our project staff called
upon the household. Respondents report relatively high educational attainment (69 percent
have completed high school and 36 percent have completed at least some post-secondary
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schooling) but low levels of household income (averaging P7,800 pesos/month, or US$157)
suggesting they may have high returns to working overseas.1 Thirty-four percent report that
they are “interested” or “strongly interested” in working abroad.
We revisited respondents in 2012 to collect information on their overseas job-search knowl-
edge, job-search behavior, and migration decisions. We ask whether and how respondents
searched for work overseas between 2010-2012, and we classify respondents as having mi-
grated if they obtained a job offer and migrated abroad during that period. We successfully
surveyed 90.8 percent of respondents or another member of their household at endline, and
we find no evidence of differential attrition across treatment assignment.2 Our primary an-
alytical sample consists of these 90.8 percent for whom we successfully fielded an endline
survey of the respondent or a fellow household member. Among the 9.2 percent who could
not be reached at endline in this manner, we fielded brief “log” surveys of neighbors on in-
ternational labor migration by the respondent, and inclusion of these log surveys raises our
total endline response rate (for the “migrate abroad” outcome) to 98.5 percent.
We show in the SOM that our estimated impacts on migration are robust to use of the
full (98.5 percent) endline sample including the log surveys. During the baseline survey, we
randomly assigned respondents to a control group or to one of four treatment groups designed
to improve their information about and access to overseas work opportunities (Figure 3.1).
These groups were application information [T1], financial information [T2], application and
financial information [T1] + [T2], and website assistance [T4]. The application information
consisted of information on typical overseas costs; the steps needed to apply for work abroad;
an advertisement to enroll in Pilijobs.org, an overseas job-finding website designed as part
of this project3; and a list of ways to avoid illegal recruitment from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency. Financial information consisted of typical placement fees for work
1This and all other conversions based on the average exchange rate from February-June 2010, 1 USD =
45.0497 PHP (OANDA, 2012)
2See TableXXX.
3See Appendix 3.A for more details on the interventions.
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abroad and a list of Manila-based financial companies that provide loans for placement fees.
To facilitate job-matching, we worked with several Manila-based overseas recruitment agen-
cies and a Sorsogon microfinance NGO to develop a website, Pilijobs.org, to help respondents
easily contact and apply with reputable recruitment agencies, and to allow those agencies to
directly post job opportunities that could be accessed by respondents. Website assistance
[T4] was always assigned along with application and financial information ([T1] + [T2]). It
consisted of a paper form they could use to enroll in Pilijobs.org, with interviewers providing
help if requested. Interviewers returned to pick up completed forms, or respondents returned
them to a nearby office. Project staff encoded and uploaded forms to the website. Based
on feedback from our partner recruitment agencies during the first stage of the project, we
determined that another potential barrier to overseas migration was difficulty accessing a
passport. Agencies reported that because of difficulty and delays many individuals encounter
when applying for passports, they preferred to prioritize applicants with passports. In mid-
2011, we randomly assigned a subset of our sample to one of two treatments targeted to help
respondents get passports for overseas work, which were cross randomized with our initial
treatments to generate 15 total treatment and control cells (Figure 3.1).
The first passport treatment, passport information [T3], provided respondents a flier on the
importance of having a passport before applying for overseas work and the steps they could
take to obtain a passport. The second passport treatment, passport assistance [T3]+[T5],
involved the passport information treatment, plus a letter inviting respondents to participate
in a program that fully subsidized the typical costs of applying for a passport (including
transportation), along with project staff assistance with passport application.
Figure 3.1 shows the treatments, which range from the control group to “All information”
(application, financial, and passport information [T1] + [T2] + [T3]) and “All information
+ website” ([T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4]). The most intensive treatment, “Full assistance,”
includes all information treatments, website assistance, and passport assistance ([T1] + [T2]
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+ [T3] + [T4] + [T5]). The supplementary online text presents the methodology used to
test the impacts of these treatments on knowledge about migration, job-search activities,
and international migration.
3.4 Results
We examine whether unilateral facilitation can increase international migration by testing
four hypotheses:
H1: The massive gain in income possible from migration should result in high migration
demand. Since the monetary gains from migration are likely to far exceed the monetary
costs for most Filipinos (2), theory predicts most individuals will wish to migrate unless the
disutility from moving is high. In fact only 33.9 percent of individuals say they interested or
very interested in migration at baseline, and far fewer search for work overseas (5.1 percent
of the control group) between survey rounds.
H2: Incomplete information prevents individuals from realizing the gains from migration. If
individuals underestimate the gains from migration (McKenzie, Gibson and Stillman, 2013),
or overstate the costs, then some individuals for whom it is optimal to migrate will decide not
to do so. Knowledge is clearly incomplete - at baseline, one-quarter of individuals responded
with “don’t know” to the typical wages and costs of work overseas for six common destination
countries, and the responses given by those who do give an answer also suggest considerable
inaccuracies. For example, half of those who did respond estimated they would earn the
same wage or less in high-wage Canada as they would in low-wage Saudi Arabia. At endline,
only 14.3 percent of the control group can name a lender who can finance migration costs
and only 19.9 percent know where to go to apply for a passport. However, the information
treatments alone do not result in higher rates of job search or international migration.
Figure 3.2 highlights means of key outcomes across a representative subset of treatments. We
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see the rate of overseas job search (5.3 percent) for the “All information” treatment is similar
in magnitude, and not statistically different, from the 5.1 percent rate in the control group,
and that only 1.1 percent of the “All information” group migrates abroad over the two year
period. Table 3.2 provides regression estimates of the treatment effects for a broader range
of job-search and migration outcomes over the two-year period and confirms this lack of
impact. Table 3.3 restricts the regression analysis to the subset of individuals who indicated
that they were interested in migrating at baseline. In this subsample, information alone
induces statistically significant increases (at the ten-percent level) in the likelihood of being
invited to interview and attending an interview for work abroad, but there is no statistically
significant impact of information alone on actual migration.
H3: Frictions in matching with recruiters limit international migration. Even if individuals
have correct information and decide the gains from migration exceed the costs, they still
need to match with a job abroad (Ortega, 2000; Lumpe and Weigert, 2009). The website
treatment is intended to help individuals do this. Figure 3.2 shows that the combination
of information and the website treatment (“All Information + Website”) caused a substan-
tial increase in the rate of search for work abroad, from 5.1 percent to 15.7 percent. The
regression-adjusted estimate of this treatment effect from Table 3.2 is nearly identical, in-
dicating a 10.8 percentage point increase (statistically significant at the one-percent level).
Despite inducing substantially higher search effort, the treatment causes no additional mi-
gration abroad: the coefficient estimate in Table 3.2 column 8 is very small in magnitude
and is not significantly different from zero. For the subgroup expressing interest in migrat-
ing at baseline, Table 3.3 shows the website and information combination resulted in a 20.1
percentage-point increase in job search and a 7.7 percentage-point increase in attending an
interview (statistically significant at the one and five-percent levels, respectively), but much
smaller and statistically insignificant increases in the job offer rate (4.4 percentage points)
and in the migration rate (2.3 percentage points).
H4: Documentation barriers prevent individuals from taking advantage of job openings
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abroad. Lack of a passport may prevent recruiters from even considering individuals for job
openings or prevent some of those who receive job offers from taking up these offers. Our
most intensive “Full assistance” treatment, which combines information, website assistance,
and assistance obtaining a passport, results in a 21.7 percent job search rate (Figure 3.2),
but is still far short of the 33.9 percent reporting interest in migration at baseline. Table 3.2
shows that this 16.0 percentage-point increase in job search over the control group rate is
statistically significant at the one-percent level, and mainly reflects increased online search
(column 2, increase significant at the one-percent level), in addition to some additional
search via other methods, such as attending job fairs (column 4, increase significant at the
five-percent level). The full assistance treatment also has positive impacts on job interview
invitations, interview attendance, and job offer receipt (columns 5-7, effects significant at the
ten, five, and one-percent levels respectively), and these effects are large relative to control
group rates (2.6 percent, 1.5 percent, and 1.7 percent, respectively). Despite these positive
impacts on pre-migration outcomes, the treatment has no statistically significant impact on
migration abroad: the point estimate is zero percentage points to the third decimal place
(column 8).
Table 3.3 shows these effects are larger for the sub-group initially expressing interest in
migration (for whom demand should not be the constraint), with a 26.7 percentage-point
increase in job search, a 8.3 percentage-point increase in job interview attendance, and a
7.4 percentage-point increase in the likelihood of receiving a job offer abroad (all statisti-
cally significant at the five-percent level or less). However, there is still only a statistically
insignificant 1.6 percentage-point increase in migration abroad. That is, our full package of
unilateral facilitation delivered to the subgroup interested in migrating still does not signif-
icantly increase migration.
Appendix 3.A shows that these results are robust to a variety of specifications and to alternate
measures of migration outcomes, including a follow-up effort in 2013 to check the migration
status of those with job offers who had not yet migrated in 2012. In Table 3.A.5, we also
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examine the reasons some individuals with job offers did not migrate. The most common
reasons given were financial and health related: 24.1 percent say they could not afford
migration costs, and 10.3 percent cite health issues or that they failed the medical exam.
Additionally, at least 27.9 percent of unaccepted offers can be attributed to a lack of demand
to migrate, either because of the conditions of the position (8.6 percent not interested in
type of work, 6.9 percent salary too low), family obligations (10.3 percent), or because the
respondent was no longer interested in working abroad (1.7 percent).
3.5 Discussion
The large gain in income possible through international migration makes it a puzzle that
so few individuals migrate abroad. We conduct a randomized impact evaluation of migra-
tion facilitation policies designed to overcome information, matching, and documentation
constraints that may inhibit individuals from realizing these gains. These are policies that
developing countries can implement unilaterally, without needing to reach bilateral agree-
ments with migration destination countries.
Our results suggest that information constraints are not an important barrier to interna-
tional labor migration. Despite individuals lacking complete knowledge about the incomes
they could earn abroad, the costs of moving, or the process involved in migrating, we find
that providing such information has no overall impact on either job search or international
migration.4
In contrast, we do find that assisting individuals to match with recruiters through a jobs
website, and to overcome documentation barriers through passport assistance, does lead to
a substantial increase in job search effort, and to an increased likelihood of obtaining a job
4(26) One potential reason for this is that more accurate information may dissuade overly optimistic
individuals from searching, balancing out an increase in search from individuals who undervalue the gains
from migrating. Indeed we find (and show in Appendix 3.A) that providing only financial information or
passport information without other facilitation has a small negative impact on job search, consistent with
individuals understating the costs and complexity of moving.
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interview. These constraints therefore appear to inhibit individuals taking steps towards
international migration, although even with our maximum intensity facilitation, the rate of
overseas job search over a two-year period, 21.7 percent, is still far short of the fraction of
individuals expressing interest in overseas migration at the start of that period (33.9 percent).
We conclude that survey-based elicitations of migration interest are likely to exceed actual
attempts at migration, even in response to intensive migration assistance.
However, these substantial impacts on job search lead to no large or statistically significant
increases in actual migration. Only a minority of the additional respondents induced to
search for jobs overseas in response to our most intensive facilitation treatment are invited
to interview for overseas jobs or receive overseas job offers. (That said, the effects of the
treatment on these outcomes are statistically significant and imply large proportional effects
relative to low control-group rates of interviews and offers.) Substantial fractions of those
induced to search for overseas jobs by our treatments appear to be screened out by those
on the demand side of the migrant labor market - recruitment agencies and the ultimate
overseas employers. This is consistent with recent work showing how binding minimum
wages specific to occupation and destination limit the number of job openings abroad for
Filipinos McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang (forthcoming).
Perhaps the most surprising result of our study is that, while our most intensive facilitation
treatment delivers statistically significant increases in overseas job offers (that are large
relative to control group rates), it has zero impact on actual overseas migration (over a two-
year post-treatment window). This finding contrasts strongly with recent work on facilitating
internal migration (Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak, 2011), which has found small subsidies
such as the cost of a bus ticket can have large impacts on internal job search and internal
migration.
This lack of impact serves to further underline the point that demand for international
migration on the part of developing-country residents is likely to be overstated - those induced
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by an intervention to receive actual job offers commonly reject those offers in the end. Our
survey evidence on the reasons these jobs are declined fails to pinpoint a dominant reason
behind such job-offer rejections. The most common reason, financial constraints (cited by
nearly a quarter of job-offer decliners), does not distinguish whether individuals face actual
financial constraints or whether they are indicative that the perceived benefits of migration
do not exceed the perceived costs.
Together, these results indicate that unilateral facilitation policies related to information, job
search, and documentation assistance are not sufficient to increase rates of international labor
migration. We find evidence of multiple remaining barriers on both the supply side (relatively
low interest on the part of potential migrants) and demand side (highly selective screening for
interviews and job offers) for overseas work. Our findings indicate that policymakers aiming
to expand access to migration, particularly for those in isolated areas, should not expect to
achieve success if relying solely on unilateral migration facilitation, and brings to the fore the
role of complementary bilateral facilitation policies. Investigating the effectiveness of such







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.2: Reported interest in overseas migration, compared to search effort and realized
migration across selected treatment conditions
Notes: “Interested in working abroad” indicates respondent reported he/she was “interested” or “very in-
terested” in migrating overseas at baseline (early 2010). Other variables reported in 2012 endline survey.
Searching for work abroad includes asking family/friends, applying with a recruitment agency, applying
online, or searching another way. Sample includes all baseline respondents with completed endline sur-
veys. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. See Figure 3.1 for treatment definitions. Stars indicate
difference vs. control group is statistically significant at 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Mean S.D. N
(1) (2) (3)
Female 0.71 0.46 4151
Age (mean) 31.65 6.06 4151
High school graduate 0.33 0.47 4151
Some college or vocational 0.23 0.42 4151
College graduate 0.13 0.34 4151
Interested in working abroad 0.34 0.47 4151
Willing to take risks (1=low-10=high) 5.39 3.53 4143
Household income 7.88 7.64 4091
Household savings (uncond.) 1.78 10.03 3927
No household savings 0.83 0.38 3927
Anyone in HH ever take out loan 0.53 0.50 4150
Normalized asset index 0.00 1.00 4151
Any immediate fam. overseas 0.13 0.34 4151
Any extended fam. overseas 0.54 0.50 4151
Observations 4151
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample restricted to baseline respondents without missing data on
education and past household member migration. Household income and















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.A.1 Data collection and sampling procedure
We obtained human subjects approval for this study from the University of Michigan, Health
Sciences and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board, project number HUM00034271,
“The Determinants of Temporary Labor Migration in the Philippines.” Participants received
information on the general purpose of the study and signed a written consent form before
participating in the baseline and endline surveys. Participants in the passport sample con-
sented before participating in a brief survey, and those who enrolled in the passport assistance
program also received information specific to the intervention and signed a separate consent
form at the time of their enrollment. Table 3.A.1 presents the full timeline of our project.
Early in 2010, we selected six municipalities in Sorsogon Province in which to conduct the
baseline survey. These were selected to include both wealthier and poorer municipalities and
both rural and urban areas. We randomly selected 42 barangays from these municipalities.
A barangay is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines. The municipalities we
selected each have between 25 and 65 barangays, and there are a total of roughly 42,000
barangays in the country. We selected eleven from the capital of Sorsogon City, seven from
Casiguran, Castilla, Pilar, and Gubat, and five from Castilla and Irosin. Due to security and
logistical considerations, three initially selected barangays were excluded and replaced with
the next randomly selected barangay.
We collected a household roster from each barangay that included a list of households,
and we used these to set barangay-specific target sample sizes proportional to population.
We targeted approximately five percent of the total population from each barangay, or
roughly 26 percent of households. We sorted households randomly and selected the first
listed households to be our target. When a household could not be located or had no eligible
members, we replaced it with the next household on the list.
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Interviewers screened the first person they approached in the household. To be eligible for
our study, the target respondent had to be between ages 20 and 45, and he or she must
have not worked abroad in the past. Households that had current or past overseas Filipino
workers (OFWs) were still eligible for the study. If the first household member was not
eligible or did not want to participate in the survey, the interviewer asked if anyone else in
the household might be eligible, and would interview that person instead. Houses selected
were typically far enough apart from each other that concerns about information spillovers
are second order; to the extent that there were spillovers, our treatment estimates are lower
bounds on the differential impact of more information. The passport assistance was only
offered to the respondents themselves, and so are not subject to such spillovers. We surveyed
5,008 individuals between March and August 2010.
In this paper, our baseline sample consists of the 4,153 individuals ages 20-40 in our sample.
In working with recruitment agencies subsequent to the baseline survey, we learned that
most individuals over age 40 would not be eligible for overseas work. In selecting the pass-
port sample, we required that individuals be between ages 20-40. Tables 3.A.9 and 3.A.10
demonstrate that our results are not affected by including the 855 respondents ages 41-45.
In 2011, we launched the second stage of our project to provide some respondents with as-
sistance obtaining a passport. We revisited a subset of our baseline sample. Specifically,
of respondents ages 20-40, we included all who received the website treatment [T4], all Pil-
ijobs.org enrollees in other treatment groups (32 respondents), 300 respondents randomly
selected from each information treatment group ([T1], [T2], and [T1]+[T2]), and 300 re-
spondents randomly selected from the control group.
At the time of the passport survey, we also interviewed and offered passport assistance to
a supplemental sample of Sorsogon Province residents who enrolled in Pilijobs.org through
other means that we describe in SOM section 4 below, but who were not a part of our
baseline sample. We do not include these respondents in our analysis.
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We conducted an endline survey in mid-2012 to measure the impacts of our interventions.
We visited all respondents from the baseline sample, making two attempts to reach each
respondent. We interviewed another household member and administered a proxy survey
when the respondent was not available, enabling us to obtain full data on respondent and
household migration steps and job-search behavior when we could not directly reach the
respondent. When no member of the household could be interviewed, we interviewed a
neighbor using a “log” survey. The information collected in that survey was limited to the
respondents’ whereabouts, and whether he or she was currently working overseas. We show
below (in section 7) that our finding of no impacts of the treatments on migration abroad
are robust to expanding the sample to include these log surveys.
Using this three-pronged approach, we obtained measures of whether the respondent mi-
grated abroad for work from full, proxy, or log surveys for 4,089 respondents, or 98.5 percent
of our sample. Of those, 73 percent were surveys with the respondents themselves, 20 percent
were proxy surveys, and 7 percent were log surveys. Excluding the log surveys, we have a
91 percent response rate for our full set of job search and migration outcome variables.
We provide full details on attrition rates in Table 3.A.2. In column 1, the dependent variable
is an indicator for the endline either being completely missing or administered only via the
log survey, in which case we are missing the pre-migration outcome measures we examine
in columns 1-7 of Tables 2 and 3. We do not find evidence that either type of attrition is
substantially related to treatment assignment. Coefficients on all treatments are small in
magnitude, and although the coefficient on treatment [T2] + [T3] is individually significant,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the treatment assignments are jointly unrelated to
attrition.
In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator for the respondent not being included
in any of our endline surveys (respondent, proxy, or log surveys). Similar to column 2, we
find some evidence of differential attrition for those assigned to treatments [T2] + [T3],
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significant at the five-percent level. However, the difference in response rates is small in
magnitude (only 1.7 percentage points). We use the sample that does not include the log
surveys for our main analysis, and only use this log survey data as a robustness check.
3.A.2 Randomization to treatment and control
3.A.2.1 Information and website assistance randomization
Our baseline sample was randomly allocated to a control group or to one of four treatment
groups: application information [T1], financial information [T2], application and financial
information ([T1] + [T2]), and website assistance ([T1] + [T2] + [T4]). The sample was
divided evenly between these five groups.
Each respondent’s treatment assignment was blind to the interviewer until after he or she
completed the baseline survey. Interviewers received sealed envelopes containing a thank-you
letter, the information treatments (as assigned), and blank paper to even out the weight of
the envelopes between treatment types so that the interviewer could not guess the treatment
until the envelope was opened after the survey. Each envelope was labeled with the house-
hold identification number assigned to the respondent being interviewed, serving as the link
between the respondent and treatment assignment.
Because of our partnership with the microfinance institution PALFSI, we anticipated that
current clients might respond differently to treatment and have different characteristics from
non-PALFSI clients. Envelopes were randomized by barangay and by microfinance client
status in blocks of five. This procedure generated block randomization within 81 barangay-
by-client-status stratification cells. Our regression estimates include indicator variables for
each stratification cell as control variables.
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3.A.2.2 Passport randomization
Respondents in the passport survey were randomly assigned with equal probability to a
control group or to one of two treatment groups prior to implementation. We stratified
members of the passport sample by baseline treatment group, whether they had enrolled in
Pilijobs.org, barangay, and age. Specifically, we divided members of this sample into groups
based on baseline treatment assignment and Pilijobs.org enrollment status, divided each
group into barangays, sorted by age within each barangay-sample cell, and block-randomized
by threes. These respondents were resurveyed and randomly assigned to a passport control
group or to the passport information [T3] or passport assistance ([T3] + [T5]) interventions.
3.A.2.3 Balancing tests
Columns 1 through 5 of Table 3.A.3 report mean values for a set of individual and household
characteristics of respondents, separately for each of the four original treatment conditions
plus the control group. In columns 6 through 8 of the table, we report the corresponding
characteristics of respondents who were part of the passport sample, based on their assign-
ment to the passport control, information, or assistance treatments. (Recall that these are
overlapping treatments, but that the passport sample excludes respondents aged 41-45.)
On the whole the various randomized treatments have similar observables to the respective
control groups. While there are some cases where the mean value of a covariate in a treatment
group is statistically significantly different from the mean value in the respective control
group (indicated by one, two, or three stars for significance levels of ten percent, five percent,
and one percent, respectively), their frequency is commensurate with what would occur via
random variation: out of 84 comparisons with the control group mean in the table, nine (10.7
percent) are statistically significant at the ten-percent level or less. Our regression estimates




We use the following specification to measure the impact of unilateral facilitation on job-
search and migration:






′γ +X ′δ + εi (3.1)
where Yi is the outcome variable for respondent i, measured in the 2012 endline survey. Dji
is a binary indicator equal to one if respondent i is assigned to combination j of application
information [T1], financial information [T2], passport information [T3], website assistance
[T4], or passport assistance [T5].
Vector B includes the barangay/client-status set of stratification cell fixed effects, along with
an indicator for whether the respondent was randomly selected to be in the passport sam-
ple. The coefficient on this indicator would be non-zero if simply being interviewed in the
passport sample affected our endline outcomes. (In practice, this coefficient is consistently
close to zero and not statistically significant.) To increase the precision of our estimates, we
also include a vector of pre-specified controls, X, for the following baseline characteristics:
female (indicator); age (continuous); high school completion (indicator); some college or
vocational training (indicator); college completion (indicator); interested in working abroad
(indicator); willingness to take risks (0-10 scale); household income (in thousands of pe-
sos); household savings (in thousands of pesos); whether the household has ever taken out
a loan (indicator); asset ownership (normalized index of durable asset holdings); whether
the respondent has extended family overseas (indicator); and whether the respondent has
immediate family overseas (indicator). Missing covariate values are coded as zeros, and we
include a set of missing value indicator flags. These covariates are outlined in our pre-analysis
plan, available online at https://sites.google.com/site/eabeam/AnalysisPlan_june8_
swap_beammckenzieyang.pdf and archived with the J-PAL Hypothesis Registry on June 8,
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2012.
This results in 14 mutually exclusive treatment categories in addition to an omitted control
group:
1. Application information [T1]
2. Financial information [T2]
3. Passport information [T3]
4. Application and financial information [T1] + [T2]
5. Application and passport information [T1] + [T3]
6. Financial and passport information [T2] + [T3]
7. Application, financial, and passport information [T1] + [T2] + [T3] (“All information”)
8. Application information, financial information, and website assistance [T1] + [T2] +
[T4]
9. Application information, financial information, passport information, and website as-
sistance [T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4] (“All information + website”)
10. Passport information and passport assistance (“Only passport assistance”) [T3] + [T5]
11. Application information, passport information, and passport assistance [T1] + [T3] +
[T5]
12. Financial information, passport information, and passport assistance [T2] + [T3] +
[T5]
13. Application information, financial information, passport information, and passport as-
sistance [T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T5] (“All information + passport”)
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14. Application information, financial information, passport information, and website as-
sistance, and passport assistance [T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4] + [T5] (“Full Assistance”)
In main text Tables 2 and 3, we estimate all coefficients but to simplify presentation we
report results for only the following five treatments:
1. Application, financial, and passport information [T1] + [T2] + [T3] (“All information”)
2. Application information, financial information, passport information, and website as-
sistance [T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4] (“All information + website”)
3. Passport information and passport assistance (“Only Passport Assistance”) [T3] + [T5]
4. Application information, financial information, passport information, and passport as-
sistance [T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T5] (“All information + passport”)
5. Application information, financial information, passport information, and website as-
sistance, and passport assistance [T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4] + [T5] (“Full Assistance”)
This enables us to report results for the full information treatment, and then for combinations
of the website assistance and passport assistance with full information. We report the full
set of 14 treatment coefficients in Tables 3.A.7 and 3.A.8.
3.A.4 Pilijobs.org
We developed Pilijobs.org in partnership with several Manila-based overseas recruitment
agencies and our local microfinance partner (PALFSI). Pilijobs.org provided applicants with
the opportunity to easily contact and apply for overseas jobs with reputable recruitment
agencies, and allowed those agencies to directly post job opportunities that could be accessed
by Sorsogon residents. While several widely used job-finding websites for overseas work
already exist in the Philippines, we developed a separate one to ensure that applicants
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would be put in contact only with high-quality, properly licensed recruitment agencies, and
to track their enrollment and participation in the website. Five recruitment agencies used
the site, both to post job listings and to review applicants, and we worked closely with them
to get their feedback and to encourage their staff to use the website.
We launched Pilijobs.org in early April 2010, within weeks of the start of the baseline survey
period. Nearly all (91 percent) of baseline respondents who enrolled in Pilijobs.org did so
using paper forms, so their enrollment is unlikely to be affected by their brief delay between
survey launch and the Pilijobs.org website launch. In addition to the baseline applicants who
enrolled online or through our paper forms, we recruited other applicants through door-to-
door advertising in selected municipalities and barangays of Sorsogon Province that were not
included in our baseline sample. This was done to ensure the website had enough of a user
base to make it attractive to the recruiters. These applicants also received paper forms that
staff encoded and uploaded to the website, and these advertising efforts all took place after
completion of the baseline survey and interventions. We also advertised with bumper stickers
and posters in municipalities that were not part of our baseline sample. To avoid spillovers,
we did not use these general advertising methods in any of our baseline municipalities.
Finally, we marketed Pilijobs.org broadly across the Philippines, using targeted Facebook
advertising. All of these efforts resulted in an additional 5,500 enrollees, bringing the total
enrollment in Pilijobs to roughly 7,100.
3.A.5 Impact on passport acquisition
Our administrative records indicate that 9.6 percent of baseline respondents offered passport
assistance successfully obtained a passport. Although the program provided a full subsidy
of the cost of the passport and required documentation, as well as fully subsidized transport
expenses, passport applicants were still required to put forth substantial time and effort to
obtain a passport. For example, each applicant traveled one to two hours to the regional
151
office of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Legazpi City three separate times to apply for
and receive their passport, and most applicants made additional trips to other local agencies
to obtain required documentation for their passport application.
The payments we disbursed for the passport assistance treatment varied across applicants,
ranging from P1250 (US$28) for just transportation and the passport fee to P2350 (US$52)
for those with additional documentation requirements. Some applicants had costs that could
not be subsidized by the program. For example, the project did not cover the expenses
of amending a birth certificate or other documentation due to misspellings or erroneous
information (with costs as much as P30,000). Approximately 11.6 percent of respondents
initiated the passport process but were not able to complete it.
Because respondents may have obtained passports without directly interacting with our
staff, these administrative records are not sufficient to test the impact of receiving passport
information. Table 3.A.4 reports the impact our assigned treatments on whether respondents
reported in the endline survey that they currently had a valid passport. All treatments
that include passport assistance [T5] have positive effects on passport ownership that are
statistically significant at the five-percent level or less. Effect sizes for these treatments range
from 7.3 to 12.7 percentage points, which are large compared with the control group rate of
4.5 percent. In addition, the most comprehensive treatment that does not include passport
assistance [T5], “All information + Website” ([T1]+[T2]+[T3]+[T4]), also increases passport
ownership by 5.1 percentage points (statistically significant at the five-percent level).
3.A.6 Reported reasons for not migrating
Table 3.A.5 presents data from our endline survey on reported reasons for not migrating, for
those individuals who did receive an overseas job offer. We discuss this table in the main
text.
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3.A.7 Impacts on migration, including log survey endline data
All estimation results presented in the main text and here so far use data from respondent or
proxy (other household member) surveys, which account for 91 percent of endline surveys.
As noted above in column 1 of Table 3.A.2, there is no systematic pattern of differential
inclusion in the respondent or proxy surveys related to treatment status.
That said, it is important to confirm that our (absence of) results for the impact of the
treatments on migration overseas are robust to including responses from the “log” surveys
of neighbors, which were administered when neither respondent nor proxy surveys could be
successfully completed. Log surveys were very limited in content, asking only whether the
respondent was currently living overseas and what they were doing abroad. Inclusion of
the log survey responses on whether the respondent was working abroad raises our endline
response rate to 98.5 percent.
We report the impact of our treatments on whether respondents were currently working
abroad, including log survey responses, in column 1 of Table 3.A.6. The results confirm our
previously reported findings that use only the respondent and proxy surveys: there is no
evidence of positive statistically significant impacts of any treatment on migration overseas.
Indeed, we find that some information treatments may have actually reduced international
migration. Those assigned to treatments [T2] + [T3] are 1.2 percentage points less likely to
have migrated overseas, which is significantly different from zero at the five-percent level.
Some of these differences could have resulted from the differential attrition observed in Table
3.A.2, column 2, though it is possible that the information we provided respondents with
new information on the difficulties involved in overseas labor migration, discouraging some
respondents from seeking to migrate. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all
of the treatment effects are jointly zero.
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3.A.8 2013 Supplementary survey of job offer recipients
At the time of the endline survey, 13.8 percent of those who had received overseas job of-
fers but had not yet migrated reported that their migration was still pending (row 2, Table
3.A.5). One possibility we sought to examine was whether our endline survey took place
too soon to capture migration effects. We conducted the endline survey from May through
August 2012, which was between nine months and one year after we offered respondents
passport assistance. Because the passport process was quite time-consuming, some respon-
dents received their passports as late as three months before the endline survey, and they
may not have yet had time to finish the migration process they initiated when we followed
up with them.
To address this concern, in March and April 2013 we re-surveyed respondents who reported
that anyone in their household was offered a job overseas between 2010 and 2012, including
those who had offers they had not yet accepted. We asked them about the status of the
offers they listed in the endline survey, as well as any offers that were received but not listed
in the endline survey, either because they were not reported or because the offer was received
after the endline survey took place.
From our set of baseline respondents, we attempted to contact 196 households, and we
successfully completed 194 surveys (99 percent). We completed 54 percent with respondents
and 46 percent with a proxy household member. (Proxy survey rates are especially high
for the 2013 offer survey because if the respondent was not available at the initial visit but
another household member was willing to participate, we interviewed that member rather
than schedule another visit.)
Using this 2013 survey of baseline respondents reporting job offers in the 2012 endline,
we generate a modified indicator of overseas migration, measured nearly two years after
initial passport treatment assignment. This variable modifies the previous “Migrate abroad”
variable (in column 8 of Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.A.7 through 3.A.10) by additionally counting
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a respondent as having migrated if a job offer they reported in the 2012 endline survey is
reported as having led to migration overseas in the 2013 survey. We did not modify the
“Migrate abroad” variable if in the 2013 survey we learned that a respondent migrated but it
was the result of a job offer not reported in the 2012 endline. This is because our objective
here was simply to check whether our results would change if we allowed migration pending
as of the 2012 endline to actually lead to migration. (To have done otherwise would have
led to a false inflation of the treatment effect of “Full Assistance,” because we only surveyed
those with job offers in the 2013 survey, and because the “Full Assistance” treatment led to
a higher rate of job offers.)
Column 2 of Table 3.A.6 reports the impacts of our treatments on this modified “Migrate
abroad” variable. Our previous results are confirmed: there are no positive statistically
significant impacts on migration, and impacts are similar in magnitude to the migration
outcomes reported in column 8 of Table 3.2.
3.A.9 Additional specifications
In Tables 3.A.7 and 3.A.8, we present the full set of results from the specifications used in
Tables 2 and 3, respectively.
Tables 3.A.9 and 3.A.10 demonstrate that our previous results are robust to including indi-
viduals ages 41-45 in our sample. These individuals, as described earlier, were part of our
baseline survey. However, we learned there are few overseas opportunities for new migrants
over 40. We restricted our passport sample to individuals aged 20-40 years old, and we
define our baseline sample similarly, which better reflects the target population of unilateral
migration facilitation efforts.
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Table 3.A.2: Sample attrition
Missing Missing
respondent or respondent,proxy
proxy survey or log survey
(1) (2)
Application Information [T1] -0.009 0.006
[0.016] [0.007]
Financial Information [T2] -0.006 0.001
[0.016] [0.007]
Passport Information [T3] 0.018 0.004
[0.034] [0.016]
[T1] + [T2] -0.002 -0.003
[0.016] [0.007]
[T1] + [T3] -0.016 -0.009
[0.030] [0.012]
[T2] + [T3] -0.051** -0.017**
[0.024] [0.008]
[T1] + [T2] +[T3] “All Information” 0.039 0.002
[0.035] [0.015]
[T1] + [T2] + Web. Assistance [T4] -0.002 0.006
[0.023] [0.012]
[T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4] “All Information + Website” 0.010 -0.006
[0.023] [0.010]
[T3] + [T5] “Only Passport Assistance” -0.002 -0.008
[0.031] [0.013]
[T1] + [T3] + [T5] -0.004 -0.010
[0.032] [0.013]
[T2] + [T3] + [T5] 0.002 -0.004
[0.031] [0.013]
[T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T5] “All Information + Passport” -0.009 0.000
[0.031] [0.015]
[T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4] + [T5] “Full Assistance” -0.004 0.009
[0.023] [0.012]
Sample Size 4,153 4,153
Control DV Mean 9.2% 1.4%
P-value, coefficients jointly zero 0.667 0.031**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample includes all baseline respondents. Stratification-cell fixed effects and baseline covariates described





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.A.4: Impact of unilateral facilitation on passport acquisition
Resp. has valid passport
(1)
Application Information [T1] -0.008
[0.011]
Financial Information [T2] -0.002
[0.012]
Passport Information [T3] -0.009
[0.023]
[T1] + [T2] 0.008
[0.013]
[T1] + [T3] 0.029
[0.024]
[T2] + [T3] 0.050*
[0.029]
[T1] + [T2] +[T3] “All Information” 0.019
[0.025]
[T1] + [T2] + Web. Assistance [T4] 0.009
[0.019]
[T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4] “All Information + Website” 0.051**
[0.020]
[T3] + [T5] “Only Passport Assistance” 0.126***
[0.037]
[T1] + [T3] + [T5] 0.073**
[0.033]
[T2] + [T3] + [T5] 0.127***
[0.037]
[T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T5] “All Information + Passport” 0.127***
[0.037]
[T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4] + [T5] “Full Assistance” 0.122***
[0.024]
Sample Size 3,763
Control DV Mean 0.0446
P-value, coefficients jointly zero 0.000***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Sample includes baseline respondents with completed endline survey. Stratification-cell
fixed effects and baseline covariates described in Table 3.2 are included. Huber-White standard
errors reported in brackets. Passport status is reported for full and proxy surveys with non-missing
responses.
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Table 3.A.5: Reported reasons for not migrating, conditional on receiving an overseas job
offer
Reason for not migrating N Share
(1) (2)
Could not afford expenses 14 24.1%
Migration still pending 8 13.8%
Health problems/did not pass medical exam 6 10.3%
Family obligations 6 10.3%
Not interested in type of work 5 8.6%
Problem with respondent qualifications 5 8.6%
Salary too low 4 6.9%
Training not completed 3 5.2%
Problem with documentation/passport 3 5.2%
Other/missing 2 3.4%
Not interested in working abroad 1 1.7%
Offer changed/no longer available 1 1.7%
Total 58
Notes: Counts based on includes all reported job offers respondents received
from 2010-2012 that did not lead to migration as of the endline survey.
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Table 3.A.6: Impact of unilateral facilitation on alternate migration measures
All surveys Respondent + proxy




Application Information [T1] -0.006 -0.003
[0.005] [0.005]
Financial Information [T2] -0.003 -0.002
[0.006] [0.006]
Passport Information [T3] -0.001 0.005
[0.012] [0.012]
[T1] + [T2] -0.003 -0.004
[0.005] [0.005]
[T1] + [T3] -0.010* -0.006
[0.006] [0.005]
[T2] + [T3] -0.012** -0.008*
[0.006] [0.005]
[T1] + [T2] +[T3] “All Information” -0.001 0.004
[0.011] [0.011]
[T1] + [T2] + Web. Assistance [T4] -0.008 -0.004
[0.007] [0.006]
[T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4] “All Information + Website’ -0.003 0.002
[0.008] [0.007]
[T3] + [T5] “Only Passport Assistance’ -0.001 0.002
[0.012] [0.012]
[T1] + [T3] + [T5] -0.010* -0.006
[0.006] [0.005]
[T2] + [T3] + [T5] -0.003 0.003
[0.012] [0.012]
[T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T5] “All Information + Passport’ 0.017 0.004
[0.018] [0.012]
[T1] + [T2] + [T3] + [T4] + [T5] “Full Assistance’ -0.001 -0.001
[0.008] [0.007]
Sample Size 4,089 3,802
Control group dependent variable mean 0.011 0.0102
P-value, coefficients jointly zero 0.500 0.781
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Column 1 sample includes baseline respondents with respondent, proxy, and log endline surveys and non-
missing outcome variables. Column 2 migration outcome is based on 2010-2012 offers confirmed in 2013 follow-up
survey, which was conducted among all households with at least one job offer overseas at 2012 endline. Stratification-
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